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ABSTRACT 
 
This research examines the factors responsible for the management conflict 
between venture capital investors (VCIs) and information and communications 
technology venture businesses (ICTVBs) in the emerging venture capital and ICT 
industries in Malaysia. In the management process of venture business, VCIs emphasize 
financial and managerial considerations while ICTVBs emphasize technical 
considerations. This is the area of management where conflict is most likely to arise 
between the two key stakeholders of a venture business (VCIs and ICTVBs are 
categorized as stakeholders in the economics literature). For a successful venture business, 
this conflict has to be reduced. Before the start-up stage of a venture business, ICTVBs 
hold the majority equity. However, at the start-up stage, VCIs play a crucial role in 
providing additional equity. Once an investment by VCIs is agreed upon and executed, 
that is, the venture business has started its business operation, careful managerial 
considerations are important; otherwise, the above-mentioned management conflict is 
likely to arise and affect the performance of the venture business.  
 
 The increasing complexity of managing venture businesses has made it necessary 
for stakeholders to develop amicable relationships with each other to achieve mutual 
goals. As a consequence, researchers and practitioners alike have focused their attention 
on searching for ways to improve relations between stakeholders. On one side, the 
ICTVBs need financing, management know-how, and marketing contacts, among others. 
VCIs are in a good position to assist by channelling not only financing but also their 
practical hands-on experience in business operations, e.g. general management and 
marketing. On the other, VCIs need information and technological know-how of their 
venture business from the ICTVBs so that they are aware of the opportunities and threats 
of their investment. Therefore, if the two key stakeholders wholeheartedly work together 
to develop their aggregate competence, their venture business will have a better chance 
for successful results. 
 
The general tenet is that differences do exist in the nature and characteristics of 
VCIs and ICTVBs, especially their expertise. Thus, a natural move would be to 
investigate the following. Firstly, what are the specific differences in their expertise? 
Secondly, do these differences have any impact on their recognition of managerial factors 
(ROMFs) in managing their venture business? Thirdly, do their ROMFs have any 
influence on their management conflict? While many past studies have been conducted in 
developed countries to shed light on issues related to reducing management conflict in 
venture capital, there is a paucity of empirical studies to investigate the association of 
ROMFs and management conflict, especially in the ICT industry. In almost all studies, a 
critical role of VCIs is generating information about the ICTVBs’ prospects. While such 
an emphasis is important, it does little to shed light on the complementary role of key 
stakeholders’ ROMFs in affecting those strategies of reducing management conflict. 
Thus, it is important to understand their managerial factors, whereby the nature of 
management conflict between these stakeholders is a consequence of their characteristics. 
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 Here, this explorative study hopes to fill the gap and selects ROMFs as one 
element of an empirical investigation into reducing management conflict. The main 
purpose of this research is to empirically establish the theoretical linkage between 
ROMFs and management conflict across the full venture capital process.  
  
 Past studies have tended to focus on venture businesses in general. Building on 
the knowledge and findings derived from these studies, this research focuses on the 
following aspects: venture businesses in ICT industry; venture capital financing from pre-
investment to post-investment stages, and risk management. The independent variables 
are the ROMFs at the pre-investment stage, namely: deal origination and screening, 
evaluation, deal structuring, and at the post-investment stage: monitoring and post-
investment activities, acquiring liquidity, and risk management. This research focuses on 
sources of due diligence, techniques of evaluation, factors or criteria used, risk 
management and the perception towards market and agency risks, and other related 
aspects at each stage of the venture capital process. The dependent variable is 
management conflict with two sub-variables as indicators (i.e. the extent of management 
conflict experienced and the affected management policies). 
 
 The triangulation approach (i.e. multi-methods of investigation and sources of 
data) was selected for this research, i.e. survey questionnaires, direct interview exercises, 
and secondary sources. The survey questionnaires were tested in a pilot study before they 
were used in the field study for data and information collection. Pre-tested questionnaires 
were mailed to 24 VCIs and 100 ICTVBs operating in the Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC), with 18 and 39 replies received, respectively. Then the collected responses were 
statistically analyzed through two parts. The first part of data analysis is the descriptive 
statistics, i.e. the profiles of VCIs and ICTVBs and case studies. Generally, both the VCIs 
and ICTVBs are just emerging in MSC having the following characteristics: a small 
number of venture capital executives and technical workers. The second part is the 
statistical analysis of the hypotheses of this research. It is suggested that if the differences 
in ROMFs between the VCIs and ICTVBs are large, the management conflict between 
the two will be intensified. For example, the difference in monitoring preferences (i.e. the 
VCIs prefer hands-on approach but the ICTVBs prefer hands-off approach) will intensify 
their management conflict and ultimately affect the business relationship in their venture 
business.  
 
 The Thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the 
research. The statement of the research problem or the area of interest is discussed; 
followed by justification, purpose, study design; and finally the organization of the Thesis. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on venture capital and the managerial factors involved. 
The review is meant to synthesize the various studies on the subject and also to identify 
the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the venture capital dynamics. It also 
focuses on this research’s model of development. The hypotheses to be tested are also 
derived from the literature reviewed. ? Chapter 3 outlines the data theory and 
methodology used for this research. The chapter specifies the conceptual framework of 
analysis and operational definitions. This chapter also provides the sampling design and 
the criteria used in selecting the respondents of this research.? Chapter 4 presents the 
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data analysis and reports the results. It covers the descriptive statistics and statistical 
analysis used to describe and test the hypotheses of this research. The results from the 
data analysis are then summarized and discussed accordingly. Finally, Chapter 5 
concludes this research. This chapter discusses the findings and conclusions that could be 
derived from the data analysis. It also covers discussions on the theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings of this research. It also indicates the limitations and 
suggestions for potential future research on this subject. 
 
 The findings indicate that VCIs (i.e. the investors as principal) and ICTVBs (i.e. 
the entrepreneur-owners as agent) have differences in their expertise and ROMFs, but 
that improvement in information exchange of strategic matters, among others, will help 
reduce the management conflict between them in their business relationship. The 
differences in their ROMFs at the pre-investment stage became more important at the 
post-investment stage and in risk management. However, some aspects of ROMFs are 
helpful to reduce management conflict between them. Among the important ROMFs 
indicated by the findings are the improvements in screening, due diligence process, etc. 
Typically, improvements in information exchange of technological, financial, and 
entrepreneurialship matters are essential for reducing their management conflict. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the focus of this research: the business relationship 
between the venture capital investors (VCIs) and the information and communications 
technology venture businesses (ICTVBs) across the full venture capital process. The 
structure of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, the background and statement of the 
research problem are introduced. Then the justification, previous studies and purpose, 
model of study and research design of this research will follow it. Finally, the 
organization of the Thesis will be explained and followed by a summary. Appendix ‘A’ 
reviews the venture capital industry in Malaysia and Appendix ‘B’ reviews the 
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC). Basically, this explorative study examines the 
differences in the recognition of managerial factors (ROMFs) of both VCIs and ICTVBs 
and the relationships between their ROMFs and management conflict experienced by 
them in managing their venture business.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 This research examines the factors responsible for management conflict between 
VCIs and ICTVBs in the emerging venture capital and ICT industries in Malaysia. In the 
management of venture business, VCIs emphasize financial and managerial 
considerations, while ICTVBs emphasize technical considerations. This is the area of 
management where conflict is most likely to arise between the two key stakeholders of 
the venture business. For a successful venture business, this conflict has to be reduced. 
Before the start-up stage of a venture business, ICTVBs hold the majority equity. 
However, at the start-up stage, VCIs play a crucial role in providing additional equity. 
Once an investment by VCIs is agreed upon and executed, that is, the venture business 
has started its business operation, careful managerial considerations are important; 
otherwise, the above-mentioned management conflict is likely to arise and affect their 
business relationship and ultimately the performance of the venture business.  
 
 The increasing complexity of managing venture businesses has made it necessary 
for stakeholders to develop amicable business relationships with each other to achieve 
mutual goals. As a consequence, researchers and practitioners alike have focused their 
attention on searching for ways to improve relations between stakeholders. On one side, 
the ICTVBs need financing, management know-how, and marketing contacts, among 
others. VCIs are in a good position to assist by channelling not only financing but also 
their practical hands-on experience in business operations, e.g. general management and 
marketing. On the other, VCIs need information and technological know-how of their 
venture business from the ICTVBs so that they are aware of opportunities and threats 
regarding their investment.? Therefore, if the two key stakeholders can wholeheartedly 
work together to develop their aggregate competence, their venture business will have a 
better chance for successful outcomes.  
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 The general tenet is that differences do exist in the nature and characteristics 
between VCIs and ICTVBs, especially their expertise. Thus, a natural move would be to 
investigate firstly, what are the specific differences in their expertise? Secondly, do these 
differences have any impact on their recognition of managerial factors (ROMFs) in 
managing their venture business? Thirdly, do their ROMFs have any influence on their 
management conflict? While many past studies have been conducted in developed 
countries to shed light on issues related to reducing management conflict in venture 
capital, there is a paucity of empirical studies to investigate the association of ROMFs 
and management conflict, especially in the ICT industry. Here, this explorative study 
hopes to fill the gap by looking at ROMFs as one element of an empirical investigation 
into reducing management conflict. Thus, the main purpose of this research is to 
empirically establish the theoretical linkage between ROMFs and management conflict 
across the full venture capital process in the business relationship between VCIs and 
ICTVBs.  
 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 The VCIs are known as one of the main risk-financiers that provide financing to 
the ICTVBs. They act as a financial intermediary between funds providers seeking high 
returns and entrepreneurs in need of capital financing. The main investment return for 
VCIs is capital gain from the venture businesses they invest in. One peculiar 
characteristic of venture capital is the participation of VCIs in the management process of 
their venture businesses (e.g. direct management, technical & marketing assistance and 
business networking). Therefore, it can be inferred that VCIs receive money from funds 
providers (e.g. institutional investors, high net-worth individuals, etc.) and then invest in 
venture businesses with high growth yet high risk potential (Wright and Robbie, 1997; 
Lerner, 2000; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2001).  
 
 Currently, the importance of ICTVBs to the creation of innovation, employment 
and entrepreneurship is receiving greater attention by academicians and policy makers 
(Tether, 1997; Tether and Massini, 1998; Alexander, 2000; Amar, 2000). However, their 
financial resource shortage remains a major issue that need to be addressed by most 
economies.1   And for these ICTVBs, their main assets are intangible assets (e.g. in the 
form of ideas, know-how, trade secrets and property rights), which are seldom acceptable 
to use as collateral for financing purpose. 
 
 Therefore, venture capital does not come easily to these ICTVBs because it 
involves meticulous, strategic, managerial factors before and after the decision to invest 
is made. These managerial factors are important to be considered carefully by the VCIs 
and ICTVBs for deal origination, screening, evaluating, deal structuring, monitoring or 
post-investment activities, acquiring liquidity and risk management (Tyebjee and Bruno, 
                                                          
1
 Van Osnabrugge (2000, p. 92) states that “these early stage firms are most reliant upon outside financing 
to foster their growth, once the entrepreneurs’ savings and investments by family and friends have dried 
up”. However, due to their inherent characteristics (e.g. high risk and uncertain nature and etc.) and the 
imperfect capital market situations, they often have difficulty in securing external financial support from 
the formal financial institutions. 
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1984; MacMillan, Zemann and Subbanarasimmha, 1987; Plummer, 1987; Sahlman, 
1990). This implies that due to the high risk of venture businesses, the VCIs and ICTVBs 
normally use a strategic approach in the management of the venture businesses across the 
full financing process. In other words, various managerial factors (e.g. practices and 
procedures) that are recognized by the VCIs and ICTVBs are deemed to be strategic and 
will affect the performance of their venture businesses.  For example, if the VCIs 
recognized a hands-on approach but the ICTVBs recognized a hands-off approach for 
monitoring, then this difference to some extent will affect their other managerial 
considerations and ultimately the performance of their venture businesses.  
 
Generally, for the VCIs, they are acting as agent to their principals, i.e. the funds 
providers. If their investments give good returns then they might improve their reputation 
and be capable of getting more funds for their future business. For the ICTVBs, as the 
borrower, they are acting as the agent to their principals, i.e. the VCIs, who require some 
return from their investments in them. This research will be using the framework of an 
applied Principal-Agent analysis, whereby the VCIs are considered as the ‘principal’ and 
the ICTVBs are considered as the ‘agent’. This classification is appropriate because in 
venture capital, the VCIs as the financiers (i.e. provider of one of the most critical scarce 
resources to ICTVBs – capital) have the upper hand compared to ICTVBs as the 
borrower in their financial contract. Besides this, the classification is also commonly used 
in the venture capital literature.2    In addition, in this framework, both views from the 
VCIs and ICTVBs are investigated in order to add robustness to this research.3 
 
 As mentioned above, an applied principal-agent analysis has been adopted in this 
research to provide a framework for the analysis of the relationship between the VCIs and 
ICTVBs. A detailed explanation on this matter is felt warranted. Here, the VCIs are 
treated as the principal, and the originator-entrepreneur of a venture business (ICTVB) is 
treated as the agent.4   The relationship usually extends beyond the simple provision of 
capital. The relationship also can be complex because an ICTVB is the majority 
shareholder of the venture business, thus, maintaining it as the principal, legally and in 
                                                          
2
 Many studies have investigated the role of VCIs as a principal and ICTVBs as the agent (e.g. Sahlman, 
1990; Reid, 1998). However, for our further understanding of the principal-agent relationship, we may also 
consider the other way too, that is, the VCIs as the agent and the ICTVBs as the principal. This 
consideration is rooted in the fact that ICTVBs are normally the majority stakeholder in their venture 
business, and it is they who actually bring in external stakeholders into their business (e.g. VCIs and others). 
In the context of being the principal, ICTVBs also should be aware that their agent (i.e. VCIs) may give 
wrong advice or may ‘shirk’ for their own reasons, which may jeopardize the interest of the venture 
business they contracted into. Following this consideration, it is also fair to assume that both the principal 
and agent are risk-neutral and risk-averse at a certain point of the venture capital process or by looking at 
different perspectives at any given time.?  
3
 This is in line with Reid’s argument (1998, p. 7) that “while differences in the principal and agent 
relationship and in the extent of contact between them are apparent, the reasons for these variations have 
not been deeply explored and are still very poorly understood”. 
4
 Previous studies using this framework that treat VCIs as a risk neutral principal and ICTVBs as a risk 
averse agent are, e.g. Chan et al., 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1994; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; and Reid, 
1998. This analysis provides an appropriate framework to analyze the relationship between VCIs and 
ICTVBs. The key characteristic of this analysis is that the agent has an incentive to shirk on effort and to 
avoid risk. This analysis is also guided by the principles of uncertainty and information asymmetry which 
are really important in the risky investment opportunities of the venture business in ICT industry. 
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the business context. However, this status changes in the financial contract between them 
because the general factor governing its form is that the VCIs offer the ICTVB an 
opportunity to acquire its much needed additional capital now and for future expansion of 
the venture business. For this research, the following assumptions are used for the 
classification of VCIs as principal and ICTVBs as agent in their business relationship: 
 
a) The VCIs tend to hold less than 50% equity shareholding in the venture business. 
This is largely due to the fact that currently in the corporate cultures of Malaysia 
ICTVBs usually hold the majority shareholding of the venture businesses, and for 
extreme cases, they insist on the one golden share to be retained by them. 
 
b) Both VCIs and ICTVBs conclude a financial contract, which governs their 
relationship in managing the venture business they invested into. 
 
c) The venture business is not currently listed on the stock market and the 
investment of the VCIs in the venture business has a strictly finite life of just a 
few years. 
 
 Based on the above assumptions, this research emphasizes the subscribing of a 
financial contract between the VCIs and ICTVBs.5  Thus, the VCIs would be seen as the 
principal, who control contractual details and assign tasks, and the ICTVBs seen as the 
agent, who accept this authority and perform certain tasks on behalf of the VCIs. The 
dominant motives for them to seek such a relationship are for the VCIs to provide better 
return on investment and for the ICTVBs to spread the down-side risk of the venture 
business which they contracted into. The VCIs may be assumed, plausibly, to be risk 
neutral because their portfolios are large and diversified in terms of investments in 
venture businesses. The ICTVBs may be assumed, plausibly, to be risk averse because all 
of the owner-managers’ wealth, including goodwill, is tied up in the venture businesses. 
 
 Nevertheless, in the absence of perfect foresight, the VCIs as principal face the 
prospect of incomplete compliance by the ICTVBs as agent. In other words, the VCIs can 
only judge the effectiveness with which the ICTVBs complete their assigned tasks in an 
indirect way, e.g. in terms of rate of return, meeting set targets, etc. Typically, the agent 
is not fully supervised and has a measure of independence which may tempt them to 
exploit to avoid risk and to shirk on effort. Thus, the VCIs may worry about the ICTVBs, 
e.g. limiting their effort, undertaking other riskier strategy or project than initially agreed, 
engaging in excessive business expenses and presenting a flattering but artificial business 
scenario, etc. In addition, where informational asymmetries are significant between them, 
the ICTVBs are tempted to defect from financial contracts because it is quite easy to 
manipulate strategic information to the VCIs about their venture businesses (e.g. 
overstating performance, understating problems, etc.) to their short-term ends. 
  
                                                          
5
 Although a financial contract reduces the potential management conflict in the venture business, 
unfortunately this contract cannot eliminate conflict, and it can be costly to write and enforce the contract. 
In other words, the problems associated with asymmetries of information between the VCIs and ICTVBs 
cannot be fully contracted away. 
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 The interests of the VCIs as principal and ICTVBs as agent can be assumed to be 
in alignment during the pre-investment stage (i.e. desire to close the deal); however, this 
is not necessarily the case at the post-investment stage and risk management. Therefore, 
in this relationship, conceived of as a principal, the VCIs’ roles are as follows: 
 
a) In the pre-investment stage, this relationship places the VCIs in a position where 
the problem of adverse selection has to be addressed. For example, selecting the 
right ICTVBs is important because the commitments and intentions of the 
ICTVBs are uncertain and difficult to gauge upfront, even after intensive 
screening, due diligence and evaluation. 
 
b) In the post-investment stage and risk management, this relationship places the 
VCIs in a position where the problem of moral hazard has to be addressed. For 
example, the selected ICTVBs, each acting in self-interest and having 
relinquished a portion of its ownership in the venture business, are motivated to 
limit effort. Thus, the VCIs, through the financial contract or by other means, 
attempt to overcome this, e.g. by imposing penalties for failure in meeting 
performance targets, establishing performance boundaries (e.g. gearing ratio 
standard) and decision-autonomy limits (e.g. asset disposal) for the ICTVBs. The 
VCIs also may attempt to influence the ICTVBs by monitoring the effectiveness 
of the venture business contracted into, through an effective flow of strategic 
information. It is commonly accepted that the ICTVBs possesses a greater 
familiarity with their businesses’ operations than the VCIs and also have control 
over the generation of strategic information. For example, given the pursuit of 
self-interest, the ICTVBs may misrepresent performance or provide information 
selectively in order to make their venture businesses appear more favourable. 
Hence, in response, the VCIs may establish disclosure rules to govern the 
information flow between them. In brief, the VCIs frequently play an active role 
with the venture business in the post-investment stage and risk management, 
representing the interests of their fund providers (e.g. small individual investors, 
government agencies, financial institutions, etc.) and to ensure their invested 
funds are not at risk but can generate reasonably high capital gains.     
 
As for the ICTVBs, conceived of as agent in this relationship, their roles are as follows: 
 
a) In the pre-investment stage, this relationship places the ICTVBs similarly as the 
VCIs, in a position where the problem of adverse selection has to be addressed. 
This situation stems from the fact that the ICTVBs are still considered as the 
principal of the venture business at this juncture. Therefore, selecting the right 
VCIs is also important to the ICTVBs because besides the additional capital that 
is badly needed, the selected VCIs also could give other value-added services and 
also become a worthy business partner. However, commitments and expectations 
of the VCIs are also uncertain and difficult to gauge upfront by the ICTVBs. 
 
b) In the post-investment stage, this relationship places the ICTVBs in a position as 
an agent to the VCIs in their financial contract. Two main reasons why the 
ICTVBs would enter into a financial contract with the VCIs are to gain additional 
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capital and to spread risk, i.e. by involving the VCIs in the operation of their 
venture businesses. Therefore, the ICTVBs’ roles here are to put forward their 
efforts to perform certain tasks according to the mutually agreed yardsticks in the 
contract, e.g. levels of performance to be achieved, timely disclosure of 
information, and above all, to give good return on investment as expected by the 
VCIs.  
 
 In conclusion, the status of the ICTVBs as principal and VCIs as agent initially, 
has changed according to the circumstances. When they enter into a financial contract, 
this turns the VCIs into principal and ICTVBs as agent in the venture capital financing.  
 
 In essence, theory on financial contracting states that management conflict will 
arise and practice confirms its existence.6  When both parties, i.e. the VCIs and ICTVBs, 
having different natures and characteristics, get engaged in the financial contracting, that 
so-called management conflict is most likely to arise. This conflict has to be reduced in 
order for them to have a successful venture business. This implies that an amicable 
business relationship is very important for the success of the venture businesses that both 
parties have contracted into. In this business relationship, there is a separation of 
ownership and control between the VCIs and ICTVBs and thus is likely to face 
management conflict. The seriousness of management conflict can be seen from the 
following perspectives. 
 
 From the organizational perspective, for example, due to the asymmetries of 
information between the VCIs and ICTVBs, management conflict arises for two reasons. 
Firstly, there is conflict when their desires and goals are in conflict; it is difficult to verify 
what they are expected to do best for their venture business. For instance, if the VCIs and 
ICTVBs have different cash-flow and profitability objectives for their venture business 
that they have contracted into, they are likely in conflict because each of them may regard 
differently various managerial factors and other considerations as they work towards 
those objectives. Secondly, there is the problem of risk sharing where both VCIs and 
ICTVBs may prefer different managerial factors because of the difference in risk 
preferences. For example, on one side, the VCIs may have higher considerations for 
agency risks i.e. pertaining to the problems between them and ICTVBs as compared to 
market risks. On the other, the ICTVBs may have higher considerations for market risks 
rather than agency risks. In general, other management conflicts which are peculiar to 
this kind of business relationship between the VCIs and ICTVBs are for example, sorting 
problems, agency costs and operating-costs.7  However, the details of actual management 
                                                          
6
 See, for example, Reid (1998), Sahlman (1990), and Sappington (1991). In the context of Agency Theory, 
Reid (1998, p. xix) states that “Given that agency problems arise, the issue of how they are resolved, 
particularly as regards the handling of risk, is subtle”. Agency conflict basically relates to the central 
dilemma of how to get the agents to act in the best interests of the principals in their agency relationship. 
This dilemma is critical when the agents have an informational advantage (e.g. technical know-how, trade 
secret, etc.) over the principals and have different interests as well (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Sappington, 1991). 
7
 In the context of agency relationship, adverse selection occurs when the agents misrepresented their 
abilities when hired by the principals. On the other hand, moral hazard occurs when the agents give effort 
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conflicts experienced by the VCIs and ICTVBs are presented in the case studies in 
Chapter 4. 
 
 From the financial perspective, there are two main sources for management 
conflict between the VCIs and ICTVBs as follows. Firstly, the parties involved make 
managerial decisions that benefit them directly but do not benefit their venture business’ 
economic value. Secondly, the parties involved are more or less effort and risk averse in 
their managerial decision-making of the venture business. For instance, one of the main 
areas of disagreement is management costs such as the costs of screening, evaluating, 
monitoring, gaining and exchanging of information, and bonding between the VCIs and 
ICTVBs. For example, in the exchange of information between the VCIs and ICTVBs, 
most likely the VCIs may require more information on the technological aspects of the 
venture business from the ICTVBs. However, the ICTVBs may refuse to give that 
information due to trade secret, etc. Thus, the VCIs incur cost through proper legal 
documentation, etc., in order to ensure the ICTVBs give the information required. As for 
the ICTVBs, the preparation of legal documentation and other periodical reports involve 
costs to them. Thus, this implies that without incurring costs, both the VCIs and ICTVBs 
are likely to face serious difficulty ensuring each of them will act according to the best 
interests of their venture business.  
 
 Both the VCIs and ICTVBs need to reduce management conflict in order to 
pursue efficient contracts that lead to a successful business relationship.8   Since it is 
contended that managerial factors and efficient contracts are pertinent for a successful 
business relationship in venture capital, it is felt justified to investigate the business 
relationship between VCIs and ICTVBs across the full venture capital process. Hence, 
the research problem can be broadly expressed as follows. Firstly, are the ROMFs of 
both the VCIs and ICTVBs significantly different? Could this difference contribute 
to any management conflict experienced in their relationship? In other words, do 
each party’s specific preference, value, usage and application of certain ROMFs 
contribute to management conflict in their relationship?  Secondly, do their ROMFs 
have any relationship to the management conflict they experience across the full 
venture capital process?  
 
1.4 PREVIOUS STUDIES AND THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Past studies on venture capital have focused on aspects of institutional framework 
(Sahlman, 1990; Murray, 1995; Hurry, Miller and Bowman, 1992), investment process 
(Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan, Zemann and Subbanarasimha, 1987; Plummer, 
1987; Amit, Glosten and Muller, 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994), monitoring and 
controlling (Sweeting, 1991; Lerner, 1995; Gompers, 1995; Reid, 1998), acquiring 
liquidity and investment realisation (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Murray, 1994; Wright 
                                                                                                                                                                             
lesser than originally agreed upon in the contract with the principals. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983, Grosman and Hart, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Sahlman, 1990).  
8According to Fama (1980, pp. 288 – 307), the Principal-Agent analysis  seeks to determine the optimal or 
most efficient contract under varying levels of outcome, uncertainty, risk aversion, information and other 
variables.  
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et al., 1993), alternative sources of venture capital (Sykes, 1990; Ehrlich et al., 1994; Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000), and management of risks and management conflict 
(Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Reid, 1998; Higashide and Birley, 2000). 
Wright and Robbie (1997, p. xxx) remarked in their introduction pages that venture 
capital has emerged as an important area of finance study for academic researchers.9  
 
 Many of the studies reviewed have focussed on developed countries with the 
setting of a developed venture capital industry. Their main subject is on the overall VCIs 
(whether institutions or independent private companies) with investment focus in the 
general small and medium venture businesses. However, studies in developing countries 
are very few. Furthermore, study that focuses on VCIs’ investment focus specifically in 
ICT industry is almost nonexistent, at least in the Malaysian context.10 ?  Appendix ‘A’ 
reviews the current state of venture capital industry in Malaysia against several selected 
countries as the background information to this research.  
 
 In addition, most studies have concentrated on the perspective of the VCIs in 
addressing the management conflict, not the perspective of the ICTVBs (except for a few, 
e.g. Reid, 1998; Sahlman, 1990). These studies also focus the mitigation of management 
conflict at the post-investment stage of the venture capital process, almost ignoring the 
pre-investment stage and overall risk management.11   Therefore, it is felt that research 
which focuses on both perspectives (i.e. VCIs as financiers and ICTVBs as borrowers) 
and investigates the differences in their ROMFs and the relationships between their 
ROMFs and management conflict across the full venture capital process is considered 
timely.  
  
 Since many facets of the venture capital still remain unknown, especially in 
developing countries, it is hoped that this research will fill the gap and add vigour to our 
understanding of the business relationship between VCIs and ICTVBs and the association 
between their ROMFs and management conflict in pursuing an efficient contract and 
amicable business relationship between them. 
 
In the effort of leapfrogging from industrial age into information age, Malaysia 
has established the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in 1996 and conceived it as the 
new engine of economic growth (as discussed in Appendix ‘B’).  However, there are still 
                                                          
9
 For example, they argue that “rather than focusing on the narrow view that venture capital investment is 
about investment in new (innovative) start-ups, it is important to investigate the range of investment 
activities actually undertaken by venture capitalists. Not only does this approach key in more closely with 
what venture capital firms do, but it also permits greater application of the important finance and 
accounting concepts and issues”. 
10
 Lerner (1999, p. 286) asserts that (except for Singapore, Taiwan and Israel) “regardless of the term we 
use, the reality is that the venture capital industry remains underdeveloped in the developing world, and 
analyzing the classical model of venture capital in this context would be fruitless”. This view is supported 
by Mani and Bartzokas (2002) in their study on venture capital industries in developing countries. They 
found that these economies are new to venture capital and on a world scale, their venture industries are very 
“insignificant” (e.g. Thailand, Vietnam, New Zealand, Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, etc.). 
11
 In relation to this argument, Mitchell, Reid and Terry (1995, p. 188) contend that despite flourishing 
theoretical studies, “the empirical character of the venture capital investor (VCI)/investee relationship is 
still very poorly understood”. 
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many institutional challenges that need to be addressed in order to assure the overall 
success of the MSC. For example in the aspect of nurturing ICTVBs in the MSC, the key 
success factor needed among others is venture capital.12   Thus, an in-depth study on 
venture capital to better understand the business relationship between the VCIs and 
ICTVBs is timely and pertinent for the success of nurturing ICT entrepreneurship in the 
MSC in particular and in Malaysia in general.13?  
 
As for Malaysia’s capital market, venture capital is relatively new but critical in 
financing the ICTVBs and promoting ICT entrepreneurship. This implies that a good 
developed capital market is important for the overall development of an economy, 
especially for developing countries like Malaysia. Therefore, this research is felt 
justifiable and will enrich the awareness of the role of venture capital in Malaysia.14   In 
brief, besides enriching the general knowledge on this subject, hopefully this research 
will also contribute to closing the information gap in the emerging venture capital and 
ICT industries in Malaysia. 
 
 The destructive consequences of management conflict are well known in the 
literature. According to the behavioral sciences, which emphasize the personal and 
organizational costs of conflict, conflict is to be reduced or mitigated.15   For example, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) described that management conflict between managers and 
investors can affect the willingness of investors to provide financing. The situation 
becomes worse due to the informational asymmetry problem.16   VCIs and ICTVBs are 
likely to face this problem. In their business relationships, management conflict may arise 
between them (e.g. goal incongruity, measurement uncertainty, information disparity, risk 
aversion, etc.) that may affect the performance of their venture businesses.  
 
                                                          
12
 According to the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia received a soft loan recently from Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC) amounted to RM1.6 billion to finance an ICT fund. In relation to this 
aspect, Abdullai (2001, pp. 183 – 188) argues that amongst the major challenges faced by Malaysia’s effort 
to move towards a knowledge-based economy is the government’s challenge to garner enough funds and 
make such funds available to local ICTVBs to enable them to produce competitive goods and services. 
13
 For these VCIs, they are not only managing their own funds but also funds received from government or 
government agencies.  
14
 In relation to this, Kitamura (2001, pp. 32 - 33) in discussing the organizational approach to the financial 
systems in Central Asia succinctly states that the financial infrastructure in these countries is fragile, that 
the information systems are incomplete and biased, and that the financial sector contributed partially to the 
general economic activities – thus making financial intermediation between the fund surplus and deficit 
units very difficult. Kitamura further argues that “Naturally a good financial infrastructure is needed for a 
good financial information system, which, in turn, is needed for a good financial market where good-
quality financial products and services are provided, renovated and promoted”. 
15
 Besides the definitional approach, conflict has also been conceptualized in terms of its characteristics. 
For instance, Molnar and Rogers (1979) studied two major organizational conflicts, namely, structural and 
operating conflicts. Structural conflict involves rules that govern a relationship, whereas operating conflict 
involves the interpretation and application of such rules.  
16
 The informational asymmetry problem refers to a situation where there are differences in the types of 
information held by each economic agent. The information can be obtained but is unevenly distributed, and 
the differences in the information held by each of them are unobservable. In the financial system, this 
situation creates problems on two fronts: before the transaction is entered into (i.e. adverse selection 
problem) and after (i.e. moral hazard problem) (Akerlof, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Greenwald, 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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As it was mentioned earlier, studies on financial contracting found that 
management conflict is a serious issue. Therefore, the main purpose of this research is to 
shed some light on this subject by empirically investigating the theoretical linkage 
between the ROMFs of both the VCIs and ICTVBs and management conflict experienced 
by them in managing their venture business. Hopefully, this research can contribute well 
to the literature on management conflict in the emerging venture capital and ICT 
industries in Malaysia.  
 
In venture capital, mechanisms employed to reduce management conflict have 
been explored in depth in a series of theoretical studies. From the perspective of 
Principal-Agent analysis in venture capital, this conflict usually refers to the agency 
conflict, i.e. between the VCIs or financiers as the principal and the ICTVBs or 
borrowers as the agent. These studies include active monitoring (Timmons and Bygrave, 
1986; Busenitz, Moesel and Fiet, 1997; Hellmann, 1998), exchanging of accounting and 
strategic information (Reid, 1998; Wright and Robbie, 1996), screening mechanisms 
employed (MacMillan, Zenmannn and Subbanaramsimha, 1987), incentives to exit 
(Berglof, 1994; Black and Gilson, 1998), proper syndicating of financing (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1994), and staging of actual financing (Sahlman 1990).  
 
Almost in all cases, a critical role of VCIs is generating information about the 
ICTVBs’ prospects. While such an emphasis is important, it does little to shed light on 
the complementary role of key stakeholders’ (i.e. the VCIs and ICTVBs) ROMFs in 
affecting those strategies of reducing the management conflict. Thus, it is important to 
understand the managerial factors, whereby the nature of management conflict between 
these stakeholders is a consequence of their characteristics. For instance, the degree of 
differences of expertise (in terms of information, knowledge, and skills) and the ROMFs 
of both VCIs and ICTVBs are the basic proxies, among others, for the occurrence of 
management conflict in their business relationship. 
  
From the theoretical perspective, this research is an attempt to identify whether 
another variable, which is called “recognition of managerial factors (ROMFs)” of the key 
stakeholders in venture business, has a role in explaining the management conflict in the 
actual venture business relationship. Therefore, firstly, this research is an attempt to 
provide evidence based on venture capital in a developing country about the differences 
of ROMFs of these key stakeholders and the relationships between their ROMFs and 
management conflict across the full venture capital process as actually experienced by 
them. By testing several hypotheses, this research will provide explanation of the nature 
of the differences and relationships between the investigated variables.17 Secondly, this 
research also examines the relevancy of ROMFs and management conflict in the real 
world of business relationships between VCIs and ICTVBs by using the MSC as the case 
study.  
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 Wright and Robbie (1997, p. xxx) contend that there is an emerging issue concerning the appropriate 
conceptual underpinning to the relationships both between funds providers and VCIs and between the latter 
and their investees (i.e. the ICTVBs). They further stress that there is also relatively little analysis of how 
ICTVBs select between competing sources of finance – the formal and informal financial institutions. 
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From the practical perspective, firstly, this research attempts to provide some 
indication and direction regarding the roles of VCIs in the ICTVBs’ growth and ICT 
entrepreneurship in the MSC, Malaysia. Since venture capital is considered one of the 
key success factors in promoting ICT entrepreneurship in a technology park, hopefully 
the additional knowledge from this research will promote the successful implementation 
of the MSC in Malaysia.18  This aspect is significant because in Malaysia, VCIs (i.e. 
especially public-sector initiated) manage a large amount of funds from the public sector 
(as discussed in Appendix ‘B’), and they have the responsibility to effectively contribute 
to closing the financial resource shortage of the ICTVBs. Secondly, this research also 
aims to find answers to the following questions: What are the specific differences in the 
expertise of both the VCIs and ICTVBs? Do these differences have any impact on their 
ROMFs in managing their venture business? Do their ROMFs have any influence on the 
management conflict they experience in managing their venture business? And finally, 
what are the bases for further research in this subject? 
 
1.5  MODEL OF STUDY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The type of investigation for this research is firstly, to examine the differences 
between the ROMFs of both VCIs and ICTVBs. Secondly, is to examine the relationships 
between their ROMFs and management conflict.19   Figure 1.1 illustrates the model of 
study of this research. Basically, this figure illustrates the flow of the operational 
activities of this research. It begins with a review of background information, theory of 
the firm and related concepts as shown at the upper level. In the middle level, the 
activities shown are literature review on venture capital and focal and data theories. 
Finally, the lower level shows the data collection and analysis. The drafting of the Thesis 
is done simultaneously at each level of the study.  
 
This research is based on a synthesis of theoretical findings of previous selected 
studies done on the venture capital industries of developed countries. Based on their 
information and knowledge, this research focuses on the following aspects: venture 
businesses in ICT industry; venture capital from pre-investment to post-investment 
stages; and risk management. The unit of analysis is the business relationship between the 
VCIs and ICTVBs. This research is guided by a research design (which will be explained 
in greater detail in Chapter 3) and is illustrated in Figure 1.2. This figure illustrates 
schematically the salient aspects of the framework employed for this research. These 
aspects are the problem statement, details of study, measurement issues and data analysis. 
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 See, for example, Miller and Cote (1987), Mansell and Wehn (eds.) (1989), Gilder (1989), Higgins and 
Savoie (eds.) (1988), and Masey et al. (1992). 
19
 Sekaran (1992, p.100) defines this type of study as “when the researcher is interested in delineating the 
important variables that are associated with the problem, it is called a correlational study”. The intention of 
this type of study is to examine the influence and some relationship among the variables investigated.  
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The theoretical framework of this research is guided by the Theory of the Firm 
and related concepts as the background theory.20   The schematic interrelationship among 
the variables (that is, the independent variables and dependent variable) that are to be 
investigated in this research are summarized in Figure 1.3 following. In this figure, the 
stages of venture capital process are shown on the left (i.e. pre-investment stage, risk 
management and post-investment stage. Specific sets of independent variables (i.e. the 
ROMFs of both VCIs and ICTVBs) to be investigated are in the middle and the 
dependent variable with its indicators on the right. 
 
                                                          
20
 This research includes studies on the current state of Malaysia’s venture capital industry and the MSC’s 
financing environment as background information, the Theory of the Firm and related concepts as the 
background theory, the Agency Theory as the focal theory, the Principal-Agent analysis as the framework, 
the data theory, the methodology and data analysis. 
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Figure 1.1: Schematic diagram of the model of study 
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Figure 1.2: Schematic diagram of the research design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem Statement 
Are the ROMFs of both 
the VCIs and ICTVBs 
significantly different and 
do these ROMFs have 
any influence on the 
management conflict 
experienced in their 
business relationship 
across the full venture 
capital process? 
DETAILS  
 
OF 
 
STUDY 
Purpose of Study 
• An explorative study on the business relationship between VCIs and ICTVBs across 
the full venture capital process in MSC, Malaysia. 
Types of Investigation 
• Firstly, to examines the differences of ROMFs of VCIs and ICTVBs. Secondly, to 
examine the relationships between their ROMFs and management conflict 
experienced.  
Extent of Researcher Interference 
• Minimal (studying events as they normally occur). 
The Study Setting 
• A non-contrived setting (variables are examine in the natural setting). 
• Field study in MSC. 
Unit of Analysis/Population to be studied 
• Business relationship is the unit of analysis. 
• Sample Groups: VCIs and ICTVBs focus on ICT industry. 
Sampling Design 
• Probability & Non-Probability sampling designs (Stratified sampling – 
disproportionate random & Judgement sampling). 
• Sample Size: VCIs (24) and ICTVBs (100). 
Time Horizon 
• One-shot (cross-sectional). 
• Pilot Studies (Mar/Apr. and Aug/Sept.2002) & Field Study (March-Jun 2003). 
MEASURE-
MENT 
Data Collection Method 
• Triangulation methodology and a Case Study approach. 
• Primary Data Sources (Questionnaires Survey-Personally Administered & Mailed 
Questionnaires & Direct Interview with selected sample). 
• Secondary Data Sources (Government publications; Industry analysis and Experts; 
Academic Journals and Articles). 
Measurement & Measures 
• Operational definitions. 
• Scaling (nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio scales). 
• Coding and Categorizing. 
DATA 
 
ANALYSIS 
Data Analysis 
By using SPSS Version 11.0 and through appropriate statistical analyses the hypotheses 
will be tested:  * Hypothesis 1 * Hypothesis 2 * Hypothesis 3  
* Hypothesis 4 * Hypothesis 5 * Hypothesis 6 
Findings & Conclusions 
• Summary of findings & conclusions  
• Future research direction. 
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Figure 1.3: Schematic diagram of the theoretical framework 
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1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 
This Thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the 
research. The statement of the research problem or the area of interest is discussed; 
followed by justification, purpose, study design; and finally the organization of the Thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on venture capital and the managerial factors 
involved. The review is meant to synthesize the various studies on the subject and also to 
identify the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the venture capital dynamics. It 
also focuses on this research’s model of development. The hypotheses to be tested are 
also derived from the literature reviewed. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used for this research. This chapter provides 
the description of the respondents, the criteria used in selecting them, and arrangement 
for access to these respondents. The chapter also specifies the sampling design, data 
collection methods, the operational definitions, and finally it explains the conceptual 
framework of this research.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the statistical analyses of this research and reports the results. 
It covers the descriptive statistics, case studies and statistical analyses used to describe 
and test the differences and relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables and the extent of the variance that could be accounted for by the independent 
variables on the dependent variable. All of the hypotheses of this research will be tested. 
The results from these statistical analyses are then summarized and discussed accordingly.  
 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this research. This chapter discusses the findings and 
conclusions that could be derived from the descriptive statistics and statistical analysis. It 
also covers discussions on the theoretical and practical implications of the findings of this 
research. In addition, the limitations will be indicated. Suggestions and directions for 
potential future research on the subject will also be highlighted. 
 
Figure 1.4 illustrates the schematic diagram of the contents of this Thesis. 
Basically, there are five chapters and six appendices. For Chapter 1 (Introduction), there 
are two appendices, i.e. Appendix ‘A’ and Appendix ‘B’ offering the background 
information of this research. For Chapter 2 (Literature Review), the background theory 
and related concepts of this research are discussed in Appendix ‘C’. For Chapter 3 
(Research Methodology), there are three appendices, which discuss the data theory 
(Appendix ‘D’) and show the survey questionnaires for the VCIs (Appendix ‘E’) and the 
ICTVBs (Appendix ‘F’). Then Chapter 4 is the Data Analysis and Results, and finally, 
Chapter 5 is the Summary and Conclusions. 
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1.7 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter justifies the requirement for an empirical research on the differences 
of the ROMFs of both the VCIs and the ICTVBs, and the relationships between their 
ROMFs and management conflict experienced in their business relationship across the 
full venture capital process. The next chapter introduces the literature review on venture 
capital and the derivation of the hypotheses of this research.      
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Figure 1.4: Schematic diagram of the Thesis 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on venture capital.  It starts with the 
literature review on the background of venture capital, which includes its cycle, 
characteristics, managerial factors, and management conflict. The contributions of several 
authors and researchers on these subjects are reviewed.  Then it will be followed by the 
synthesis of their works, which facilitates the model development and the derivation of 
hypotheses for this research. Next, there follows a brief discussion on the theoretical 
underpinnings of venture capital, and finally the last section summarizes this chapter. The 
background theory of this research is based on the Theory of the Firm and its related 
concepts, which are discussed in Appendix ‘C’ of this Thesis.1 
 
2.2  BACKGROUND ON VENTURE CAPITAL  
 
 This section and the following Section 2.3 review some of the works of the 
authors and researchers in the subject of venture capital. Their contributions facilitate in 
developing the construct to test the differences of ROMFs of both VCIs and ICTVBs and 
the relationships between their ROMFs and management conflict experienced by them in 
managing their venture business across the full venture capital process. 
  
In terms of definition, Wright and Robbie (1997, p. xiii) state that venture capital 
can be defined broadly “as the investment by professional investors of long-term, risk 
equity finance where the primary reward is the eventual gain, rather than interest income 
or dividend yield”.2   In another definition, Lerner (2000, p. 203) defines venture capital 
“as equity or equity-linked investments in young privately held companies, where the 
investor is a financial intermediary who is typically active as a director, advisor, or even 
manager of the firm”. A similar definition, according to Cumming and MacIntosh (2001, 
p. 1), is that “venture capital investors are financial intermediaries (in essence a kind of 
specialized mutual fund) which receive capital contributions from institutional investors 
or high net worth individuals across the economic spectrum, and invest the pooled 
deposits in small, private and mainly high technology businesses or entrepreneurial firms 
with potentially high growth”. In a much broader perspective, Liles (1974) states that 
venture capital involves “investment in any high risk financial venture; investment in 
unproven ideas, products, or start-ups situation i.e. the provision of what is called ‘seed-
capital’; investment in going concerns that are unable to raise funds from conventional 
public or commercial sources; and investment in large and – in some cases – controlling 
interests in publicly traded companies where there is a considerable degree of 
uncertainty” (cf. Pfirrmann, Wupperfeld and Lerner, 1997, p. 9). These definitions imply 
                                                          
1The related concepts are Separation of ownership and control; Stakeholder Theory; ICTVBs and their 
financial resource shortage; and the Agency Theory (as the focal theory for this research).?   
2
 According to Paqvalen (2001, p. 4), this term is used interchangeably with private equity [including both 
management buy-outs (MBO) and management buy-ins (MBI)] in Europe but not in the U.S. 
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that venture capital involves the provision of equity finance to venture businesses that are 
typically small in size, unquoted on the stock market and provide an opportunity for gain 
through growth potential, contingent on acquiring finance to permit new investment. In 
addition, Mitchell, Reid and Terry (1995, p. 187) contend that normally the VCIs expect 
to earn an adequate investment return within a few years through one of the methods for 
acquiring liquidity (e.g. initial public offerings (IPO), mergers and acquisitions, 
secondary sale, etc.). Besides the understandings from these definitions of venture capital, 
Section 3.7.3 in Chapter 3 uses a specific definition for VCIs for the operational purpose 
of this research. 
 
2.2.1 Venture capital cycle 
 
Various scholars have approached the analysis of any industry dynamics by 
looking for regularities in terms of a life cycle through which the industry passes. Hence, 
this implies that in order to understand the venture capital industry, one must first 
understand the whole venture cycle. Generally, according to Gompers and Lerner (2001, 
p. 152), a venture capital cycle “starts with raising a venture fund; proceeds through the 
investment in, monitoring of, and adding value to firms;  continues as the venture capital 
firm exits successful deals and returns capital to its investors; and renews itself with the 
venture capitalist raising additional funds”. 
 
Venture capital financing can be categorized into different phases that normally 
correspond to the ICTVBs’ developmental stages. The phases of venture capital financing 
vis-à-vis the development stages of ICTVBs are illustrated in Figure 2.1 following. Each 
phase is related with different financial and managerial requirements. The phases are as 
follows: 
 
a) When a venture business is formed, it is usually funded by the VCIs in three 
stages as follows, which all fall under the terms of “early stage financing”. 
 
i) Seed financing – small amounts of capital received by an ICTVB to 
investigate a business model and transform it into a tangible business plan. 
Key management personnel of the ICTVB have not been chosen. 
 
ii) Start-up financing – larger amounts of capital received by an ICTVB to fund 
products/services development and initial marketing. Basically, the ICTVB is 
organized and the key personnel have been chosen. 
 
iii) First-round financing – this type of financing enables an ICTVB to develop a 
prototype and to begin producing and selling its products/services. Thus, 
financing is needed for commercialization and to initiate sales. 
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Figure 2.1: Phases of venture capital financing and ICTVBs’ growth stages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Source: Adapted from Auer (1990) [cf. Paqvalen, K. K. (2001, p. 6)]. “How does the venture capitalist-
 entrepreneur relationships translate to the performance of the venture?”. Seminar Paper. Espoo, Finland 
 Helsinki University of Technology, Institute of Strategy and International Business. 
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control of the venture business (i.e. management buy-in [MBI]), or to help the 
ICTVB acquire other businesses that are synergistically viable to its existing 
business (i.e. management buy-out [MBO]).3 Normally, the acquired business 
is often restructured and the ICTVB’s assets are used for collateral 
(Gladstone, 1988; Sagari and Guidotti, 1992; Paqvalen, 2001).4   
 
 Generally, factors that influence VCIs in making investment in ICTVBs are,   for 
example, their business preferences, diversification strategies, stage of financing, etc. As 
for the ICTVBs, their business purposes and developmental stages influence their 
financing needs. In reality, the VCIs are already involved in the venture businesses at the 
pre-investment stage by giving advice, mentoring the ICTVBs, etc. (although at this stage 
VCIs have very limited say and practically have to rely on the technological knowledge 
of the ICTVBs). And at the post-investment and in risk management of the venture 
businesses, the VCIs’ roles are more crucial for their expansion. Thus, without 
marginalizing the importance of mezzanine or bridge financing and leveraged buyouts, 
this research focuses on the early stage, second and third-round financing from the VCIs, 
largely due to the nature of things, i.e. majority of the ICTVBs in the sample are at their 
early and growth stages of development. 
   
2.2.2 Characteristics of venture capital  
 
In terms of characteristics, Chan (1999, pp. 15–17) states that venture capital has 
several key features as follows: i) VCIs are neither short-term nor long-term financiers; 
ii) VCIs contribute more than finance to their investee firms; iii) VCIs tend to be an 
expensive source of financing; iv) VCIs fill a void between sources of funds; v) VCIs 
view themselves as risk financiers; vi) VCIs are highly selective; and vii) VCIs are biased 
towards certain industries. These characteristics imply that VCIs are not only different 
from other types of financiers (e.g. banks) but also are recognized as specialists and risk-
takers in financing high-risk venture businesses such as the ICTVBs. For example, VCIs 
normally search actively for a deal, i.e. searching for the right and most promising 
prospective ICTVBs to invest in. Once they make their investments in ICTVBs they tend 
to be active investors i.e. involved in the operation of the venture businesses. In addition, 
Sagari and Guidotti (1992, p. 8) contend that VCIs play different roles compared to 
conventional financial institutions, and these roles are as follows: i) analyzing the 
investment idea from both technological and business perspectives, ii) contributing in the 
preparation of the business plan and investment prospectus, iii) estimating the risk-reward 
ratio of the investment, iv) assisting in finding individuals who are capable of forming a 
qualified technical and managerial team, v) assisting in obtaining additional financing, vi) 
participating as active advisors to facilitate the success of the venture business, and vii) 
assisting in developing supplier relations and in marketing products, often through 
networking contacts. These roles imply that to be successful, VCIs should have a mix of 
                                                          
3
 The concepts of MBI and MBO are normally differentiated by many economists. 
4
 According to Paqvalen (2001, p. 6), recently there is an additional stage called breed or pre-seed financing 
which is associated with the rapidly changing ICT industry. For example, in most developed countries (e.g. 
Japan) they have the so-called incubation system that provides, among others, the avenue for the VCIs and 
ICTVBs to get to know each other at this very early stage and thus be able to develop their business 
relationship further. 
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excellence in various skills, experiences, and knowledge (e.g. pertaining to financial, 
managerial, market, and technical matters). 
 
2.3 MANAGERIAL FACTORS  
 
VCIs’ active involvement with the ICTVBs does not exist in a vacuum. They 
come into contact as the result of a financial resource shortage known as the ‘equity gap’ 
problem (as discussed in Appendix ‘C’). Murray (1994, p. 73) defines ‘equity gap’ as “a 
situation whereby there is insufficient provision of long-term, external equity sources to 
finance the creation and development of the young and growing business”. In fact, 
Murray further contends that a venture business financed by an early stage fund may well 
face two equity gaps: i) first gap occurs when trying to obtain initial funding to create the 
venture business, and ii) second gap occurs when attempting to attract additional funding 
for further expansion of the venture business after the initial funding has been exhausted. 
In another definition, Mason (1996, p. 4) defines this gap as “the absence of small 
amounts of risk capital from institutional sources for companies at the seed, start-up and 
early growth stages which arises because the fixed costs of investment appraisal and 
monitoring make it uneconomic for venture capital funds to make small investments, and 
also because of the reluctance of banks to make unsecured lending” (cf. Van Osnabrugge 
and Robinson, 2000, p. 38). 
 
With the notion that these ICTVBs do contribute to the overall economic 
development, efforts to bridge this financial resource shortage is crucial, particularly in 
developing countries. The literature surveyed admits that informal financial institutions, 
such as individual investors, VCIs, business angels, and corporate venture companies, are 
important sources of risk financing to these ICTVBs, especially in developed countries 
(Sykes, 1990; Ehrlich et al., 1994; Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000). 
 
Lerner (2000, pp. 203–207) argues that small ICTVBs that are backed by VCIs 
have been particularly strong innovators. Lerner found that VCIs not only contributed a 
relatively modest share but also provided critical early financing and management 
guidance to start-up ICTVBs involved in biotechnology, computer networking and the 
Internet. In return, these venture businesses have used the capital, expertise and contacts 
provided by their VCIs to establish themselves as market leaders. Lerner also contends 
that some of these potentially profitable start-up ICTVBs would be unable to access 
normal financing if VCIs did not exist due to factors such as uncertainty, asymmetric 
information, and the nature of intangible assets involved as collateral for financing 
purposes and the availability of mechanisms to address the changing business 
environment.   
 
The following section will discuss in detail the managerial factors pertaining to 
the practices and procedures at each stage of the venture capital process. Most of these 
references are made in the context of VCIs, based on the findings of previous studies that 
have been concentrated on the VCIs’ perspective in addressing management conflict (as 
discussed in Chapter 1). However, some references will be made accordingly in the 
context of ICTVBs. 
  
24 
2.3.1 Pre-investment stage 
 
2.3.1.1  Deal origination and screening 
 
 It is a widely accepted fact that VCIs receive thousands of venture proposals for 
financing every year. However, only a handful of proposals are accepted for in-depth 
evaluation at this early stage of the financing process. Among the managerial factors 
employed are selecting the sources of deal origination and criteria used for screening 
purposes (Sahlman, 1990; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). A reliable source of deal 
origination is important as it helps to improve reliability in the screening process of 
prospective ICTVBs. These sources are for example when the ICTVBs approach the 
VCIs directly, referral processes (e.g. from the venture community, venture businesses, 
banks, etc.), active search by the VCIs for deals, and other mechanisms (e.g. technology 
exhibitions and conferences, and etc.). In the context of ICTVBs, these sources also help 
them in identifying suitable VCIs for their financing and other value-added services (e.g. 
business networking, marketing contacts, etc.) that the selected VCIs can offer to their 
venture business. 
 
 The screening process involves the usage of some broad criteria that normally 
correspond to the individual VCIs’ and ICTVBs’ preferences. The most common criteria 
for screening are as follows: i) the size of investment required, ii) the production 
technology involved, iii) the location of the venture, iv) the stage of financing required, 
v) the management team and track record, and vi) the markets for the products and 
services. According to Sagari and Guidotti (1992, p. 12), many VCIs “choose areas in 
which they have expertise, which facilitates the in-depth evaluation of the firm and the 
post-investment monitoring processes”. In supporting this argument, for instance, 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) found that 63% of their sample of VCIs followed the criteria 
of technology and market sector of their venture preferences in their screening process. 
As for the ICTVBs, these criteria are important to increase the probability of their 
application for financing being accepted by the VCIs because the VCIs are known to be 
selective. 
 
2.3.1.2  Deal evaluation 
 
 For the VCIs, the potential ICTVBs are rigorously reviewed with the main 
objective of making the decision to invest or otherwise. In the context of ICTVBs, they 
also need to check the potential VCIs as to make sure that they can get financing and 
acceptable business partners for their venture business. The managerial factors involved 
are referring sources of due diligence, employing evaluation techniques, and selecting the 
evaluation criteria to be used. These factors are crucial in venture capital because the 
success of the investment depends on the sources of information gathered for the purpose 
of future management of the investment and the venture business. Basically, four main 
aspects are focused on here namely the quality of their management team, characteristics 
of the products and services, technology to be employed, and market potential. 
 
  
25 
Empirical studies on the evaluation criteria that are considered crucial for venture 
capital found that the quality of the management team is more important than other 
criteria such as market attractiveness, product characteristics and etc. (Wells, 1974; 
Poindexter, 1976; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). For instance, Wells (1974) found that 
management commitment, product, and market criteria rank higher than industry or 
technology and cash-out method criteria. In another study in the U.S., Tyebjee and Bruno 
(1984) found that the managerial capabilities and resistance to environment threats are 
two criteria that have the highest impact on reducing risk of the investment. They also 
found that market attractiveness and product differentiation criteria have improved 
significantly the expected return of the investment.  
 
2.3.1.3  Deal structuring   
 
The managerial factors of deal structuring in venture capital also poses many 
challenges. Deal structuring refers to the set of contractual arrangements negotiated 
between the VCIs and the ICTVBs with the intention of reconciling any conflicts that 
arise in their venture businesses. Sagari and Guidotti (1992, p. 20) state that issues to be 
negotiated are normally related to:  i) the kind and mix of financial instruments to be used 
(e.g. the capital structure), ii) the pricing of the deal, and iii) other terms of the agreement 
(including warranties and covenants). In relation to this, Kaplan and Stromberg (2000a, p. 
2) argue that financial contracting in venture capital as compared to the real world 
contracts is more complex than the existing theories predict.5   In their study, they found 
that amongst the distinguishing characteristics of venture capital is the allowance of VCIs 
and ICTVBs to allocate cash flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights 
and other control rights. It is also common for VCIs and ICTVBs to include non-
competing and vesting provisions that make it more expensive for each of them to leave 
the venture business, thus mitigating the potential management conflict between them. 
Finally, they also found that cash flow incentives, control rights and contingencies 
implemented in the contracts are used more as complements than as substitutes. The 
arguments above indicate that contractual arrangements through legal documentation are 
a crucial tool in the deal structuring of venture capital for both the VCIs and ICTVBs. 
 
2.3.2 Post-investment stage 
 
2.3.2.1  Monitoring  
 
The main purpose of monitoring is to minimize losses by anticipating possible 
conflicts in the business relationship between the VCIs and ICTVBs. The managerial 
factors involved are such as, choosing what types of monitoring are preferred, 
exchanging strategic information (e.g. financial and technological information), 
providing advice and information as required, and determining factors of an ideal 
relationship. Through strategic monitoring, both VCIs and ICTVBs have ample and 
timely information for any further corrective decisions and actions to be made. This is 
                                                          
5
 In their study, they compared the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in 
financial contracting theory. Their study involved actual contracts between VCIs and ICTVBs in the U.S., 
that is, 213 venture capital investments made in December 1986 to April 1999 in 119 ICTVBs by 14 VCIs. 
  
26 
much easier said than done though. In their business relationship, both parties will incur 
monitoring costs to a certain extent. For instance, both parties incur costs when they 
monitor and infuse financing, such as costs of legal documentation of their contracts and 
costs of other valuable resources (e.g. man-hour, man-power, etc.)  
 
In one of the pioneer studies on venture capital using an applied Principal-Agent 
analysis, Sahlman (1990, p. 518) concludes that venture capital is characterized by 
substantial uncertainty about payoffs on individual investments and a high degree of 
information asymmetry between the principal and agent. 6   Therefore, certain standard 
managerial factors have evolved, including staging the commitment of financing, basing 
compensation on value created and preserving mechanisms to force the agent to distribute 
capital and profits. Sahlman also found that the business relationship of VCIs and 
ICTVBs shared several common elements such as staging the commitment of financing 
and preserving the option to abandon, compensation schemes, which are based on 
incentives to create value for both parties and are defined mechanisms to acquire liquidity. 
 
Reid (1998) did a study in the United Kingdom’s venture capital industry to 
explore the relationship between VCIs as the principal and mature small firms as the 
agent.7   From this study, Reid (1998, p. 259) found that the trading of management 
accountancy information between them is valuable and provides a rich and highly 
organized information set upon which economic agents can predicate their decision-
making. Reid also stresses that in the contracting relationship between the principal and 
agent, there exists management conflict due to the problems of adverse selection, moral 
hazard and asymmetry of information. Reid found that certain managerial factors such as 
using a fine filter on proposals, requiring high rates of return and strongly resisting 
downside risk exposure were employed in order to limit the adverse selection pre-
investment problems. Whereas, to attenuate moral hazard post-investment problems, right 
monitoring and an unwillingness to bear all risk measures were employed.? Reid’s 
arguments imply that monitoring and control devices do have a practical edge for both 
VCIs and ICTVBs, which promotes efficiency in the way predicted by the Principal-
Agent analysis.  
 
                                                          
6
 Sahlman’s study focused on the relationship between funds providers and VCIs and also between VCIs 
and the ICTVBs in which they invest. The study was done in the U.S. and covers the period from 1980 to 
1988. According to Sahlman, the agency contract contained certain standard procedures to address three 
fundamental problems, namely, the sorting problem (i.e. how to select the best VCIs and the best ICTVBs), 
the agency problem (i.e. how to minimize the present value of agency costs) and the operating-cost 
problem (i.e. how to minimize the present value of operating-costs including taxes). 
7
 By using an applied Principal-Agent analysis, Reid focused on the importance of risk and information to 
the relationship of the principal and agent through four aspects namely risk management, information 
demand, information development and the exchange of risk and information. 
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2.3.2.2  Acquiring liquidity 
 
In highlighting the means of acquiring liquidity for the VCIs and ICTVBs to 
choose, Gladstone (1988) identifies six main methods: i) sale of the ICTVBs’ shares in a 
public offering, ii) sale of shares to other ICTVBs, iii) repurchase of shares by the 
ICTVBs, iv) sale of shares to other VCIs, v) reorganization of the ICTVBs, and vi) 
liquidation of the ICTVBs. In relation to this, Barry et al. (1990) contend that sale of the 
ICTVBs’ shares in an initial public offering (IPO) and trade sale are considered to be the 
most popular methods of acquiring liquidity in venture capital. In a recent study, 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2000) also describe five main methods of acquiring liquidity 
namely an initial public offering (IPO), acquisition exit, a secondary sale, a buyback and 
a write-off. Their empirical study based on Canadian and American evidence supported 
that the choice of acquiring liquidity is related to the desire to minimize moral hazard and 
informational asymmetries between the VCIs and ICTVBs and hence to maximize the 
capital gain.8  These studies imply that there are many methods of acquiring liquidity 
available for the VCIs and ICTVBs but the most chosen method is the IPO. This is 
particularly true in developed countries with established capital markets and venture 
capital industries but it still remains to be seen in most of the developing countries. 
 
2.3.2.3  Risk management 
 
Overall risk management is also important for both the VCIs and the ICTVBs.  In 
other words, the managerial factors based on the strategic importance of certain types of 
risk (e.g. management risk, inexperience risk, competitive risk, viability risk, and cash-
out risk) by both VCIs and ICTVBs are a crucial aspect of managing their venture 
business. Besides this, their perceptions towards overall market and agency risks can also 
have some repercussions on the management conflict experienced in the business 
relationship across the full venture capital process. Market risk refers to the degree of 
uncertainty related to gaining a competitive advantage due to environmental factors 
(Porter, 1980; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Barney et. al, 1989; Fiet, 1995). Managerial 
factors of this risk include the aspects of technical obsolescence, many competitors, many 
substitutions of products or services, weak customer demand, and market attractiveness. 
On the other hand, agency risk could be related to the divergent interests between the 
VCIs and ICTVBs, and the managerial factors include the aspects of potential dishonesty, 
short-term self-interest seeking, many venture businesses to be monitored, contractual 
ambiguities, differences in cash flow and profitability objectives, and manipulation of 
profitability.9  
                                                          
8
 In another study, Cumming and MacIntosh (2001, p. 39) found that the theory and evidence relate the 
total venture capital investment period to various factors. These factors are as follows: the market and book 
values of the ICTVBs, the stage of its development at the time of initial investment, the nature of its assets 
and the industry it operates in, the type of venture capital fundraising and the reason for acquiring liquidity. 
They also contend that there is a causal link from each of these factors to investment duration, and they 
conjecture that total venture capital investment duration has a role in mitigating informational asymmetries 
between the VCIs and ICTVBs. 
9
 For example, Fiet (1995) did a study on risk avoidance strategies employed by 141 VCIs and 83 business 
angels in the U.S. and found that differences in their strategies for evaluating risk lead them to hold 
predictably different views of the dangers of market and agency risks. VCIs were found to attach more 
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2.3.3 Management conflict in venture businesses 
 
As discussed in Appendix ‘C’, the theoretical and conceptual framework on 
separation of ownership and control is based on the seminal work of Berle and Means, 
(1967) which has led to further studies on this subject in modern organizations (Beed, 
1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz, 1988).10   In an environment where ICTVBs 
receive financing from external equity, there is a situation for a separation of ownership 
and control as well as diversity of stakeholders, which are bound to govern the 
management of the venture businesses. Moreover, related to the focus of this research, 
with the expected differences in the areas of expertise between VCIs (which are inclined 
to be more expert in financial matters) and ICTVBs (which are inclined to be more expert 
in technological matters) contracting into venture businesses, they will certainly face 
some conflicting aspects in managing together their venture business. This kind of 
business relationship implies that both parties will have to manoeuvre their resources and 
managerial factors for the success of their venture businesses.  
 
 Following the arguments in the literature reviewed, for example, due to 
asymmetries of information, management conflict will arise between the contracted 
parties, i.e. the VCIs and ICTVBs.11   The conflict is related to adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems. Adverse selection relates to misrepresentation by the VCIs and 
ICTVBs as to their real abilities. Adverse selection occurs due to the fact that either VCIs 
or ICTVBs cannot completely observe and verify the other’s abilities when they engage 
in the business relationship. For example, either the VCIs or ICTVBs are so-called 
experts in their respective fields but how far this is true is subject to real situations that 
arise when they manage their venture business together. Moral hazard arises when the 
VCIs and ICTVBs do not put forth the effort originally agreed upon in the contract or 
when they act on their own agendas to withhold or modify crucial information (Grosman 
and Hart 1983; Fama? and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen, 1994; Hart, 1995).12  
For example, the ICTVBs are supposed to have more information and knowledge about 
the technological aspect of their products or services than the VCIs. Thus, the ICTVBs 
can possibly withhold some important technological information (e.g. unproven proto-
type, etc.) that can affect the success of their venture business.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
importance to market risk than agency risk, but the converse is true for the business angels. Fiet further 
states that ICTVBs with a technical or market advantage would probably find a more receptive investor 
audience among VCIs. 
10
 In their study on 200 of the largest American corporations, they found that 44% were in the category of 
ultimate management control while 23% were in the category of minority control. Thus, they conclude that 
due to the extensive dispersal of ownership structure in these corporations, the separation of ownership and 
control has become virtually complete. This study also remains a standard reference on the unquestioned 
fact of the separation of effective control from ownership of the firm. 
11
 This concept is critical in the theories of property rights and corporate governance (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972), the transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1979), the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Sappington, 1991) and the game theory (Hillier, 1997).  
12
 According to Ayres and Cramton (1994, p. 6), “moral hazard is the contracting problem that arises when 
the actions of one of the contracting parties are unobservable. Adverse selection is the problem that arises 
when an attribute of one of the contracting parties is unobservable”. 
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Management conflict can promote challenges, heightened attention, and efforts, 
but extreme or uncontrolled conflict threatens chaos in a venture business. 13   The 
assumption of management rationality, whereby the VCIs and ICTVBs can see the 
objectives of their venture business and can react logically, implies that it is sufficient to 
bring about cooperation and success to their venture business. Nevertheless, the literature 
reviewed and realities prove this basic assumption to be an illusion after all. In relation to 
this, there are four complications in the VCIs and ICTVBs’ business relationship that 
may affect their venture business as follows: i) goal incongruity, e.g. selected methods 
and specifications may be different between them; ii) measurement uncertainty, e.g. a 
great deal of uncertainty in evaluating how well both of them are performing; iii) 
information asymmetry between them; and iv) risk aversion that affects their 
performance.  
 
Higashide and Birley (2000) did a study on factors associated with the inter-
organizational conflict between VCIs and the entrepreneur team at the post-investment 
stage of the venture capital process. Based on the sample of 80 VCIs in the United 
Kingdom, they found that conflict as disagreement can be beneficial for the venture 
business performance but conflict as personal friction is negatively associated with 
performance. They also stress that it is important to manage conflict well both in the pre-
investment (e.g. due diligence and deal structuring processes) as well as in the post-
investment stages. 
 
In addition, the contextual influences affecting the business relationship between 
the VCIs and ICTVBs largely pertain to agency risks, market and business risks, task 
uncertainty, and degree of influence (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Gorman and Sahlman, 
1989; Barney et al., 1989; Paqvalen, 2001). Agency risks are related to the probability 
that either the VCIs or ICTVBs will act contrary to the wishes of each other.  Market or 
business risks are related to the uncertainty of venture businesses vis-à-vis the business 
environment in which they operate, which affects their competitiveness. According to 
Paqvalen (2001, p. 21), task uncertainty refers to the “gap between the information 
necessary to make effective decisions and the information available to decision makers”. 
The degree of influence refers to the actual percentage of shareholding of each 
stakeholder (i.e. between the VCIs and ICTVBs) in the venture business, which normally 
determines the degree of influence they have. 
 
                                                          
13
 In a broader perspective, this kind of business relationship is affected by various conflicts, complications 
and contextual influences. For instance, conflict is where two or more parties try to occupy simultaneously 
the same scarce resources state (e.g. power or space), but only one can do so. Classical management theory 
and human relations philosophy state that conflict indicates a breakdown of organization or a failure of 
management. Potential conflict arises when both parties draw on common resources, when their tasks are 
interdependent, and when they pursue incompatible objectives. Hence, conflict is endemic in organizations 
because of a lack of consensus on expectations and prescriptions for various organizational positions or 
because of a lack of uniform commitment to organizational objectives. However, from the point of view of 
both organizational and individual group goals, some types of conflict are detrimental (i.e. disadvantageous 
or damaging, resulting in cooperation standstill, disrupted flow of organization process, etc.) and others are 
beneficial (i.e. conflict can result in a reduction of tension or confrontation that may improve the 
relationship). 
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2.3.4 Mechanisms used to reduce management conflict 
  
In venture capital, mechanisms employed to reduce management conflict have 
been explored in depth in a series of theoretical studies.  These studies have covered such 
topics as active monitoring (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Busenitz, Moesel and Fiet, 
1997; Hellmann, 1998), exchanging accounting and strategic information (Reid, 1998; 
Wright and Robbie, 1996), screening mechanisms (MacMillan, Zenmannn and 
Subbanaramsimha, 1987), exit incentives (Berglof, 1994; Black and Gilson, 1998), 
proper syndicating of financing (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994), and staging of actual 
financing (Sahlman 1990). Some of these studies are discussed below. Nevertheless, the 
findings of these studies have been somewhat inconclusive. These studies have neglected 
the aspect of the nature and characteristics of key stakeholders. In addition, most of these 
studies have assumed that the key stakeholders of the venture business are relatively 
homogeneous, e.g. in terms of their expertise and risks preferences.  
 
Almost in all cases, a critical role of VCIs is generating information about the 
ICTVBs’ prospects. While such an emphasis is important, it does little to shed light on 
the complementary role of key stakeholders’ ROMFs in affecting those strategies of 
reducing management conflict. Thus, it is important to understand their actual ROMFs, 
whereby the nature of management conflict between these stakeholders is a consequence 
of their characteristics, among others. 
 
Staged financing is perhaps the most potent control mechanism VCIs can employ. 
Prospects of the ICTVBs are periodically re-evaluated and the shorter the duration of the 
staging of financing, the better VCIs monitor ICTVBs’ progress and the greater the need 
to gather new information. Gompers and Lerner (1999, pp. 130 – 131) state that 
commonly used mechanisms are the staging of financing, informal monitoring and 
controls, stock grants and stock options, and additional compensation controls to reduce 
potential gaming or shirking by ICTVBs. They also argue that “it is the non-monetary 
aspects of venture capital that are critical to its success”. They examined the staging of 
financing using a random sample of 794 venture capital-financed businesses in the United 
States. They found that the staging of financing allows VCIs to gather new information 
and monitor the progress of the venture businesses, maintaining the option to abandon 
these businesses periodically. They also argued that increases in asset tangibility increase 
financing duration and reduce monitoring intensity.  
 
Gorman and Sahlman (1989) did a survey to explore VCIs’ monitoring of 
ICTVBs in the U.S. They found that although VCIs are not usually involved in the day-
to-day management of the venture business, they check between financings to limit 
opportunistic behaviour by ICTVBs between evaluations. In another study, Hurry, Miller 
and Bowman (1992) compared the monitoring techniques of United States’ and Japanese 
VCIs in the United States’ market. They found that the United States’ VCIs are more 
likely to have greater incentives and ability to monitor ICTVBs than the Japanese VCIs 
who tend to make fewer investments but take larger equity stake. They also found that 
close formal monitoring techniques are less prevalent in the Japanese market. 
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A proper syndication of financing is another mechanism used to reduce 
management conflict in venture capital. Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) develop a rationale 
for syndication in later rounds of venture financing, based on informational asymmetries 
between the initial VCIs and other potential investors. They argue that the only way to 
avoid opportunistic behaviour by ICTVBs is if lead VCIs maintain a constant share of the 
ICTVBs’ equity. 
 
In relation to the above studies, Gompers and Lerner (2001, p. 152) contend that 
venture capital has developed a variety of mechanisms to address management conflict 
that emerges at each stage of the financing process. Some of these mechanisms include 
meting out financing in discrete stages over time, syndicating investments with other 
VCIs, taking seats on the ICTVBs’ board of directors, and compensating arrangements 
including stock options (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Sahlman, 1990). 
 
2.3.5 Linking ROMFs to management conflict 
 
 The discussion above about business relationships in venture capital involves 
management conflict which needs to be reduced by both the VCIs and ICTVBs in order 
to achieve an efficient contracting relationship to make their venture business a 
successful one. The managerial factors of venture capital constitute important means to 
reduce management conflict that is bound to be encountered in their business relationship. 
This implies that their ROMFs are expected, to some extent, to be used to reduce 
management conflict and thus be capable of increasing the economic value of their 
investment and venture business. Hence, these ROMFs are deemed necessary to be 
investigated in order to better understand how management conflict can be reduced.  
 
2.4 HYPOTHESES OF THE RESEARCH    
 
 The focus of this research is the business relationship between VCIs and ICTVBs 
across the full venture capital process. Based on the literature reviewed above and 
judging from their expected differences in areas of expertise, it can be inferred that their 
ROMFs would also be different and thus could be one of the causes of management 
conflict experienced by them in their business relationship. Based on the rationales and 
arguments from the same literature reviewed, it can also be inferred that certain ROMFs 
of both VCIs and ICTVBs can influence the management conflict experienced in their 
business relationship. For instance, by rigorously scrutinizing ICTVBs before making 
capital investment and later on by monitoring them systematically after making the 
investment, VCIs can minimize some of the information asymmetries which are 
important to their investments’ success. As for the ICTVBs, they can focus on the success 
of their business ideas rather than worry about their financing constraints. Hence, with 
both parties having the same intention of reducing management conflict, the success of 
their venture business stands a better chance and becomes more promising.  
 
 Therefore, the first part of this research is the examination on the differences of 
the ROMFs between them whereby it posits a significant difference of ROMFs between 
the VCIs and ICTVBs across the full venture capital process. For example, due to their 
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differences in expertise and ROMFs, the VCIs and ICTVBs may have different 
managerial considerations on certain aspects of managing their venture business, e.g. on 
the budgeting for R&D, staffing of manpower, marketing of product and services etc. 
This conceptual hypothesis is further categorized into three operational hypotheses as 
follows: 
 
H1: There is a significant difference in ROMFs between VCIs and ICTVBs at the pre-
investment stage. 
 
H2: There is a significant difference in ROMFs between VCIs and ICTVBs at the post-
investment stage. 
 
H3: There is a significant difference in ROMFs between VCIs and ICTVBs for risk 
management. 
 
Then, the second part of this research is the examination of the relationships 
between their ROMFs and management conflict experienced across the full venture 
capital process.14  Thus, the other conceptual hypothesis of this research posits a negative 
relationship between their ROMFs and management conflict experienced by them across 
the full venture capital process. For example, at the post-investment stage i.e. with 
reasonably smooth exchanges of strategic business information between the VCIs and 
ICTVBs in the management of the venture business, this may reduce their management 
conflict as both of them are aware of what are the appropriate managerial considerations 
for their venture business. This conceptual hypothesis is further categorized into three 
more operational hypotheses as follows: 
  
H4: There is a significant negative relationship between their ROMFs and management 
conflict at the pre-investment stage. 
 
H5: There is a significant negative relationship between their ROMFs and management 
conflict at the post-investment stage. 
 
H6: There is a significant negative relationship between their ROMFs and management 
conflict for risk management. 
 
For this research, the independent variables are their ROMFs at the pre-
investment stage namely: deal origination and screening processes, evaluation process, 
contracting or deal structuring processes, and at the post-investment stage the variables 
are namely: monitoring and post-investment activities, acquiring liquidity, and risk 
                                                          
14
 It is expected that appropriate ROMFs will in turn reduce management conflict between the VCIs and 
ICTVBs accordingly. In this research, the management conflict indicators are assessed in such a way that 
higher scores represent greater magnitude of management conflict experienced. Thus, in the statistical term, 
an inverse or a negative relationship between the independent and dependent variables is expected, 
meaning that as one variable increases the other decreases. For example, ‘free-sharing of information’ is 
one of the sub-variables for managerial factors of an ideal relationship for monitoring. So, if the 
respondents give a higher score to it, then ‘free-sharing of information’ is associated with a lower score for 
the management conflict indicators.  
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management. The sub-variables to be investigated are sources of due diligence, 
techniques of evaluation, factors or criteria used, risk management and the perception 
towards market and agency risks, and other related aspects at each stage of the venture 
capital process. The dependent variable is management conflict with two sub-variables as 
indicators (i.e. the extent of management conflict experienced and the affected 
management elements). In testing the above hypotheses, the important requirements 
would be to specify the research design and its conceptual framework, to identify the data 
collection methods, to devise a practical survey instrument and lastly to analyze the data 
collected. These aspects will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 3 and Appendix 
‘D’ of the Thesis. 
 
2.5 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
The above review on venture capital indicates that generally this industry is an 
important financial segment of the overall capital market and economy.  For example, 
Cumming (2001, pp. 1–3) argues that the study of venture capital is important because 
the success of the venture capital and entrepreneurial industries in a country has 
important implications for economic growth and innovation. However, venture capital is 
heavily characterized by management conflict and other agency costs (Sahlman, 1990; 
Reid, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1999).   
 
This implies that an important question arises as to the needs for strategic ROMFs 
to achieve efficient financial contracting and business relationship among the VCIs and 
the ICTVBs. In relation to this, there is growing literature on venture capital regarding 
how management conflict is reduced through various mechanisms. As it was noted earlier, 
the focus on generating information about the ICTVBs’ prospects is important but it does 
little to shed light on the complementary role of key stakeholders’ ROMFs in affecting 
the strategies of reducing the management conflict. Thus, it is important to understand 
their managerial factors, because doing so will help us better understand the 
complementary role of their nature and characteristics in affecting those strategies of 
addressing management conflict.15  
 
In addition, the importance of venture capital in developed countries, and 
indications from the main literature to date, strongly suggests its potential importance for 
developing countries such as Malaysia. Hence, this research on the business relationship 
between VCIs and ICTVBs across the full venture capital process is an attempt to further 
enrich the literature on this subject.  The empirical evidence that will be based on the 
emerging venture capital and ICT industries in Malaysia will add richness to the general 
knowledge because the settings of this research will be slightly different from developed 
countries with an established venture capital industry (as discussed in Appendix ‘A’). 
 
                                                          
15There is also an emerging issue regarding the appropriate conceptual underpinning to the relationship of 
the principal and agent in the venture capital. Along similar argument, Kaplan and Stromberg (2000a, p. 1) 
contend that despite the burgeoning volume of literature on the principal-agent problem in financial 
contracting theory, “empirical work has lagged behind in comparing the contracts and actions of real world 
principals to their counterparts in financial contracting theory”.   
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The literature also largely concentrates on a mixture of small and medium venture 
businesses with diversity in types of business. However, this research focuses solely on 
VCIs and venture businesses in the ICT industry. These ICTVBs with their peculiar 
characteristics (as discussed in Appendix ‘C’) will provide additional information to the 
general knowledge of venture capital. Views from both VCIs and ICTVBs are studied 
across the full venture capital process. Therefore, this research is different from previous 
studies which mostly are a one-sided affair (i.e. normally from the VCIs’ perspective) 
and also concentrate on the post-investment stages of the venture capital process. 
 
2.6 SUMMARY 
 
In general, there is no doubt that the literature on venture capital is abundant and 
keeps growing. Nevertheless, there are very few empirical studies on the subject matter 
of this research, that is, firstly an examination into the differences of ROMFs of both the 
VCIs and ICTVBs, and secondly an examination into the relationships between their 
ROMFs and management conflict experienced by them across the full venture capital 
process. This Chapter reviews the managerial factors at each of the venture capital 
process. The literature reviewed facilitates the development of the model for conducting 
this research. This research attempts to extend the literature by investigating empirically 
the business relationship between VCIs and ICTVBs in managing their venture business. 
The following Chapter 3 specifies the methodology of this research. It also includes the 
conceptual framework of analysis and the data collection methods to be employed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter outlines the research methodology of this research. It starts with the 
description of the sample, the sampling design, the data collection procedures, and the 
discussion of how access was achieved to gather the information will follow. Then, the 
methods of analysis which include the conceptual framework and operational definitions 
are discussed. Appendix ‘D’ reviews the details of data theory and also explains the 
statistical analysis employed for this research. Appendix ‘E’ and Appendix ‘F’ are the 
survey questionnaires for the VCIs and ICTVBs respectively. 
 
3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE 
 
3.2.1 The selection criteria of the VCIs and ICTVBs  
  
 For this research, 24 VCIs and 100 ICTVBs were selected as the sample. 
Basically, the criteria for their selection are as follows: 
 
a) They must be classified as a locally incorporated business entity in Malaysia. 
 
b) Their business focus must be on ICT industry. 
 
c) They must be representative and accessible. 
 
 According to the Bank Negara Malaysia, there are 46 venture capital companies 
and funds as of the end of 2002 (BNM Annual Report, 2002).1   Hence, the population 
sample of the VCIs which focus solely on ICT industry is naturally limited due to the fact 
that the Malaysia’s venture capital industry is relatively new (as discussed in Appendix 
‘A’) and in the growing stage of the industrial cycle. These VCIs include both the private 
and government-funded venture capital companies. For example, all of the 19 venture 
capital companies listed in the ‘Funding Guide & Directory for the ICT/Multimedia 
Industry’, 1st Edition, May 2002 by Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC) were 
automatically selected. Besides fulfilling the above criteria, these VCIs also represented 
two-thirds of the total population of venture capital companies currently operating 
actively in the industry. Since almost half of these VCIs are government initiated and/or 
funded, the accessibility will be high.2?  
                                                          
1
 According to the Malaysian Venture Capital Association, there are currently 49 members, comprised of 
31 Venture capital companies, 13 associate companies (corporate) and 5 associate (individuals) members. 
These members are involved in the venture capital investment. 
2
 This is partly due to the fact that the researcher himself is being an official at one of the central ministries, 
the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia. In addition, any attempt to enrich information facilitating the 
management of government funds by these VCIs is certainly a move in the right direction. 
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 Since the focus of this research is on venture capital financing, it is appropriate to 
select ICTVBs that actually received financing from VCIs.3   Hence, the ICTVB lists 
given by the VCIs were used to select these ICTVBs.  These ICTVBs also are involved in 
software development (engineering and business application), content development, 
internet-based business, hardware design, systems integration, computer and system 
security, telecommunication and network technologies, other multimedia technologies 
and life sciences.  
 
 Based on the criteria above, the sample of the VCIs and ICTVBs selected is 
considered sufficient for this research. Their businesses are located in or around the MSC 
and the Kuala Lumpur-Selangor areas which are considered as prime location in 
Malaysia.4   In a recent study about locational tendency of ICTVBs in Malaysia, Seta, 
Onishi and Kidokoro (2001) identify Kuala Lumpur-Selangor corridor, Penang and Johor 
as the three main cores. According to them, more than half or 65.7% of ICTVBs in 
Malaysia are concentrated in the Kuala Lumpur-Selangor area. They also state that the 
MSC strategies led by the Malaysian government to make a new agglomeration to a 
suburb of Kuala Lumpur have some degree of influence to locations of these ICTVBs.  
 
3.2.2 The selection criteria of the interviewees 
 
 This research also seeks further information and clarification on the subject of 
examination from the VCIs and ICTVBs. Thus, direct interview exercises with selected 
internal and principal shareholders of the VCIs and ICTVBs were conducted for inside 
views and interpretation of the actual, strategic, managerial practices and procedures.5 By 
virtue of their status, power, and involvement, they are the most informed about their 
venture business activities; therefore, a direct observation of their strategic managerial 
factors is appropriate and justified for this research. The selection of the interviewees was 
based on the following criteria: 
 
a) They are the highest level of management in their organization.6 
 
b) They are perceived having comprehensive knowledge and working experience in 
venture capital financing and managing venture business. 
 
                                                          
3
 Although there are 914 MSC-Status ICTVBs operating in the MSC as at August 11, 2003, but not all of 
them get financing from VCIs.  
4
 In relation to this, the agglomeration of ICTVBs, whether in developed or developing countries, is 
generally found to be concentrated in central business district or sub-centres as in New York, San Francisco, 
Tokyo (Ogawa and Ishikawa, 1989 and 1990; Yukawa, 1998, 1999 and 2000), except some cases in 
Germany (cf. Seta, Onishi and Kidokoro (2001, p. 2). 
5
 For example, Kanter et al. (1992, p. 234) suggest that in evaluating changes in organization–both from the 
context of the organization and individuals – information and clarification from the management (e.g. 
manager) and shareholders are important because they are the internal stakeholders. They further state that 
these internal stakeholders take various strategic managerial actions with reasonable assurance that the 
desired consequences will stem from these actions.   
6
 This is in line with the classification suggested by Snow and Hrebiniak (1980, p. 324) whereby they 
classify top managers as including chief executive officers, presidents, vice-presidents, chairmen of the 
board, general or group managers, and division managers. 
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3.3 SAMPLING DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 Based on the above explanation, the sampling design of this research is a mixture 
of probability and non-probability sampling designs. On one hand, it is a probability 
sampling design (i.e. specifically, it is a disproportionate stratified sampling design) in 
the sense that the population was first divided into two meaningful segments (i.e. the 
VCIs and ICTVBs). Then, based on criteria described above, other than their original 
population numbers, the respondents were selected. However, on the other hand, it is also 
partly a non-probability sampling design (i.e. specifically, it is a judgement sampling 
design) in the sense that the respondents were selected on the basis of their expertise in 
the subject investigated (i.e. venture capital financing and managing venture business). 
Justifications for the selection of these sampling designs are obviously due to the 
representativeness of the sample which is important for the purposes of a wider 
generalization and as the only meaningful way to investigate the task at hand.7  
 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION METHOD   
 
The primary data and information for this research were collected using 
questionnaire surveys and direct interview exercises. The literature suggests that survey 
studies can be defined as planned data collection for description or prediction and for 
analyzing the relationship among selected variables and these studies collect data and 
information through questionnaires or through telephone or direct interviews (Oppenheim, 
1966; Dillman, 1974; Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996).   
 
This research was also entirely based on a survey conducted in Malaysia. The 
choice of Malaysia was based on the following justifications. Firstly, an investigation of 
past research shows that there has been little study done on this subject in the context of 
developing countries. Moreover, no significant research on venture capital for ICTVBs 
has been done in MSC. Hence, this research will help to fill these gaps. Secondly, since 
1996, Malaysia has launched the development of MSC as the new engine of economic 
growth (as discussed in detail in Appendix ‘B’).8   Therefore, there is a need for the 
government to address any institutional impediments (e.g. ineffective venture capital, 
etc.) for the successful implementation of MSC to be the “Asian Silicon Valley” which 
still remains to be seen.9   
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 According to Sekaran (1992, p. 236), “the generalizability of all non-probability sampling designs is very 
restricted, but they have other advantages and are sometimes the only viable alternative for researcher”. 
8
 According to Jomo and Felker (1999, p. 24), Malaysia has embarked on the ‘latest and most ambitious 
industrial technology policy initiative thus far’ by the establishment of MSC. The authors argue that many 
concerns have been raised with regard to MSC such as whether any government can adequately plan for 
future developments in the extremely fluid and unpredictable ICT industry. 
9
 The other justifications are firstly, the researcher has since 1984 been employed at the Ministry of Finance, 
Malaysia where he has been directly involved in formulating implementation policies of MSC. Secondly, 
Malaysia too is the home country of the researcher and hence constitutes further incentive for him 
personally. 
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3.4.1 Primary data sources 
 
As discussed in Appendix ‘D’, both questionnaire surveys and interviews are 
appropriate for this research. The details of these methods of data collection are as 
follows:  
 
3.4.1.1  Survey questionnaires  
 
This research was based on two sets of structured survey questionnaires, whereby, 
one set was meant for the VCIs and the other set was for the ICTVBs. The two sets of 
survey questionnaires employed were similar in nature except for different wording and 
phrases used to match the respondents’ groups that were being investigated. Please refer 
to Appendix ‘E’ and Appendix ‘F’ respectively. The survey questionnaires were mailed 
to the chief executive officers of the selected respondents to get their responses on the 
questions concerning their ROMFs across the full venture capital process and for risk 
management and information on their business relationship. For the independent and 
dependent variables questions, they were based (with some modifications after the pilot 
studies) on studies done by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), Sahlman (1990), Fiet (1995), 
Wright and Robbie (1996), and Reid (1998).  
 
 Basically, the structure of the survey questionnaires is as follows. Overall, the 
survey questionnaire for both sets of respondents consists of thirty-one close-ended and 
four open-ended questions each.  The close-ended questions use rated or ranked scales 
which have several ordered response categories.10   The questions are grouped into five 
parts. Part 1, basic information, aims to obtaining basic data from the respondent that 
may be analyzed for any relationship with other variables. Part 2, managerial practices 
and procedures, aims to obtain information and opinions pertaining to their ROMFs. This 
part covers five topics as follows: deal origination and screening (Section A), evaluating 
(Section B), contracting and deal structuring (Section C), monitoring and post-investment 
activities (Section D), and acquiring liquidity (Section 5). Part 3, risk management, aims 
to obtain information on their ROMFs for risk management and their perception towards 
market and agency risks. Part 4, information on the business relationship, aims to obtain 
information on management conflict experienced while managing their venture business. 
Finally, Part 5, general information, aims to obtain the respondent’s general opinion on 
the prospect of venture capital and ICT industries in Malaysia. 
 
3.4.1.2  Direct interview  
 
The main purpose of this interview is to supplement the data and information 
gathered from questionnaire surveys. Further information on certain issues which require 
an in-depth understanding and investigation can be sourced from this interview. Not all of 
                                                          
10
 These ordered response categories or Likert scales strictly are ordinal data; however, many social 
scientists or researchers assume these scales provide interval data (Burns, 2000; Bryman, 2001). For 
instance, Bryman (2001, p. 222) states that reason for this is “of the relatively large number of categories 
they generate”. Thus, this research presumed these ordered response categories as interval data accordingly. 
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the respondents were interviewed but only selected ones with prior consent of the 
interviewees. 
 
3.4.2 Secondary data sources 
 
 For this research, data and information were also collected and examined from the 
following secondary sources: 
 
a) Academic journals, articles and newsletters published and reported in the mass 
media. 
 
b) Government publications–such as BNM Annual Reports, Treasury’s Economic 
Reports, Statistic Department’s Reports, Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) industrial reports and others. 
 
c) Industry analysis and studies by relevant entities and experts in the local venture 
capital industry such as the Malaysian Venture Capital Association, Ministry of 
Energy, Communications and Multimedia (MECM), Multimedia Development 
Corporation (MDC) and others. 
 
d) Survey data such as census records or data collected from previous studies. 
 
e) Other related written materials, e.g. information surveyed from unpublished and 
published non-confidential government documents. There is quite an abundance 
of non-confidential data and information available from many central ministries, 
agencies and departments on various aspects of the Malaysian economy, the 
MSC and ICTVBs.11  
 
3.5 HOW ACCESS WAS ACHIEVED 
 
Two pilot studies in the form of preliminary meetings, discussions and direct 
interviews were conducted in March/April, 2002 and August/September 2002. The 
objectives of these pilot studies were to test the instruments of research and to evaluate 
the willingness of the respective respondents to be involved in this research.  
 
Prior to the first pilot study, the selected VCIs were contacted through telephone 
and then followed-up by sending the Pilot Study survey questionnaires to them. 
Accompanying these questionnaires, two letters of introduction were attached. These 
letters of introduction are from the researcher’s supervisor and from the Secretary, MOF 
(Incorporated) Coordination, Privatization and Public Enterprise Division, Ministry of 
Finance, Malaysia. The letters of introduction and the Preface of the Pilot Study survey 
questionnaires explained the purpose of the research and asked for consent and 
                                                          
11
 As the Cabinet of Ministers in Parliament formulate the policies of the government, investigation into 
policy formulation should only theoretically be made at the ministerial level. In this respect, the 
investigation of this research would only be contained to relevant government publications and interviews 
with senior officials involved in the related policy formulation process, e.g. venture capital, etc. 
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cooperation to allow the researcher to carry out the survey and to collect preliminary data 
and information, particularly their list of ICTVBs’ addresses and contact persons. The 
responses from these introductory letters were encouraging with all the five VCIs 
expressing their support for this research.12 ? The second pilot study was conducted in 
August and September 2002 for further information gathering with the prospective 
respondents (i.e. including several ICTVBs).  
 
 The field study was conducted in March and April, 2003. Prior to the actual field 
study, necessary assistance from the Malaysian Venture Capital Association (MVCA) 
was sought to get its members’ cooperation accordingly. In order to achieve a high 
response rate, the survey questionnaires were accompanied by two letters of introduction, 
one from the supervisor of this research and the other from the Deputy Minister of 
Finance, Malaysia. Basically, the letter from the supervisor indicated that this research 
was meant to satisfy the academic requirement for the PhD program. The letter from the 
Deputy Minister of Finance, Malaysia indicated the importance of this research to the 
government as any attempt facilitating additional knowledge about the local venture 
capital industry is a purposeful exercise.13   In addition, the researcher also made a pledge 
to the respondents that the data and information collected would be used strictly for 
research purposes. Lastly, an official cover letter from the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia 
was attached to the mailed survey questionnaires.  The chronology of events of the field 
study for this research is shown in Appendix ‘D’. 
 
3.6 METHODS OF ANALYSIS  
 
Primary data and information collected from the survey questionnaires (which 
constitute the crucial instruments of this research) and supplemented from the interview 
exercises, were scrutinized and analyzed using both the descriptive and inferential 
statistical methods.14  
 
 The following sub-sections explain the detail of the conceptual framework and the 
operational aspect of this research. The conceptual framework elaborates the 
measurement issues of the independent variables (i.e. ROMFs in venture capital process) 
and their sub-variables (i.e. the observable variables or dimensions) and the dependent 
                                                          
12
 According to one of the chief executive officers, to his knowledge there is no academic research yet that 
documents venture capital industry in MSC, Malaysia. This view was equally matched with the view of the 
official in charge of the venture capital industry at the Ministry of Finance who expressed that this research 
will add information and further understanding in the local venture capital industry. These views were 
expressed during the Pilot’s study interview sessions conducted on March 4, 2002 and March 27, 2002. 
13
 To the researcher’s knowledge, there is no research done in Malaysia that involves a letter of introduction 
from the ministerial level. However, for this research, the Honorable Deputy Minister of Finance himself 
has showed his personal support by giving his letter of introduction. This support is highly appreciated by 
the researcher as it improved the response rate of the survey.  
14
 For example, Foster (2001, p. 6) states that “descriptive statistics are used to describe and summarize sets 
of data” while “inferential statistics are used in generalizing from a sample to a wider population, and in 
testing hypotheses, that is, deciding whether the data is consistent with research prediction”. Following this 
understanding, in this research the descriptive statistical methods were used to provide key profile 
information of the respondents under examination while inferential statistical methods described the 
implications from the data collected. 
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variable (i.e. management conflict) and its indicators used in this research. The 
framework also explains the operational definitions used.  
 
3.6.1 The conceptual framework of analysis 
  
3.6.1.1  Independent variable (i.e. ROMFs of VCIs and ICTVBs) 
 
The data and selection of these variables were derived from the survey 
questionnaires and literature reviewed. Basically, the independent variables used in this 
research referred to the strategic managerial practices and procedures at each stage of the 
full venture capital process (i.e. both at the pre-investment and post-investment stages, 
and risk management). These variables and their sub-variables were as follows (the 
numbers in brackets represent the actual number of sub-variables to the main variables in 
the survey questionnaires): 
 
a) Deal origination and screening: 
 
i) Sources referred (3) – i.e. directly by cold calls (i.e. either the ICTVBs 
approach directly the VCIs and vice versa), through referral process, and 
other mechanism (if any). 
 
ii) Screening criteria used (7) – size and policy of investment, production 
technology involved, location of venture, stage of financing required, 
management team and track record, markets for products/services, and 
other (if any). 
 
b) Evaluation: 
 
i) Sources of due diligence referred (5) – i.e. carry out own market 
evaluation, obtain independent market reports, reliance on personal 
references, reliance on independent accountant’s report, and other source 
(if any). 
 
ii) Evaluation technique used (6) – i.e. pay-back, internal rate of return, net 
present value, accounting rate of return, qualitative assessment, and other 
technique (if any). 
 
iii) Evaluation criteria considered (16) – i.e. market attractiveness ( i.e. access 
to market, market need for product/services, size of market, and growth 
potential of market), product differentiation (i.e. technical skills, profit 
margins, uniqueness of products/services, and patentability of 
products/services), managerial capabilities (i.e. management skills, 
marketing skills, financial skills, and references of investor/entrepreneur), 
environment threat resistance (i.e. protection from competitive entry, 
resistance to economic cycles, protection from obsolescence, and 
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protection against down-side risk), and cash-out potential (i.e. 
opportunities for exit, and merger/acquisition potential). 
 
c) Deal structuring: 
 
i) Types of investment instrument preferred (5) – i.e. issues of common 
equity, issues of preferred equity, short-term loans (debt), long-term loans 
(debt), and other type (if any). 
 
ii) Financial contract agreement (9) – i.e. provisions normally included. 
 
d) Monitoring: 
 
i) Types of monitoring preferred (3) – i.e. specific contractual monitoring 
(legally defined), non-contractual monitoring (trust and understanding), 
and both types of monitoring above. 
 
ii) Exchange of information preferred (14) – i.e. advice and contact [i.e. 
business/entrepreneurialism, tax and legal matters, personnel and 
recruitment policy, public policies and institutions, current 
scientific/technological development, and other (if any)], category of 
information required [i.e. technology and markets, managerial and 
technical staffs, budgets, capital structure and investments, business 
strategy, management and financial accounts, supply sources, and other (if 
any)]. 
 
iii) Factors in determining ideal relationship preferred (7) – i.e. maximum 
return on investment, appropriate capital structure, efficient risk-sharing, 
free sharing of information, increasing motivation, enhancement of 
reputation, and other factors (if any). 
 
e) Acquiring liquidity: 
 
i) Methods of acquiring liquidity preferred (6) – i.e. initial public offering, 
mergers and acquisition, secondary sale, buy-back, write-off, and other 
method (if any). 
 
f) Risk management: 
 
i) Strategic importance of overall risk management (5) – i.e. management 
risk, inexperience risk, competitive risk, viability risk, and cash-out risk. 
 
ii) Perception on market and agency risks (16) – i.e. market risks [i.e. 
unattractiveness of the industry, weak demand, small market, many 
competitors, many potential new competitors, technical obsolescence, 
many substitute products/services, and other (if any)], agency risks [i.e. 
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both parties having different cash flow objectives, both parties having 
different profitability objectives, many ventures to be monitored, 
contractual ambiguities, manipulation of profitability, short-term self-
interest seeking, potential dishonesty, and other (if any)]. 
 
3.6.1.2  Dependent variables (i.e. Management conflict) 
 
In this research, management conflict indicators were measured in terms of 
affected management aspects of the venture business and the extent of management 
conflict experienced. These indicators were considered appropriate because as it was 
discussed in Appendix ‘C’, firms do not operate in a vacuum because so many 
stakeholders’ needs have to be addressed and met. In managing venture business, the 
existence of external key stakeholders such as VCIs can be very serious because their 
involvement is not only providing financing, but they also tend to get involved in the 
managing of the venture business. In other words, both VCIs and ICTVBs want to make 
sure their investment is good and capable of getting back the amount invested as well as a 
huge profit. Thus, the affected management policies of the venture business with the 
involvement of the VCIs, which in turn will influence the extent of the occurrence of 
their management conflict, were considered justified indicators to be investigated.  
 
In addition, these two indicators were considered pertinent for increasing the 
complexity of managing the venture business contracted between the VCIs and ICTVBs. 
The data on these indicators were also collected from the same survey questionnaires. 
The selection of these indicators to assess management conflict was derived from the 
literature. They are as follows (the numbers in brackets represent the actual number of 
sub-variables to the main indicators in the survey questionnaires):  
 
a) Affected management policies of the venture business (8) – i.e. corporate 
mission and objectives, corporate strategy, organization structure, management 
system, decision-making process, information and control, incentive and reward 
system, and other (if any). 
 
b) Extent of management conflict experienced (4) – i.e. the frequency of 
management conflict encountered in their business relationship. 
  
The above variables or indicators and their sub-variables formed the basis for the 
construction of the questions in the survey questionnaires. The survey questionnaires 
were pre-tested to selected respondents in order to check the clarity of the questions. 
From the responses and interviews, it was concluded that the respondents were able to 
comprehend the terminologies and wordings used in the survey questionnaires.15 
  
 Based on the literature reviewed on venture capital, related theories, and concepts 
and how these concepts were operationalized (as discussed in Chapter 2 and this Chapter), 
a model is presented in Figure 3.1? to show the business relationship between the VCIs 
                                                          
15
 The survey questionnaires were drafted in English (i.e. there were no Bahasa Malaysia versions – the 
national language in Malaysia). 
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and ICTVBs in managing their venture business together. Basically this figure explains 
the governing factors (e.g. separation of ownership and control i.e. pertaining to the 
shareholding of the venture business between the VCIs and ICTVBs, etc.) that can affect 
their business relationship. Besides these factors, their business relationship is further 
affected by management conflict due to the differences in expertise and asymmetries of 
information between them. Thus, the management conflict needs to be reduced through 
reducing the asymmetries of information and using strategic ROMFs, among others. By 
doing so, hopefully their management conflict and other related costs can be reduced and 
ultimately improve their business relationship and the success of their venture business. 
(These strategic ROMFs will be discussed later in the Thesis).  
 
 In addition, Figure 3.2 following illustrates the assessment flow between the 
independent and dependent variables.  This figure illustrates the specific sets of ROMFs 
(i.e. the independent variables) and the management conflict (i.e. the dependent variable) 
indicators that are to be investigated. For example, the ROMFs at the deal origination and 
screening are sources of reference made by the VCIs and ICTVBs to get to know each 
other and to know what screening criteria they used. The indicators of management 
conflict are such as the affected management policies of the venture business with the 
involvement of VCIs (e.g. management system, decision-making process, information 
and control, etc.) and the actual occurrence of the conflict experienced (e.g. constantly, 
sometimes, rarely, etc.). 
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Figure 3.1: Explanatory relationships expected between VCIs and ICTVBs  
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the assessment between independent and  
dependent variables. 
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3.6.2 Operational definitions 
 
 In this Thesis, several terminologies are frequently mentioned and for the purpose 
of the whole research, these terminologies were defined as follows: 
 
3.6.2.1  Venture capital investors (VCIs) 
  
This term refers to both private and government initiated venture capital 
companies locally incorporated in Malaysia. Besides their private funds they also manage 
funds directly or indirectly from the Government of Malaysia and/or quasi-government 
entities. Their investment focuses is in the ICT industry and operate their businesses in 
and around the MSC and the Kuala Lumpur-Selangor areas in Malaysia. 
 
3.6.2.2  ICT venture businesses (ICTVBs) 
  
This term refers to the venture businesses locally incorporated in Malaysia. Their 
business focuses is in the ICT industry and operate their businesses in and around the 
MSC and the Kuala Lumpur-Selangor areas in Malaysia. 
Agency Problems: 
 
* Differences in areas of 
expertise; 
* Affected strategic 
management elements; 
and 
* Extent of occurrence of 
agency problems. 
Management Conflict: 
• Extent of occurrence of management conflict  
• Affected management policies of the venture 
business 
 
Reduction of management conflict between  
VCIs and ICTVBs 
Managerial Factors: 
• Deal origination & screening: 
o Sources referred 
o Screening criteria used 
• Evaluation: 
o Sourc s of due dilig nce used 
o Evaluation techniques used 
o Evaluation criteria considered 
• Deal structuring: 
o Investment instruments used 
o Legal provisions included 
• Monitoring & p st investme t: 
o Types preferred 
o Advice/contact applicability 
o Information required 
o Factors of ideal relationship 
• Acquiring liquidity: 
o Methods preferred 
• Risk management (RM): 
o Strategic importance of RM 
o Perception on market/agency risk 
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3.6.2.3  Venture capital process 
 
This term refers to the financing stages of venture capital and covers the full 
scope of venture capital financing activities at the pre-investment stage, post-investment 
stage, and risk management.  The activities of venture capital financing can be described 
as an orderly process involving five sequential steps: deal origination, deal screening, 
deal evaluation, deal structuring, and post-investment activities, which include acquiring 
liquidity and risk management (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan, Kulow and 
Khoylian, 1988; Sahlman, 1990; Fried and Hisrich, 1994). The involvement of 
meticulous and lengthy activities implies that due to the high risk of their venture 
business, both the VCIs and ICTVBs have to be cautious and strategic in their managerial 
factors starting from the pre-investment stage, and then following through to the post-
investment stage and for risk management.  
 
3.6.2.4  Recognition of managerial factors (ROMFs) 
 
This term refers to the strategic managerial practices and procedures of the VCIs 
and ICTVBs that facilitate or hinder the management and success of the venture business 
that they contracted into. In other words, this term relates to their specific preferences, 
importance and applicability of certain managerial practices and procedures in managing 
their venture business. For example, for due diligence and screening, the VCIs may prefer 
their own search for ICTVBs to invest and also they may prefer to use other independent 
market reports as the main screening criteria. Another example is for evaluation of the 
deal; the VCIs may prefer the market and cash-out potential as the main evaluation 
criteria to be used. As for the ICTVBs, they may have other preferences in terms of the 
sources of due diligence, screening and evaluation criteria to be used. Thus, this implies 
that their individual preferences may be due to their own expertise, business experiences, 
etc. In the context of reducing management conflict, these managerial practices and 
procedures are crucial for both parties.  Other specific examples of the ROMFs of the 
VCIs and ICTVBs are given in the related context of discussion throughout the Thesis. 
 
3.6.2.5  Business relationship 
 
 This term refers to the management relationship between the VCIs and ICTVBs 
engaged in co-operative efforts to manage the venture business they contracted into. 
Hence, contracts (whether behaviour-based or outcome-based) were employed to address 
management conflict that may arise in the course of this business relationship (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hart, 1995). Following this understanding, 
business relationship is the unit of analysis for this research.  
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3.6.2.6  Management conflict 
  
This term refers to the conflicts experienced by the VCIs and ICTVBs in 
managing together their venture business. Since this research focuses on two key 
stakeholders’ business relationship in venture capital financing, this term covers agency 
conflicts or problems that are impossible to fully contract away by both parties. 
According to the literature reviewed, examples of management conflict between the VCIs 
and ICTVBs are as follows. Firstly, conflicts in alignment and verification of goals for 
their venture business are such as cash-flow and profitability objectives, R&D 
expenditures, etc.  Secondly, conflicts in risk sharing of their venture business are such as 
the differences in the perception between the VCIs and ICTVBs on market and agency 
risks, etc. These conflicts lead to an increase in costs and risks, e.g. screening costs, 
bonding costs, monitoring costs, and other related operating-costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989; Sahlman, 1990; Van Osnabrugge, 2000). Other 
specific examples of management conflict between the VCIs and ICTVBs are given in 
the related context of discussion throughout the Thesis, particularly in the case studies of 
Chapter 4. 
 
3.7 SUMMARY 
 
 In conclusion, this chapter has discussed the methodology and the conceptual 
framework of analysis for this research. The data and information were collected through 
the survey questionnaires and supplemented by direct interview with selected respondents. 
The survey questionnaires were pre-tested in the first pilot study before it was used in the 
field study for the data and information collection. Then the collected responses were 
statistically analyzed. The next chapter will discuss and report the results of the 
descriptive statistics and statistical analysis on the data and information collected during 
the field study, which was conducted in March – April 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
49 
CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
 This chapter presents the results of the analyses of data collected for the research. 
Primary data and information were obtained from survey questionnaires sent to 24 VCIs 
and 100 ICTVBs operating in and around MSC, Malaysia (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
The mailed questionnaires were replied to by 19 VCIs and 41 ICTVBs. However, as 
expected, minor irregularities were encountered in the completed questionnaires (such as, 
non-response and unintelligible entries) which resulted as non-usable questionnaires. The 
effective response rate for the total sample of fifty-seven respondents was approximately 
47%.1   These sample size and percentage are considered reasonably effective for this 
research.2    This chapter is organized as follows. The following section contains the 
descriptive statistics that analyze information on the main characteristics and profiles of 
VCIs and ICTVBs and case studies of selected samples. Then it is followed by the 
statistical analysis of the t-Independent Samples test used to test the differences of the 
ROMFs between VCIs and ICTVBs (i.e. for hypotheses H1, H2 and H3). The Pearson’s 
Product-Moment correlation analysis is used to test the relationships between their 
ROMFs and management conflict indicators (i.e. for hypotheses H4, H5 and H6). Finally, 
the last section summarizes this chapter. 
 
4.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF VCIs AND ICTVBs IN MALAYSIA3 
 
 This section describes the essential background and several main characteristics 
of the VCIs and ICTVBs in Malaysia. It also highlights the focus on MSC as the 
exemplary case in Malaysia where this research was conducted in pursuing a better 
understanding of venture capital financing for the ICT industry. 
 
 For much of the 1990s, many researchers discussed and documented the so-called 
Asian Economic Miracle that would lead Asia into the rapid economic growth of the new 
knowledge-based economy. However, major international developments, e.g. the Asian 
Financial Crisis 1997-1998 and the technology bubble-burst of April 2000, among others, 
                                                          
1
 The non-usable questionnaires were one case from VCIs and two cases from ICTVBs. According to 
Bryman (2001, p. 96), the effective response rate is the percentage of a sample that agree to participate. Its 
calculation is as follows: Number of Usable Questionnaires divided by [Total Sample – Unsuitable or 
Uncontactable Members of the Sample] x 100. 
2
 Sample sizes larger than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate for most research (Roscoe, 1975; Sekaran, 
1992). For example, according to Sekaran (1992, p. 254), “as a rule of thumb, sample sizes between 30 and 
500 could be effective depending on the type of research questions investigated”. 
3
 Data and information for this section were sourced from Bank Negara Malaysia annual reports. The 
industry sources were from the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC) and Malaysia Venture Capital Association (MVCA). 
Under the Guidelines for Registration of Venture Capital Corporations (VCCs) and Venture Capital 
Management Corporations (VCMCs), which came into operation in 2002, all registered VCCs and VCMCs 
are required to submit annual activity reports to the Securities Commission within 30 days from every year-
end.  
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provided proof that the miracle was short-lived because of the adverse impacts on many 
of these countries, including Malaysia. In brief, faced with the new reality and increasing 
global competitiveness, Asian countries are diligently developing various initiatives in 
order to strengthen their internal economic structure, particularly the development of their 
small and medium size venture businesses to be the catalyst for future economic growth. 
In Malaysia, among the major initiatives taken by the government are the establishment 
of MSC in 1996 and further developmental strategies for venture businesses. These 
initiatives are also in tandem with the Vision 2020 which envisages the transformation of 
the country into a knowledge-based society and developed status by the year 2020 (as 
discussed in Appendix ‘B’). 
 
 
4.2.1 Main characteristics of VCIs in Malaysia 
 
 
 Silicon Valley, Taiwan, Singapore and many others have demonstrated that a 
vibrant venture capital industry can be a major catalyst to economic growth. Statistically, 
VCI-backed businesses have better results and greater chance of success than the average 
non-VCI-backed businesses. For example, the U.S. venture capital industry is famous for 
giving birth to many of the largest businesses such as Apple Computers, Compaq, 
Microsoft, Intel, Sun Microsystems, Netscape, etc. Thus, the emphasis on venture capital 
as the main alternative source of financing for venture businesses is not unique to 
Malaysia because it is based on the generally proven belief that developing a vibrant 
venture capital industry is indeed an integral part of the new knowledge-based economy. 
The following are some main characteristics of the industry and VCIs that are worth 
noting. 
 
 
a) Emerging nature of the industry 
 
 
 Historically, Malaysia’s development of this industry lagged behind the more 
developed countries, e.g. Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, etc. Although the first VCI was 
established in 1984, it was not until 1992 that the government started to seriously develop 
this industry through the establishment of the Malaysia Technology Development 
Corporation (MTDC) focusing on technology financing to the venture businesses. Other 
initiatives were also taken by the government and other VCIs emerged during the period 
prior to 1995, but it was not until 1996 (i.e. the establishment of MSC) that the pace of 
the development of this industry seemed to really take off. This trend can be clearly seen 
in figure 4.1 which shows the distribution of the number of VCIs and venture businesses 
invested and the amount of investment made. 
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Figure 4.1: Key statistics of Malaysia’s venture capital industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from Bank Negara Malaysia annual reports. (Since 1998,  
the exchange rate for Ringgit Malaysia (RM) has been fixed at RM3.80 to US$1.00). 
 
From this figure, the number of VCIs has increased steadily, from 13 in 1992 to 21 in 
1996 and to 43 in 2003. The number of venture businesses invested also has increased 
significantly, from 32 in 1992 to 231 in 1996 and to 298 in 2003. Similarly, the total 
annual amount of investments by VCIs also showed an increasing trend, from merely 
RM26 million in 1992, which increased to RM234 million and RM227 million in 1996 
and 2003 respectively.  Nevertheless, these figures also show that there were slight dips 
during the period of 1998 to 2001 due to the impacts of the Asian Financial Crisis and the 
technology bubble-burst. According to the industry sources, generally, Malaysia’s 
venture capital industry is still in its infancy compared with those in other neighboring 
countries such as Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. For instance, the size of funds of 
these industries in Singapore and Hong Kong are 10 and 32 times larger than in Malaysia 
respectively. 
 
b) Government as the main player 
 
 Since 1992, the government has continued its efforts in supporting this industry 
by providing adequate liquidity and incentives to meet the industry needs. Historically, 
the government was the main provider of funds to this industry as shown in figure 4.2 
below. 
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of main sources of funds for Malaysia’s venture capital industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from Bank Negara Malaysia annual reports. 
 
 
 On average, 43% of the total sources of funds for this industry were from the 
government, followed by 30% from corporations, 16% from banks and other financial 
institutions, 4% from insurance and pension funds and 7% from other sources (i.e. 
individuals and foreign VCIs). This is in contrast with developed countries, e.g. over 50% 
of funds for the venture capital industry in the U.S. are from private pension funds, 
endowments, insurance companies, etc.  
 
 The government also has established several government-owned VCIs to manage 
specific funds, e.g. Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Berhad (PUNB), Malaysia Venture 
Capital Management Berhad (MAVCAP), Kumpulan Modal Perdana Sdn. Bhd., MIMOS, 
etc. In 2002, the government also established the Malaysia Debt Ventures (MDV) with a 
total funds of RM1.6 billion (i.e. sourced from the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation), which mainly provides project-based loans to high value-added ICTVBs 
and other high-growth businesses and thus supplements VCIs and bank financing to these 
businesses. Moreover, since the government also holds many of the corporations and 
banks, its role, perhaps, is even more substantial. Other initiatives taken by the 
government are, for example, the Capital Market Masterplan, which was launched in 
2001. This plan includes recommendations for the future direction of this industry, e.g. 
the establishment of Islamic venture capital funds, matching services, etc. These facts 
suggest that the government is the main player in this industry through its substantial 
roles in providing funds and developmental measures, and perhaps similar situations can 
be found in most other developing countries. 
 
c) Domination by local VCIs 
 
 Unlike Taiwan, Hong Kong or Singapore with more developed venture capital 
industries, Malaysia’s industry is dominated by local VCIs. Historically, there are few 
foreign VCIs with an established presence in Malaysia, e.g. the South-East Asia Ventures 
Investments (SEAVI) and H & Q Asia Pacific Venture Management Pte. Ltd. (H & Q), 
Government
Corporations
Banks
Insurance/pension
fundsOthers
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
  
53 
both are from the U.S., PNB Nomura Jafco Management Sdn. Bhd. (PNBNJ) and BI 
Walden Management Sdn. Bhd. (BIWalden). According to the industry sources, currently, 
both SEAVI and H & Q are no longer active in Malaysia, but PNBNJ and BI Walden are 
still active. For instance, BIWalden has invested RM20 million in the last three years. 
Due to the Asian Financial Crisis that engulfed Asian countries, the government 
introduced selective capital control measures as a pre-emptive step in September 1998, 
which included making the national currency (RM=Ringgit Malaysia) non-tradable 
outside Malaysia and pegging the RM at RM3.80 to US$1.00. Although these measures 
are a desired policy to support growth and to improve Malaysia’s competitiveness and 
balance of payments, unintentionally this policy discouraged foreign investors including 
VCIs to operate in Malaysia. 
 
 As noted earlier, the majority of the VCIs in Malaysia have been either 
government-related or bank-related, and in almost all cases, they have chosen to manage 
their own funds rather than to outsource to other private independent VCIs which are 
considered to be more experienced and professional as commonly practiced in other 
developed countries. As a consequence of the domination of local VCIs and the 
reluctance to outsource, these VCIs are found to be lacking necessary expertise for 
helping venture businesses. This situation is different from other developed countries, e.g. 
in the U.S., where there are many successful entrepreneurs who became VCIs and who 
possessed experience, expertise and the funds to help other new entrepreneurs to build 
their businesses. 
 
d) Limited number of venture capital professionals 
 
 According to the industry sources, Malaysia also lags behind others in terms of 
number of venture capital professionals. Besides this shortage, the VCIs also do not seem 
to have the necessary expertise in appraising and running ICT venture businesses. As 
noted above, this could be due to the reluctance in the past to outsource the management 
of funds from the government and banks to private independent VCIs. Thus, it is not 
surprising to note that private independent VCIs have not featured substantially in 
Malaysia’s venture capital industry, as they are unable to raise substantial amounts of 
funds to manage although they might have the necessary experience and expertise in 
venture businesses. Nevertheless, this situation is changing now as the government in 
2001 has started to outsource its funds by selecting four private independent VCIs. The 
number of venture capital professionals also has gradually increased over the past couple 
of years as a result of a huge amount of funds having been allocated by the government to 
the industry. For instance, there are 153 venture capital professionals in the industry as of 
the end of 2003 as compared to 95 in 2001 (Securities Commission Annual Report 2003). 
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4.2.2 Main characteristics of ICTVBs in Malaysia 
 
 The role of small and medium-size venture businesses in the economic growth of 
many developed countries is well documented, e.g. these businesses created the majority 
of new employment and innovation that drove economic growth in the 1990s. For 
example, at its peak, Silicon Valley had more than 7,000 venture businesses that together 
created more than 50,000 new jobs each year. In fact, they contributed to turning 
California into one of the largest economies in the U.S. with a GDP exceeding many 
other developed countries. In Asia, the achievements of Taiwan and Korea, for example, 
have most successfully emulated that of Silicon Valley. For instance, many of the venture 
businesses in Taiwan and Korea have become world-class suppliers of electronics 
products. 
 
 Recognizing the importance of these small and medium size venture businesses in 
becoming the engine for economic growth, the Malaysian government has and will 
continue developmental measures to assist these businesses (Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001-
2005). The government has continued its efforts in the creation of an enabling 
environment for the development of venture businesses across all sectors of the economy, 
e.g. strengthening the infrastructure, building the capacity and improving the access to 
financing. These measures have become inevitable, particularly due to the adverse 
impacts of the Asian Financial Crisis and the technology bubble-burst. For instance, 
during the economic boom of the 1990s, venture businesses had less difficulty in getting 
financing from traditional sources, e.g. commercial banks. However, after the Asian 
Financial Crisis, lending by banks to these businesses in Malaysia has decreased 
substantially coupled by the continuing effects of non-performing loans and other 
ongoing international uncertainties. In relation to this scenario, ICTVBs face even greater 
challenges because of their nature, e.g. little or no collateral and their ‘high-risk high-
return’ kind of business that normally makes it difficult for them to secure financing from 
banks (as discussed in Appendix ‘C’). Thus, like their counterparts globally, have to rely 
on alternative sources of financing, especially from the VCIs. 
 
 The following are some main characteristics of the ICT industry and ICTVBs in 
Malaysia that are worth noting because these characteristics might create difficulty for 
the ICTVBs to procure financing for their business needs. 
 
a) Emerging nature of ICT industry 
 
 The Malaysian economy is an open economy and international trade makes up 
more than half of the GNP. Traditionally, a substantial proportion of its exports are 
primary commodities which are subject to international price fluctuations. Thus, the 
government has encouraged the growth of manufacturing in the resource-based industries. 
Nevertheless, realizing the hollowing out effects of its traditional economics sectors and 
the need to drive the economy towards higher productivity through technology, a 
strategic initiative in the establishment of MSC in 1996 was taken by Malaysia (as 
discussed in Appendix ‘B’). Besides spearheading Malaysia’s industrialization, MSC is 
  
55 
now a place where ICTVBs can develop. The investment opportunities for venture capital 
financing also have been further enhanced with the establishment of MSC. 
 
 In terms of yearly investments of VCIs by economic sectors, there was a 
significant shift in their preferences with many of them now investing in the new growth 
sectors of ICT and life sciences as shown in figure 4.3 below. 
 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of VCIs’ investments by economic sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia annual reports. 
 
 
Source: Based on data from Bank Negara Malaysia annual reports. 
 
 From this figure, on one side, consonant with the industrial development in 
Malaysia, VCIs’ investments in manufacturing are still strong, averaging annually at 23% 
for the period of 1999 to 2003. On the other, ICT and life sciences have attracted 
significant interest among the VCIs over these last couple of years with an annual 
average of 54%. Nevertheless, according to the industry sources, the fact remains that 
Malaysia’s emerging ICT industry has yet to produce a success story of any home-grown 
ICTVBs becoming world-class businesses, e.g. Acer in Taiwan, Hotmail in India, 
Creative Technologies in Singapore. Perhaps, the reason for this is largely due to the 
innovative capacity of these ICTVBs in Malaysia not being as strong as in most of the 
developed countries. For instance, the total expenditure on R&D as the percentage of 
GDP for 2000 was only 0.5% in Malaysia compared to 3.1% in Japan, 2.7% in Korea and 
1.9% in Taiwan (World Competitiveness Report 2002). Currently, there is a 30% 
shortage of scientists and technologists across all industry sectors in Malaysia. In relation 
to this, one of the thrusts in the National Science & Technology Policy 2, which was 
launched in 2003, is to create a competent R&D workforce with at least 60 scientists and 
engineers per 10,000 of the population by the year 2010.  
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 Thus, it is not surprising that many VCIs in Malaysia are complaining that they 
are seeing a lot of ideas but most are business ideas without that unique breakthrough 
technology behind them. In brief, the emerging nature of the ICT industry in Malaysia 
could be one of the reasons that VCIs and other investors have yet to accumulate a 
sufficient stock of know-how (e.g. venture business operations, R&D activities, etc.) and 
capacity of credit analysis (e.g. appraising technology-based businesses) in their 
transactions with ICTVBs. 
 
b) Domination by ICTVBs at the early stage of growth 
 
 Since the establishment of MSC in 1996, the proliferation of ICTVBs has been 
very encouraging and has exceeded the original target set by the government (as 
discussed in Appendix ‘B’). According to MDC, the number of ICTVBs is expected to 
increase further from 914 as of August 2003 to more than 1,300 in 2004. The government 
has continued its efforts in supporting the growth of ICTVBs by launching several 
measures in its Economic Stimulus Package in 2003 and the 2004 Budget, e.g. the 
establishment of Malaysia Debt Ventures Berhad, Cradle Investment Programme, etc. 
Among the main objectives of these measures were to produce quality ICTVBs and in 
turn generate a more vibrant and sustainable entrepreneurial environment in Malaysia 
(BNM Annual Report 2003). 
 
 In relation to this, venture capital financing is gaining recognition as an 
alternative source of funds for ICTVBs. There was encouraging development over these 
few years whereby investments by VCIs in ICTVBs at the start-up and early stages were 
on an increasing trend, with an annual average of 38% compared to 29% for ICTVBs at 
the growth stage and 33% for others (e.g. bridge/mezzanine/recapitalization and pre-IPO) 
as shown in figure 4.4 below. 
 
Figure 4.4: Distribution of VCIs’ yearly investments by stages of venture businesses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from Bank Negara Malaysia annual reports. 
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 Prior to 1999, the majority of VCIs’ investments were in the ICTVBs at the later 
stage. However, since 1999 the numbers of investments in ICTVBs at the start-up and 
early stages have increased significantly, particularly due to the increased allocation of 
funds by the government to invest in the new growth sector of ICT. The higher 
percentage of VCIs’ investments in the ICTVBs at the start-up and early stages suggests 
an increase in risk tolerance of the VCIs in supporting ICTVBs during the more risky 
period of their developmental growth. Nevertheless, this fact also suggests that as most of 
these ICTVBs are starting anew, they normally do not have track record, collateral, etc., 
thus, not many investors would want to venture into the unknown, except specialist 
investors such as VCIs. 
 
c) Fragile foundations in managerial resources 
 
 In tandem with the nature of the start-up and early stages, these ICTVBs 
apparently have some structural deficiencies in their business managerial aspects, e.g. 
lack of experience, incomplete management team, etc. For instance, many of these 
ICTVBs have a shortage of R&D specialists (34.8%), technicians (29.9%) and marketing 
specialists (25.3%), etc. (JBIC, 2001). JBIC further stresses that the current situation of 
these ICTVBs in Malaysia is that they are not only having a shortage of marketing 
experts, but also training programs for managers and supervisors are still in a state of 
development. It is logical that to succeed the business idea or technological know-how, 
the ICTVBs must complement it with management, corporate finance and marketing 
expertise, among others. Thus, it is important that these ICTVBs be prepared to work 
with those who have these expertises because this will not only improve the chances of 
success but should there be failure, ICTVBs will not bear the whole risk. 
 
d) Corporate culture of the ICTVBs 
 
 According to the industry sources, in Malaysia, it is quite common for ICTVBs to 
keep their technical knowledge to themselves. These ICTVBs will not share this technical 
knowledge with others for fear of losing their advantage. This situation is perhaps 
contrary with the developed countries where technical knowledge is freely disseminated 
and shared through publications and other means, whereby the innovator will be paid 
royalty or some sort of fees. For instance, JBIC (2001) contends that venture businesses 
in Malaysia were reluctant to disclose information to the outsiders because they looked 
on it as part of their business strategy and trade secret. The insufficient information 
disclosures by these businesses were not only in R&D activities, financial conditions but 
also in some extreme cases, all information about business operations. 
 
 Another corporate culture of the ICTVBs in Malaysia is that they are reluctant to 
dilute the ownership of the venture business. It is quite common for the originators or 
entrepreneurs to hold the majority shareholding of the venture businesses because they 
have invested a lot of personal wealth and efforts in building their business. According to 
Bank Negara Malaysia, the reluctance to dilute ownership by the venture businesses is 
one of the factors that have hampered the development of vibrant venture capital 
financing in Malaysia. 
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 In summary, the establishment of MSC, with one of its objectives to successfully 
create clusters of ICTVBs has been considered as the main initiative by the government 
to spearhead Malaysia into the new knowledge-based economy and developed nation 
status in 2020. Given that this new economy is expected to be driven by venture 
businesses with lots of ideas but no track record, venture capital financing is seen as 
having a critical role to play as an alternative source of funds to finance these businesses. 
Although the Asian Financial Crisis and technology bubble-burst have affected the 
business climate in Malaysia and globally, MSC remains a highly ambitious initiative and 
thus presented the avenue for this research to study venture capital financing for ICTVBs. 
Hopefully, the discussion above on some of the main characteristics of the industries, 
VCIs and ICTVBs in Malaysia, which constitute the marked different settings from 
developed countries, will enrich the understanding of this research. 
 
4.3 PROFILES OF VCIs AND ICTVBs IN THE SAMPLE 
 
4.3.1 Profile of VCIs (N=18) 
 
 This section analyzes the profile of VCIs in the sample. The dimensions analyzed 
are business history (i.e. year of incorporation), total employees and venture capital 
executives, amount of funds managed and invested, number of venture businesses 
invested, and equity stakes. Figure 4.5 shows the distributions of the different types of 
VCIs in the sample. 
 
Figure 4.5: The profiles of VCIs in the sample according to type 
 
 
Source: Survey on Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia conducted in March – April 2003. 
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 The chosen 18 VCIs in the sample are comprised of 6 government-related, 4 
bank-related and 8 private independent VCIs. The following explanations in this 
paragraph and the next one are based on average figures. For the government-related 
VCIs, their average number of years in operation is 8 years with 43 total employees and 9 
venture capital executives. Thus far, the number of venture businesses that they have 
invested is 40 businesses with total investments of RM114 million. In terms of total funds 
under their management, the amount is RM245 million. They usually take an equity stake 
of 28% in the venture businesses that they invested. The bank-related VCIs also have 
been in operation for quite some times, on average 6 years. Their total employees and 
venture capital executives are 16 and 8 persons respectively. They have invested in 
approximately 23 venture businesses with total investments of RM129 million. This 
amount was higher than the government-related VCIs’ investments, reflecting that they 
are not as cautious as the government-related VCIs, which manage public funds. The 
amount of funds under their management is also comparable to the government-related 
VCIs, i.e. RM198 million. However, they managed to get an equity stake of 40%, which 
was much higher than the government-related VCIs.  
 
 Although there were many private independent VCIs in the sample, they are 
typically young, having 5 years business history. They also manage small amounts of 
funds, i.e. RM30 million, and their total employees number 6 persons and 3 venture 
capital executives. The number of venture businesses that they invested is 5 businesses 
with total investments averaging RM15 million only. In terms of equity stake, these 
private independent VCIs manage to get 55%, i.e. the highest among the VCIs in the 
sample. This fact suggests that they are the most cautious among these VCIs because they 
manage their own funds, and also they are willing to take more risk in the venture 
business through their holding of a higher percentage of the equity. 
 
 In general, the majority of these VCIs are new in this emerging industry in 
Malaysia. A closer look at the data also revealed that perhaps due to the Asian Financial 
Crisis, the incorporation of VCIs decreased as only one was incorporated during this time. 
However, the number of incorporated VCIs increased sharply during the period of 2000 
to 2002, suggesting that after the technology bubble-burst subdued and several 
encouraging measures were taken by the government (e.g. tax incentives and additional 
ICT funds from the Japanese government, etc) this industry began to experience 
recognition in financing ICTVBs. Most of them are also relatively small in size as 
compared to VCIs in the developed countries. The limited number of venture capital 
executives suggests that the man-power capabilities (e.g. know-how) and real personal 
experience of running a venture business are still lacking and will be among the major 
constraints in developing a vibrant industry in Malaysia (as discussed in Appendix ‘A’). 
In addition, only 24% of these VCIs have an equity stake of over 51% per investment 
made in the venture businesses. These facts suggest that it is difficult for the VCIs to 
have a majority shareholding (i.e. 51 % and above) of the venture business they 
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invested.4  This is partly due to the corporate culture of the ICTVBs in Malaysia as noted 
earlier, e.g. reluctance to dilute their share ownership, etc.  
  
These VCIs received approximately125 venture proposals and from this number, 
75 proposals or 60% were reviewed and only five proposals or 4% were invested 
annually. These facts suggest that the VCIs are very selective in making their investments 
as prescribed by the literature reviewed, particularly in the high-risk venture businesses in 
ICT industry. Though normally success is not guaranteed, the VCIs have to be stringent 
in selecting ICTVBs because their main objective is to make capital gains, thus targeting 
the right ICTVBs is important for them. Moreover, as noted earlier in Section 4.2 that the 
ICT industry in Malaysia is relatively new and dominated by ICTVBs at the early and 
growth stages, VCIs are naturally cautious as there are still many unknowns about these 
ICTVBs. Like elsewhere, the technology bubble burst has in fact affected Malaysia’s 
nascent ICT industry where some ICTVBs failed and VCIs that did invest are believed to 
have suffered losses. While failed investments are quite normal in the ICT and venture 
capital industries, the fact remains that VCIs have to be prudent in making their 
investments. 
 
4.3.2 Profile of ICTVBs (N=39) 
 
 
 This section analyzes the profile of ICTVBs in the sample. The dimensions 
analyzed are business history (i.e. year of incorporation), total and technical employees, 
net assets, annual sales, current rate of return on investment (ROI) and business focus. 
Figure 4.6 below shows that 39 ICTVBs were selected for this research, which comprises 
8, 9 and 22 large, medium and small-sized ICTVBs respectively. This classification is 
based on the total employees, i.e. more than 100 persons (large-size), 50 to 100 persons 
(medium-size) and less than 50 persons (small-size). Moreover, size classification of 
these ICTVBs is very useful because it normally corresponds to their business history and 
accounts for the differences in tax and financial treatments, among others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The literature reviewed indicates that VCIs usually own less than 50% of the shares in ICTVBs. For 
example, in the U.S., the average equity stake is 25% (Carter and Van Aiken, 1994), while in the U.K. most 
VCIs also take a 10 – 30% equity stake in their investment (Cary, 1995) [cf. Van Osnabrugge and 
Robinson, 2000, p. 183]. 
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Figure 4.6: The profiles of ICTVBs in the sample according to size 
 
 
 
Source: Survey on Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia conducted in March – April 2003. 
 (Note: The maximum scale for equity stakes is 50% because some of these ICTVBs have good  
 performance and ROI). 
  
 The explanations in this paragraph and the next one are based on average figures 
as shown in figure 4.6 above. The large-size ICTVBs have been in operation for about 8 
years with total employees and technical staff of 250 and 100 persons respectively. Thus, 
they are considered established businesses with net assets of RM35 million and annual 
sales of RM50 million. Currently, their businesses manage to yield a 20% return on 
investment. These facts suggest that these ICTVBs are mostly at the growth stage and 
have a complete management team, track record, etc. The medium-size ICTVBs are also 
quite established with 6 years of business history. Typically, they employ about 57 total 
employees and have 23 technical staff. Their net assets are RM7 million and annual sales 
of RM14 million, i.e. lower than the large-size ICTVBs. Nevertheless, their current rate 
of return on investment (ROI) is slightly higher, i.e. about 22% annually.  
 
 The small-size ICTVBs mostly started their businesses just about 4 years ago and 
only have 19 total employees with typically few technical staff, i.e. 7 persons. Since they 
are at their early stage of development, they have a smaller amount of net assets (i.e. 
RM2 million) but stated annual sales of RM5 million. They also stated that currently their 
businesses manage to generate return on investment of 22% per year and most of them 
are involved in Internet-based, software and content development businesses. In Malaysia, 
although the large-size ICTVBs dominate, the medium and small-size ICTVBs have each 
shown a reasonably good performance with a slightly higher ROI than the large-size 
  
62 
ICTVBs. However, compared with other developed countries, there is still some room for 
improvement in performance and ROI for these ICTVBs. 
 
 A detailed examination of the data revealed that thirty-one or 80% of them were 
incorporated for less than ten years with relatively fewer total employees and technical 
staff as compared to most ICTVBs in the developed countries. These facts suggest that 
the ICT industry is emerging in Malaysia similarly with the venture capital industry. 
Although there was an increase in the number of ICTVBs incorporated, particularly with 
the establishment of MSC in 1996 and after the technology bubble-burst subdued in the 
later part of 2000, these ICTVBs are relatively small in size, and most of them are in their 
early and growth stages of their development.  
 
 Their main technological focuses are shown in figure 4.7 below. Based on 
frequency counts, the majority or 80% of them were involved in capital-intensive new 
technology-based production businesses (e.g. system integration, telecommunications, 
software and hardware development) in comparison to 20% involved in less capital-
intensive businesses such as education and training, consultancy, and life sciences.  This 
fact suggests that capital is critically important to support their venture businesses. Thus, 
specialized financiers such as VCIs are needed as most of these ICTVBs are at their early 
and growth stages and thus require a lot of capital now and also to finance their future 
expansion programs. 
 
Figure 4.7: Distribution of main technological focuses of ICTVBs 
 Legend: 
  
A = Computer/Security System& Integration 
  B = Telecomm./Networking/Data & Support Centers/Heavy Users 
  C = Software/Content Developments & Specialized Business Applications 
  D = Internet-based Businesses 
  E = Education/Training &Consultancy 
  F = Hardware Design & Electronics 
  G = Other (i.e. Life Sciences/Biotechnology/Production/Animation 
Source: Survey on Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia conducted in March – April 2003. 
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4.4 TOTAL SAMPLE (N=57) 
 
 For the total sample (i.e. both VCIs and ICTVBs), 22 respondents or 39% of them 
allocated a period for planning of investment of less than two years, twenty-six or 46% of 
them allocated period of three to four years, and nine or 15% of them allocated period of 
more than five years. This fact suggests that both VCIs and ICTVBs are proper and 
diligent in managing their business by allocating quite a longer time frame for planning 
their investment.  
 
 Their distribution of acceptable investment duration and preferred rate of return 
on investment (ROI) is shown in figures 4.8 and 4.9 following. Thirty-six or 63% of them 
preferred five to six years of investment duration. This fact suggests that both VCIs and 
ICTVBs prefer quite a long investment duration. Reasons for this are for example, most 
of these VCIs manage government funds with longer maturity periods thus allowing them 
to be quite patient in their investment in ICTVBs. This is quite different from the 
developed countries (as discussed in Appendix ‘A’) whereby normally the VCIs would 
like to acquire liquidity for their investment as early as possible (e.g. within 2 years or at 
the most 3 years in the U.S.). Another reason is perhaps due to the availability of ample 
avenues for acquiring liquidity for their investments such as special stock exchanges for 
technology-based venture businesses (e.g. NASDAQ in the U.S., JASDAQ and 
MOTHER in Japan, etc). As for the ICTVBs, since most of them are young and at their 
early and growth stages they probably require longer investment duration before they 
could generate good returns.  In terms of preferred rate of return on investment (ROI), 
forty-six or 81% of them preferred ROI of 21% to 40%. This fact indicates that this is 
quite high as compared to the normal 10% to 15% for manufacturing and other kinds of 
businesses in Malaysia.  
 
Figure 4.8: Distribution of acceptable investment duration (N=57) 
Source: Survey on Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia conducted in March – April 2003. 
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of acceptable return on investment (ROI) (N=57) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Survey on Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia conducted in March – April 2003. 
  
 In their business relationship, 73% of them experienced management conflict 
“sometimes and often or constantly” in comparison to 27% “never or rarely” and the 
distribution can be seen in figure 4.10 below. This fact suggests that management conflict 
is a serious matter in their business relationship as prescribed in the literature reviewed. 
Perhaps, this is partly due to the emerging nature of both industries. The majority of the 
ICTVBs are also at their early and growth stages, which inevitably have many 
management problems. Thus, both the VCIs and ICTVBs need to find ways and means 
for an amicable business relationship as this is important to the success of the venture 
business they contracted into. 
 
Figure 4.10: Distribution of extent of management conflict 
experienced by the respondents (N=57) 
 Source: Survey on Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia conducted in March – April 2003. 
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4.5 CASE STUDIES 
 
 This section presents six case studies (i.e. three each for VCIs and ICTVBs), 
which aim to show the detail of the differences in their ROMFs and management conflict 
experienced as observed in the practical venture capital process. Hopefully, from these 
case studies, several hypothetical observations can be derived on the business relationship 
between VCIs and ICTVBs, particularly regarding their ROMFs and the management 
conflict that they experienced.  As the researcher has pledged confidentiality to the 
respondents, references to each case will only be referred by numbers, e.g. VCI One, 
ICTVB One, etc.  
 
4.5.1 VCIs’ case studies 
 
 The following cases are of the VCIs based on their size and sources of funding. 
They are as follows: 
 
a) VCI One 
 
 VCI One is a venture capital company that manages the largest funds in the 
industry and is owned by the government. It was incorporated in 2001 and was allocated 
funds totalling RM500 million for the purpose of providing financing and nurturing the 
development of the ICT and venture capital industries in Malaysia. Its main investment 
focuses are in ICT and high-growth sectors, e.g. ICT domains, Internet-based domains, 
life sciences, etc. Its geographical focuses are Malaysia and also overseas. It has total 
employees of 36 which include 14 venture capital executives, making it among the larger 
size VCIs in terms of personnel and funds. Currently, the total amount invested in 17 
venture businesses is approximately RM100 million with an available balance to invest of 
RM400 million. The percentages of equity stake per investment made are in the range of 
minimum 10% and maximum of 49%. The acceptable duration of investment preferred 
by VCI One is between 3 to 7 years with a minimum return on investment (ROI) of 25% 
per year. Normally, the time taken by VCI One in making an investment, i.e. from 
receiving a venture proposal to completion of investment could vary from three to nine 
months, depending on each case. 
 
 At the pre-investment stage, the specific ROMF of VCI One normally uses for 
deal origination is an active search personally and through the referral process (i.e. 
usually from other VCIs or banks), for venture businesses to invest. For screening criteria, 
VCI One uses the production technology, the management team of the venture businesses 
and the market potential of the products/services as among the most important criteria. As 
for evaluation of venture business proposals, the main sources of due diligence VCI One 
normally uses are their own market evaluation as the most essential and followed by 
independent markets reports and personal references. VCI One also uses the internal rate 
of return (IRR) and net present value (NPV) as the most essential evaluation techniques 
to evaluate venture business proposals. The most important evaluation criteria VCI One 
uses are the market attractiveness and the cash-out potential of the venture businesses. 
For deal structuring, VCI One prefers using a specific investment instrument, particularly 
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in the form of preferred and common equity but not in the form of debt (whether short or 
long-term). In its financial contract agreements with venture businesses, almost all the 
normal legal provisions are included, particularly the board structure, information rights 
and other negative covenants. VCI One stresses that “we invest public money so we have 
to invest conservatively and go for relatively safe investments which are sure will 
produce positive returns”.   
  
 At the post-investment stage, VCI One prefers both the specific contractual 
monitoring (i.e. legally defined) and also the non-contractual monitoring (i.e. based on 
trust and understanding). In maintaining its business relationships with the venture 
businesses, VCI One requires board directorship and submission of periodical reports of 
the business’s progress from them. In the aspect of information exchange with its venture 
businesses, VCI One usually provides advice and contacts for business and other 
entrepreneurship matters to them because these are considered most important for their 
success. In return, VCI One requires certain types of information from them, e.g. 
budgetary and capital structure, financial and management accounts, and most 
importantly the technological information of the venture business. As for factors in 
determining ideal business relationships with its venture businesses, VCI One gives 
priority to motivation and reputation factors. Finally, for the method of acquiring 
liquidity of its investment in the venture businesses, initial public offering (IPO) is the 
most preferred method to VCI One. 
 
 For the overall risk management of the venture businesses, VCI One rates 
management risk (e.g. less effort, not articulate of the venture businesses) and 
inexperience risk (e.g. poor leadership and poor track records of the venture businesses) 
as the two most strategic and important aspects for the success of the venture businesses. 
VCI One has quite a balance perception towards market and agency risks in managing the 
venture businesses. In terms of expertise, VCI One claims that it has very good 
knowledge in managerial staff and reasonably good knowledge in markets, budgetary and 
capital structure. VCI One’s involvement in its venture businesses must have a very great 
deal of influence in their management, particularly in the decision-making process, 
management system, information and control. Otherwise, it is difficult to monitor these 
venture businesses. 
 
 On the extent of occurrence of management conflict with its venture businesses, 
VCI One experiences this conflict constantly. Thus, VCI One ranks the ROMFs for deal 
structuring, monitoring and overall risk management as most important to reduce its 
exposure to this conflict with its venture businesses. According to VCI One, examples of 
the management conflict it normally faces with venture businesses are matters pertaining 
to R&D expenditures, production costing, failures in meeting performance targets, etc. 
VCI One also comments as follows: “ideally, entrepreneurs should learn how to work 
with us in an interactive manner. They need to show us the real value of their business”. 
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b) VCI Two 
 
 VCI Two is a private venture capital company, i.e. a subsidiary of a well-known 
commercial bank in Malaysia. It was incorporated in 1992 and its main investment 
focuses are in ICT, multimedia, biotechnology and advance manufacturing sectors 
primarily in Malaysia. The total number of employees is 20 which include 13 venture 
capital executives, putting it in the medium size category. Currently, the total amount 
invested in 36 venture businesses is approximately RM250 million with an available 
balance to invest of RM120 million. The percentages of equity stake per investment made 
are anything from 5% to 30%. The acceptable duration of investment preferred by VCI 
Two is between 3 to 7 years with a minimum return on investment (ROI) of 25% per year. 
The time scale taken by VCI Two in making an investment in the venture businesses is 
usually less than six months. 
 
 At the pre-investment stage, the typical ROMF of VCI Two usually uses for deal 
origination of venture businesses to invest is an active search personally and through the 
referral process (e.g. outsourcing). VCI Two normally uses the size & business model, 
the production technology, the management team of the venture businesses and the 
commercialization of the products/services as the most important screening criteria. The 
most essential sources of due diligence used by VCI Two are independent markets (i.e. 
accountant) reports and technical due diligence from other experts. In evaluating the 
business’s proposal from venture business, VCI Two uses the internal rate of return (IRR), 
net present value (NPV) and qualitative assessment as the most essential evaluation 
techniques. As for the evaluation criteria used, VCI Two typically emphasizes the 
importance of market attractiveness, the managerial capabilities and the cash-out 
potential of the venture businesses. VCI Two prefers an investment instrument in the 
form of preferred equity with convertibles in its deal structuring with the venture 
businesses. VCI Two normally insists on legal provisions that are specifically defined, 
particularly the information rights, negative covenants and conversion rights of 
preference shares at an agreed value. VCI Two says that “different VCIs have different 
expectations, thus, entrepreneurs need to fully comprehend the complexity we face in 
trying to benchmark the hundreds of proposals that we received. We also need to operate 
within the operational guidelines and the cost of funds to be met”.   
 
 According to VCI Two, it usually prefers both the specific contractual monitoring 
(i.e. legally defined) and also the non-contractual monitoring (i.e. based on trust and 
understanding). VCI Two normally requires board directorship and compulsory 
submission of periodical reports of businesses’ progress (i.e. quarterly or if necessary on 
a monthly basis) for maintaining its business relationships with the venture businesses. 
VCI Two also prefers to maintain close personal relationships with the venture businesses. 
In the aspect of information exchange with its venture businesses, VCI Two usually 
provides advice and contacts for entrepreneurship and personnel matters to them as these 
are considered the most important aspects for their success. However, VCI Two insists on 
information about the revenue model, financial and management accounts, technological 
and supply sources from the venture businesses. VCI Two gives priority to the maximum 
return on investment, appropriate capital structure and free-sharing of information as the 
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most important factors in determining ideal business relationships with its venture 
businesses. As for the method for acquiring liquidity of its investments, initial public 
offering (IPO) is VCI Two’s most preferred method. 
 
 For the overall risk management of the venture businesses, VCI Two rates 
inexperience risk (e.g. poor leadership and poor track records of the venture businesses) 
as the most strategic aspect for the success of the venture businesses. VCI Two ranks 
agency risks much higher than market risks in managing the venture businesses. VCI 
Two claims that it has very good expertise in budgetary and capital structure but is not 
really knowledgeable in technology and technical staff matters. According to VCI Two, 
its involvement in the venture businesses must have a very great deal of influence in the 
decision-making process, management system, information and control of the venture 
businesses. 
 
 Thus far, VCI Two claims that it has cultivated a reputation for working closely 
with its venture businesses by displaying a high level of its commitment towards them. 
However, on the extent of occurrence of management conflict with its venture businesses, 
VCI Two experiences this conflict sometimes, e.g. over matters pertaining to production 
issues, operating expenses and failures in meeting targets (e.g. sales and profit targets).  
VCI Two’s most important ROMFs for reducing this conflict are evaluation, deal 
structuring and monitoring, and it further comments that “the biggest issue is to have a 
regular meeting (i.e. formal or not formal) where both parties can have better 
understanding on their respective expectations”. 
 
c) VCI Three 
 
 VCI Three, as an institution, is a private independent venture capital company in 
Malaysia. It was incorporated in 2001 and manages a small amount of funds totalling 
RM25 million and has total employees of only 4 which include 3 venture capital 
executives, making it among the small size VCIs in terms of personnel and funds.  As a 
person, VCI Three is a well-known player in Malaysia’s venture capital scene. He has 
spent 14 years in the banking and investment field with an international banking group. 
VCI Three’s main investment focuses are in the ICT and multimedia sectors, e.g. 
software and content development. Its geographical focus is predominantly Malaysia. 
Currently, its investments in 6 venture businesses amounts to approximately RM10 
million with an available balance to invest of RM15 million. The percentages of equity 
stake per investment made are in the range of minimum 10% and maximum of 70%. VCI 
Three prefers 3 – 4 years of investment duration in the venture businesses and with a 
minimum return on investment (ROI) of 35% per year. Normally, the time taken by VCI 
Three in making investment in venture businesses varies from three to six months, 
depending on the stage of investment. 
 
 At the pre-investment stage, the specific ROMF of VCI Three uses for deal 
origination is conducted an active search personally, or through the referral process or 
through trade exhibitions. For screening criteria, the management team of the venture 
businesses, the production technology and the market potential of the products/services 
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are the most important criteria used by VCI Three. A personal reference is the main 
source of due diligence and qualitative assessment is the most essential evaluation 
technique to evaluate venture business proposals. VCI Three also stresses “skip the 
number on a business plan, any body can run a spread sheet program. A sound business 
concept is far more important and a weak management team rarely succeeds”. Market 
attractiveness and managerial capabilities of the venture business are used as the main 
evaluation criteria by VCI Three, and it normally requires an investment instrument in the 
form of preferred equity for deal structuring. In its financial contract agreement with the 
venture businesses, all the normal legal provisions are included especially the board 
directorship, information rights and compulsory check signatories.   
 
 For monitoring its venture businesses at the post-investment stage, VCI Three 
prefers both the specific contractual monitoring and also the non-contractual monitoring 
(i.e. based on trust and understanding). To maintain its business relationships with the 
venture businesses, VCI Three insists on a board directorship and submission of 
periodical reports of businesses’ progress. VCI Three usually provides advice and 
contacts for business, consulting services and marketing assistance to its venture 
businesses and requires technological and managerial information from them. VCI Three 
considers efficient risk-sharing and free-sharing of information as the most important 
factors for ideal business relationships with its venture businesses. VCI Three prefers 
initial public offering (IPO) and secondary sale in order to acquire liquidity of its 
investments in venture businesses. 
 
 To VCI Three, the most important aspect for the success of the venture businesses 
is the management risk (e.g. less effort, not articulate of the venture businesses). 
However, VCI Three has higher perception towards agency risks than market risks in 
managing the venture businesses. VCI Three claims that it has very good knowledge of 
capital structure, investments, markets, budgetary and business strategy. VCI Three 
believes that its involvement in the venture businesses must have a very great deal of 
influence in the information & control and incentive & reward system of the venture 
businesses in order to monitor their performance. 
 
 On the extent of occurrence of management conflict (e.g. matters pertaining to the 
strategic information required, failures in meeting set targets and differences in cash-flow 
and profitability objectives) with its venture businesses, VCI Three experiences this 
conflict very often and ranks highest for the ROMFs in evaluation, deal structuring, 
monitoring and overall risk management. According to VCI Three these are very helpful 
in reducing this conflict with its venture businesses based on its experience thus far. 
Finally, VCI Three comments that “we are calculated risk takers not gamblers. Conflict 
with them is inevitable because we have different priorities. For example, they view 
product development and production as top whilst we are just the opposite. To us, 
financial and operating leverages are as important as technological leverages”. 
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4.5.2 ICTVBs’ case studies 
 
 The following cases are of the ICTVBs based on their size of employees. They 
are as follows: 
  
a) ICTVB One 
 
 ICTVB One was incorporated in 1994 and its main business focuses are in 
hardware design, electronics, engineering and specialized business applications. Its total 
employees number 450, which includes 70 technical staff, making it among the 
established and larger-sized venture businesses in Malaysia. Currently, its net assets are 
RM10 million with an annual sales volume of approximately RM15 million. The desired 
duration of the VCIs’ investment in its venture business is 5 years with a minimum return 
on investment (ROI) of 25% per year. So far, it has successfully secured two rounds of 
financing from the VCIs. Based on its experience, normally the time taken by VCIs in 
making investment in ICTVB One has been three to six months. According to ICTVB 
One, this is considered fast and could be due to its good track record, e.g. management 
team and proven products. 
 
 At the pre-investment stage, the specific ROMF of ICTVB One used for deal 
origination is to approach the VCIs directly. For screening criteria, ICTVB One uses its 
production technology, management team and the market potential of its 
products/services as the most important criteria in preparing proposals to the VCIs. The 
main sources of due diligence normally used by ICTVB One are to carry out its own 
market evaluation and personal references (e.g. agencies and dealers) as the most 
essential sources to support its proposal. ICTVB One prefers to use the internal rate of 
return (IRR) as the most essential technique to evaluate its venture proposals. According 
to ICTVB One, in order to increase the probability of its proposals being accepted by the 
VCIs, the market attractiveness, product differentiation and managerial capabilities are 
the most important evaluation criteria it normally uses. For deal structuring, ICTVB One 
issues preferred equity as the specific investment instrument to entice the VCIs. In its 
financial contract agreement with the VCIs, besides the normal legal provisions, it insists 
on the provision of its ‘golden share’ to be included.   
 
 At the post-investment stage, ICTVB One prefers non-contractual monitoring (i.e. 
based on trust and understanding). In maintaining its business relationships with the VCIs, 
ICTVB One allows board directorship and provides periodical reports of its business 
progress to them. In the aspect of information exchange with its VCIs, it usually provides 
current technological information to them so that they can understand better its business. 
In return, ICTVB One requires information on budgetary and capital structure, financial 
and management accounts, and also assistance on marketing contacts from them. As for 
factors in determining ideal business relationships with its VCIs, ICTVB One gives 
highest priority to the maximum return on investment and efficient risk-sharing factors. 
Finally, for the method of acquiring liquidity for its venture business, the buy-back and 
initial public offering (IPO) methods are the most preferred methods of ICTVB One. 
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 ICTVB One considers its venture business as a high-risk type of business. 
Therefore, for the overall risk management of its venture business, ICTVB One rates 
competitive risk (e.g. low growth rate, unanticipated competition) and viability risk (e.g. 
no product protection, unfamiliar industry) as the most strategic and important aspects for 
the success of its venture business. ICTVB One has a higher perception towards market 
risks as compared to agency risks in managing its venture business. In terms of expertise, 
ICTVB One claims that it has very good knowledge in all aspects of its venture business, 
e.g. managerial staff, markets, technology, etc. According to ICTVB One, the 
involvements of VCIs thus far have affected quite a great deal of influence in the 
decision-making process and information and control of its management. 
 
 On the extent of occurrence of management conflict with its VCIs, it experiences 
this conflict sometimes, thus, ranks the ROMFs for screening, deal structuring, 
monitoring and overall risk management as helpful in reducing this conflict to a certain 
extent. In relation to this, ICTVB One comments that “we do have our ups and downs, 
but I guess that’s just part of the game. We focus on our business idea while they always 
expect to see a realistic plan with a decent chance of success”. 
 
b) ICTVB Two 
 
 ICTVB Two was incorporated in 1997 with 53 total employees, which includes 
25 technical staff, making it among the medium-sized venture businesses in terms of 
personnel. It is a software venture business that specializes in web and mobile Internet-
based wireless solutions and services as well as Internet and Intranet application 
development. Currently, its net assets are about RM5 million and an annual sales volume 
of approximately RM10 million. To ICTVB Two, the acceptable duration of the VCIs’ 
investment in its business is 5 years with 25% minimum return on investment (ROI) per 
year. According to ICTVB Two, the time taken by the VCIs to invest in its venture 
business is from six to nine months, and it stresses that “we wasted almost two years 
trying to borrow money, but we hit only brick walls (i.e. the main reason being that we 
are running a technology company). Finally, in 2000, we managed to raise funds from the 
VCIs who saw enough value in our business preposition to give him some money”. 
 
 Based on its experience, the specific ROMF it uses for deal origination are direct 
approaches to the VCIs and also the referral process. ICTVB Two uses screening criteria 
according to the stage of financing it requires, production technology, management team 
and market potential of its products in preparing its proposal to the VCIs. ICTVB Two 
carries out its own market evaluation and prefers the usage of the internal rate of return 
(IRR) and net present value (NPV) as the evaluation techniques to support its venture 
business proposal. In presenting its proposal to the VCIs, it also emphasizes the market 
attractiveness, product uniqueness and protection from obsolescence of its product as the 
main evaluation criteria. ICTVB Two issues common equity to the VCIs in its deal 
structuring. Almost all the normal legal provisions are included in its financial contract 
agreement with the VCIs, particularly the form and terms of investment, board structure 
and employment contract. However, ICTVB Two is unsatisfied with the information 
rights due to its concern on trade secret and intellectual property rights.   
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 If possible, ICTVB Two prefers non-specific contractual monitoring (i.e. based on 
trust and understanding) from the VCIs. Besides allowing a board directorship, it also 
provides periodical reports of its business progress to the VCIs. In addition, it usually 
provides information on its business strategy, management and financial accounts and 
technological information because these are most applicable for the VCIs’ understanding 
on its venture business. However, ICTVB Two required information on public policies, 
tax and legal matters from the VCIs. Regarding the most important factors for an ideal 
business relationship with its VCIs, it gives priority to the efficient risk-sharing and 
reputation factors. According to ICTVB Two, the buy-back and secondary sale methods 
of acquiring liquidity for its venture business are the most preferred methods. 
 
 For the overall risk management of its venture business, ICTVB Two rates 
viability risk (e.g. no product protection, no market acceptance) and cash-out risk (e.g. 
not highly liquid) as the most important aspects for the success of its venture business. 
Thus, ICTVB Two has a higher perception towards market risks than agency risks in 
managing its venture business. In terms of its expertise as compared to its VCIs, ICTVB 
Two claims that it has very good knowledge of technology, market, technical and 
managerial staff but satisfactory knowledge in financial and business matters. According 
to ICTVB Two, the VCIs’ involvement in its management has affected a very great deal 
of influence in the decision-making process, management system, information and 
control. 
 
 Normally ICTVB Two has conflicts with its VCIs on matters pertaining to R&D 
expenditures, marketing budget and strategies, strategic information requirement and 
failures in meeting set targets. ICTVB Two experiences these conflicts quite often and 
ranks the ROMFs for evaluation, deal structuring and monitoring as most important for 
reducing its conflict with the VCIs.  ICTVB Two says that “granted that we normally 
lack a proper grounding in managing business and often did not know how to draw up a 
credible business plan but they also should know that they only had banking expertise but 
none at all in technology”. 
 
c) ICTVB Three 
 
 ICTVB Three is a developer of mobile games as well as entertainment services 
for the mobile content market and now is focussing on providing entertainment to the 
youth segment with a lifestyle of mobile usage. It was newly incorporated in 2002 and 
has only 8 total employees, which includes 4 technical staff. Currently, its net assets 
stand at RM0.3 million with annual sales of approximately RM0.5 million. Since it is 
quite new, the desired timescale of the VCIs’ investment in its business is between 6 to 7 
years with a minimum return on investment (ROI) of 20% per year. It took almost a year 
before ICTVB Three managed to secure financing from the VCIs. ICTVB Three recounts 
that “in the beginning, as with other new start-ups, the going was really tough. We have 
been pounding the streets many times over in search of financing”. 
 
 In securing financing from VCIs, the specific ROMF ICTVB Three uses for deal 
origination is to approach directly the VCIs. ICTVB Three uses its production technology 
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and the market potential of its products as the most important screening criteria to support 
its application, and it also carried out its own market research as the main source of due 
diligence. In order to evaluate its venture business proposal, ICTVB Three uses the pay-
back and internal rate of return (IRR) evaluation techniques. In addition to this, ICTVB 
Three uses the production differentiation and market attractiveness evaluation criteria to 
lend further support to its financing application to the VCIs. For deal structuring, ICTVB 
Three issued common equity to the VCIs and stresses that all the normal legal provisions 
are included, e.g. form and terms of investment, buy-back provision, and right of first 
refusal, but it hesitates on the information rights provision.   
 
 At the post-investment stage, ICTVB Three prefers the non-contractual 
monitoring (i.e. based on trust and understanding) as compared to the contractual 
monitoring. ICTVB Three comments that it has to allow a board directorship and also to 
submit many required periodical reports to the VCIs. Nevertheless, if possible, it prefers 
the VCIs’ involvement in its venture business be limited to the provision of capital only. 
In the aspect of information exchange with the VCIs, it normally requires advice and 
contacts for business, marketing, tax, legal and public policies, as these are most 
important for its success. In return, ICTVB Three agrees to provide information on the 
technological, budgetary, financial and management accounts. ICTVB Three reiterates 
that it gives highest priority to the maximum return on investment factor in having an 
ideal business relationship with its VCIs. For the method of acquiring liquidity of its 
venture business, buy-back and mergers are the most preferred methods to ICTVB Three. 
 
 ICTVB Three rates management risk (e.g. reacts to risk badly, not articulate about 
its venture business) and competitive risk (e.g. low growth rate, longer gestation period of 
its venture business) as the most strategic aspects for the success of its venture business. 
When asked about the importance of market and agency risks in managing its venture 
business, ICTVB Three has a higher perception towards market risks. ICTVB Three says 
that it has very good knowledge in technology, technical staff and markets compared to 
its VCIs. ICTVB Three also stresses that until now, the VCIs’ involvement in its 
management has affected a very great deal of influence in the management system, 
decision-making process, information and control. 
 
 ICTVB Three experiences management conflict with the VCIs constantly over 
such issues as setting financial budgets, costing of production, producing information for 
operating decisions, and many other things. Hence, it ranks the ROMFs for deal 
structuring, monitoring and overall risk management as the most important and helpful to 
reduce its conflict with the VCIs. ICTVB Three says that “the VCIs imposed all sort of 
conditions on us, which could put us at risk of losing the right of our intellectual property. 
They also are too risk-averse which could cost our survival and market penetration. It 
could be better if less arguing but more practical action. After all it’s about willingness to 
get the hands dirty, so let’s move things forward”. 
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4.5.3 Main observations from case studies 
 
 The diversity of the case studies presented above is apparent. Despite this 
diversity, there are some common grounds between them. Among the main observations 
that could be derived from these case studies are the following: 
  
a) Both VCIs and ICTVBs operate in risky environments, especially where both 
venture capital and ICT industries are relatively new as in Malaysia. Apparently 
there are many expectation and expertise gaps between them, suggesting that 
there are many new learning curves to be discovered. For example, VCIs need 
more professionals with in-depth technical knowledge, preferably from their 
own personal experience of running a venture business. Meanwhile, ICTVBs 
need to fully understand potential VCIs, especially in choosing the right one to 
approach for financing (i.e. not only to be their financiers but also to be their 
business partners). 
 
b) By nature, apparently, there are differences in the expertise between VCIs and 
ICTVBs. Thus, these differences influence their ROMFs almost throughout the 
entire venture capital process. Initially at the pre-investment stage, their ROMFs 
fit their desire to conclude a deal, e.g. on one side, VCIs expect to have potential 
capital gains and to share technical expertise from ICTVBs, and on the other, 
ICTVBs expect to relieve their capital scarcity and to share the downside risk of 
their venture businesses with VCIs. In other words, regarding the comparative 
advantages of each party in their business relationship, those of the VCIs seem 
to reside largely in the supply of capital and business management, and those of 
the ICTVBs reside largely in technological knowledge, efforts and commitments. 
However, at the post-investment stage and for risk management, their ROMFs 
do not seem to fit well enough in their business relationships, leading to 
management conflict between them. In general, their ROMFs at the pre-
investment stage are viewed by them as means of addressing adverse selection 
problems and their ROMFs at the post-investment stage, particularly monitoring, 
are means of addressing moral hazard problems as prescribed in the literature 
reviewed. 
 
c) Following the b) observation above, management conflict between VCIs and 
ICTVBs seems to be unavoidable. The vicious circle starts with differences in 
expertise, expectations and ROMFs, which then increases the acuteness of the 
information asymmetries between them, and ends with conflict in managing the 
venture business they contracted into. These cases indicate that the extent of 
occurrence of management conflict is reflected largely at the post-investment 
stage, particularly on the monitoring aspects (e.g. exchanging of strategic 
information and performance measurements) and overall risk management 
issues. Based on these case studies, table 4.1 below illustrates hypothetically the 
extent of occurrence of management conflict between the VCIs (i.e. according to 
their sources of funds) and ICTVBs (according to their developmental stages). 
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Table 4.1: Extent of management conflict based on types of VCIs and ICTVBs’ growth stages 
 
ICTVBs/VCIs VCIs (Government-related) VCIs (Banks-related) VCIs (Private Independent) 
ICTVBs at seed 
stage 
Strong Strong Strong 
ICTVBs at start-up 
stage 
Strong Semi-strong Strong 
ICTVBs at growth 
or expansion stage 
Semi-strong Weak  to semi-strong Strong 
Preference Low-risk ICTVBs Medium-risk ICTVBs Niche or high-risk ICTVBs 
  
Based on the above table, clearly it can be seen that the views of the VCIs and 
ICTVBs on the management conflict they experienced are mixed.  
 
For the VCIs, the government-related VCIs are seen to be very cautious, and the 
time they took to make the investment is quite long, i.e. 6 to 9 months. They also 
seem to lack expertise in the technological aspect of the venture business, perhaps 
due to their lack of experience. Thus, it is not surprising when they encounter 
stronger management conflict with the ICTVBs at almost all stages of 
development. As for the bank-related VCIs, due to their established nature and 
having managed to inculcate reasonably good relationships with the ICTVBs, 
they encounter weaker to semi-stronger management conflict with the ICTVBs at 
almost all stages of development.  Although the time taken for investments to be 
made was less than 6 months, they also lack the technological expertise of the 
venture business. For the private independent VCIs, they require higher returns on 
investment due to their own limited sources of funds. They are also seen to be 
quite knowledgeable about the technicalities of the venture business, perhaps due 
to their own experiences in managing venture business. Nevertheless, they are 
more concerned about agency risks in their relationships with the ICTVBs and 
also prefer to get involved in the venture business. This hands-on involvement has 
led them to experience stronger management conflict with their ICTVBs at all 
stages of development.  
 
For the ICTVBs, it can be seen that their stages of development were significant 
factors that affected their extent of management conflict with the VCIs. Perhaps, 
it is the unfamiliarity of the VCIs (e.g. technological aspect of the 
products/services, management team, no track and market records) of these 
ICTVBs at the seed and early stages of development that caused them to 
encounter stronger management conflict. At this early stage, it could be assumed 
that the ICTVBs have many managerial matters that are still not in place that 
could affect the smooth running of their venture business. For the more 
established ICTVBs at the growth stage, they have weaker management conflict 
with the VCIs because they are already selling their products/services and also 
have managerial capabilities in running their venture business. 
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d) Examples of management conflict between the VCIs and ICTVBs are as follows. 
Firstly, at the early stage of the ICTVBs’ growth, the size of R&D expenditures is 
important. ICTVBs have promising prospects because of their technological 
advantage or the uniqueness of their products/services, but VCIs as principals are 
very much afraid of market uncertainties. In addition, there is no profit generation 
from the ICTVBs in this stage, thus, they must require them to reduce R&D 
expenditures. Therefore, their ROMFs relating to the size of R&D expenditures 
may cause management conflict and deter constructive business management 
between them. 
 
Secondly, at the growth stage of ICTVBs, both the size of marketing expenditures 
and marketing strategies are crucial in order to achieve their sales target. The 
ICTVBs have to compete aggressively in the market place and thus may require 
an adequate budget and appropriate marketing strategies for their 
products/services, but VCIs as principals may think this is not necessary as the 
products/services are quite unique, which naturally should attract customers. 
Hence, their ROMFs regarding the size of the marketing budget and marketing 
strategies in achieving their sales target may cause management conflict between 
them.  
 
Finally, the VCIs have put their invested funds at risk because venture businesses 
are classed as risky investment opportunities. Thus, the VCIs as principals have to 
take steps to ensure that they are well served by strategic information, which is of 
relevance to their managerial decisions on a timely basis. However, the ICTVBs 
may not be willing to provide all the information required by the VCIs due to 
trade secret or intellectual property rights. Therefore, their differences in ROMFs 
pertaining to exchange of strategic information may cause management conflict 
between them. 
 
e) In general, there is also conflict over realizing the investment of the venture 
business. For the VCIs, an initial public offering (IPO) seems to be the most 
preferred method of acquiring liquidity of their investments in venture businesses, 
partly due to reasons such as hefty capital gains potential and an increase in their 
reputation, etc. The VCIs may also wish to realize a venture business’s profits 
rather than to keep investing in its future development in order to distribute profit 
to its fund providers, particularly when the venture business is financially viable 
but too small to go for IPO. In contrast, ICTVBs prefer the buy-back and 
secondary sale for acquiring liquidity. Perhaps, this could be due to their 
corporate culture (e.g. on dilution of ownership) or other institutional constraints 
in the capital market in Malaysia (e.g. difficulty in fulfilling listing requirements). 
Moreover, the ICTVBs’ motivation to start a venture business may not be solely 
future wealth maximisation but may involve other personal needs and satisfaction, 
e.g. personal independence and peer recognition, etc. In such cases, the sale of the 
venture business or floatation through IPO would not be a consideration by the 
ICTVBs. As a result, these different preferences may lead to management conflict 
between them. 
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f) The government-related and bank-related VCIs tend to make larger investments 
and invest for longer periods in the ICTVBs (as in the case of VCI One and VCI 
Two). They also require a lower percentage of equity stakes and rate of return on 
investment, perhaps due to their financial strength, among others. In contrast, the 
private independent VCIs (as in the case of VCI Three) tend to invest for a shorter 
period and are personally involved in the management of the ICTVBs. However, 
they prefer a higher percentage of equity stakes and rate of return on investment, 
partly due to their own funding source. However, all these VCIs preferred both 
contractual and non-contractual monitoring on the ICTVBs, suggesting their 
preference for a hands-on approach. Typically, these VCIs always require 
representation on the board of directors of the venture businesses, reflecting their 
tight monitoring and control of the ICTVBs. 
 
g) The large-size ICTVBs tend to have not many difficulties in getting financing 
from VCIs and experience weaker management conflict with the VCIs, partly due 
to their proven track records and managerial capabilities (as in the case of ICTVB 
One). However, this is the opposite for the small-size ICTVBs. They have 
difficulties in convincing VCIs for financing (as in the cases of ICTVB Two and 
ICTVB Three). They also tend to have stronger management conflict with VCIs, 
especially at the post-investment stage and in risk management of the venture 
capital process. As for exchanging of information, all of these ICTVBs typically 
tended to retain their strategic technological information (e.g. trade secret and 
intellectual property rights). Typically, these ICTVBs prefer a non-contractual 
type of monitoring by the VCIs, reflecting their preference for hands-off approach.    
 
 The above observations are hypothetical in nature although they are based on six 
case studies and direct interviews. However, it is clear that management conflicts are 
widely present and not ignorable in the business relationship between VCIs and ICTVBs. 
Rather, they have created serious business problems that could determine the success of 
venture business activities and future technological innovations.  The following sections 
present a series of statistical analyses for further discussions.    
 
4.6 TESTING OF DIFFERENCES IN ROMFs BETWEEN VCIs AND 
 ICTVBs 
 
 The t-Independent Samples test is used to determine if the means of two unrelated 
samples differ. This test is selected to determine whether the difference between means 
for the scores of VCIs and ICTVBs is significant.5  For the purpose of this research, if 
more than half of the tested variables are found to be statistically significant (i.e. based on 
                                                          
5
 Statistically, the determination is done by comparing the difference between two means with the standard 
error of the difference in the means scores of VCIs and ICTVBs. According to Foster (2001, p. 167), this 
test is an analysis of variance on the absolute deviation of the means scores of the samples and thus when 
interpreting the significance value of this test, “remember that it is the absolute value of t is taken: ignore 
the negative sign”. 
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the results of the t-values and level of significance), they will provide the basis for 
accepting or rejecting the hypotheses tested (as discussed in Appendix ‘D’).6 
 
4.6.1 Testing of differences in expertise 
 
 Before hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 were tested, the t-Independent Samples test 
was used to test the differences in expertise between the VCIs and ICTVBs in ten areas. 
The ten areas of expertise tested (i.e. business strategy, markets, budgets, capital structure 
& investments, management account, financial account, managerial staff, technology, 
supply sources and technical staff) are considered important aspects that are needed by 
both VCIs and ICTVBs, particularly to manage their high-risk kind of venture business. 
Therefore, if their expertise in these main aspects is equally good (i.e. not much 
difference between them), they may manage the venture business contracted into without 
much conflict, e.g. there are minimal asymmetries of information between them. They 
also should be able to understand each other better and thus be capable of agreeing on 
similar managerial considerations for the benefit of their venture business.  
 
 The results showed that there are significant differences in six areas of expertise 
between them as shown in table 4.2 below. For example, the differences of expertise 
between VCIs and ICTVBs are found to be quite high in budgetary, capital structure and 
investments, technology and supply sources as indicated by the t-values and significance 
values. A closer look at the data revealed that VCIs are found to be good in the financial 
matters while ICTVBs are found to good in the technological matters of the venture 
business. Thus, it is likely that these differences in expertise, particularly in the financial 
and technological aspects, would affect their ROMFs and management conflict in 
managing their venture business together, as being evidenced in the case studies 
presented earlier.  
 
Table 4.2: The results of t-Independent Samples test on differences in expertise (N=57) 
 
AREAS OF EXPERTISE t-VALUES SIGNIFICANCE VALUES 
Technology 
Budgets 
Capital Structure and Investments 
Management Account 
Financial Account 
Supply Sources 
-2.255 
3.105 
4.363 
3.110 
3.700 
-3.445 
0.030 
0.003 
0.000 
0.003 
0.001 
0.001 
Note: i) In addition to the six areas in the above table, expertise in Markets and Technical Staff were also found to have 
significant difference using Mann-Whitney U test, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Kruskal-Wallis H test, and Median test. ii) 
Expertise in Managerial Staff and Business Strategy were not significant in all tests. iii) Please refer to footnote 10 on 
page 38 (for the t and significance values). 
 
4.6.2 Testing of hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 
 
 This section presents the results of t-Independent Samples test used to test 
hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 of this research.7   The t-test analysis attempts to identify the 
                                                          
6
 There is no clear-cut criterion used (i.e. pertaining to the numbers of significant variables) to accept or 
reject a hypothesis because it depends on the researcher to set the cut-off point. For this research, a simple 
cut-off point of 50% or half of the total variables tested for each hypothesis is used.  
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differences in the ROMFs between VCIs and ICTVBs that could contribute to the causes 
of management conflict experienced by them.  
 
 Hypothesis H1 states that “there is a significant difference in ROMFs between 
VCIs and ICTVBs at the pre-investment stage”. From a total of 54 variables tested, only 
22 are found to have statistically significant difference. Thus, the prediction of this 
hypothesis is not supported by the data since less than half of the variables were 
significant. Table 4.3 shows the results of t-test analyses for significant variables at the 
pre-investment stage. For example, the following had statistically significant differences 
in ROMFs between the means scores of VCIs and ICTVBs, direct approach to the VCIs 
and referral process for sources of deal origination, etc.   
 
Table 4.3: The results of t-Independent Samples test for hypothesis H1 (N=57) 
VARIABLES t-VALUES SIGNIFICANCE VALUES 
a) Deal Origination & Screening 
i) Sources of Deal Origination: 
   Cold calls to VCIs directly 
   Through referral process 
   Active search by VCIs 
   Other mechanisms (trade exhibitions) 
ii) Screening Criteria: 
   Size & Policy of investment 
   Location of venture 
   Markets for products/services 
iii) Acceptable investment duration 
iv) Time taken for investment decision 
b) Valuation 
i) Sources of Due Diligence: 
   Obtain independent market reports 
   Reliance on personal references 
ii) Valuation Techniques*: 
   Pay-back 
   Accounting rate of returns 
iii) Valuation Criteria: 
   Size of market 
   Technical skills 
   Patentability of products/services 
   Management skills 
   References of investor/entrepreneur 
iv) Deal Structuring: 
   Debt (long-term loans) 
v) Contract Agreement Provisions: 
   Go-along rights 
   Information rights 
   Others (warranties/negative covenants) 
 
 
-4.745 
-3.153 
-11.662 
-4.618 
 
2.103 
2.618 
2.093 
-3.871 
-3.208 
 
 
2.133 
2.417 
 
1.899 
3.212 
 
-2.116 
-2.395 
-2.550 
2.950 
1.781 
 
-6.753 
 
-1.835 
-1.790 
-2.774 
 
 
0.000 
0.003 
0.000 
0.000 
 
0.040 
0.011 
0.042 
0.000 
0.002 
 
 
0.037 
0.019 
 
0.032 (1-tailed) 
0.002 
 
0.039 
0.020 
0.016 
0.005 
0.043 (1-tailed) 
 
0.000 
 
0.036 (1-tailed) 
0.039 (1-tailed) 
0.008 
Note: *Variable for Net-Present Value was significant using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (z stats=1.320; 1-tailed 
Sig.=0.030) and Median test (chi-squares=7.486/5.957; Sig. Levels=0.006/0.015). 
  
 Hypothesis H2 states that “there is a significant difference in ROMFs between 
VCIs and ICTVBs at the post-investment stage”. A total of 30 variables were tested and 
17 of them are found to have statistically significant difference. Since more than half of 
these variables are significant, the prediction of this hypothesis is supported by the 
data. Table 4.4 shows the results of t-test analyses for significant variables at the post-
investment stage such as the differences in ROMFs between the means scores of VCIs 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7
 The number of variables tested in each of these hypotheses (i.e. H1 to H6) varies because the variables 
were derived from the literature reviewed which indicate that the managerial factors involved are different 
at each stage of the venture capital process (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
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and ICTVBs on monitoring type preference, exchanging of strategic business information, 
etc. 
Table 4.4: The results of t-Independent Samples test for hypothesis H2 (N=57) 
VARIABLES t-VALUES SIGNIFICANCE VALUES 
a) Monitoring Type Preference 
b)Maintaining Relationship: 
   Allow VCIs’ director/staff to hold executive position 
   Limit to provision of capital funds only 
c) Advice Required from VCIs: 
   Tax and legal matters 
   Personnel and recruitment policies 
   Current scientific/technological information 
d) Information Required from ICTVBs: 
   Managerial and Technical staffs 
   Budgets 
   Capital structure and investments 
   Business strategy 
   Management and Financial accounts 
   Supply sources 
e) Factors of an Ideal Relationship*: 
   Maximum return on investment 
   Free-sharing of information 
f) Acquiring Liquidity: 
   Mergers and acquisition 
   Buy-back 
   Write-off 
3.438 
 
2.000 
2.198 
 
-2.100 
5.050 
-1.663 
 
2.282 
3.320 
1.866 
3.196 
3.576 
2.834 
 
2.086 
3.606 
 
4.522 
-3.790 
-9.286 
0.002 
 
0.050 
0.032 
 
0.043 
0.000 
0.053 (1-tailed) 
 
0.029 
0.002 
0.036 (1-tailed) 
0.003 
0.001 
0.006 
 
0.043 
0.001 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
 Note: * Variable for Efficient Risk-sharing was significant using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
 (z stats=1.320; 1-tailed sig.=0.030) and Median test (chi-squares=7.486/5.957 and sig. levels=0.006/0.015. 
 
 Hypothesis H3 states that “there is a significant difference in ROMFs between 
VCIs and ICTVBs for risk management”. From a total of 25 variables tested for risk 
management, 13 are found to have statistically significant difference. Since more than 
half of these variables are significant, the prediction of this hypothesis is supported by 
the data. Table 4.5 shows the results of t-test analyses for significant variables of risk 
management, e.g. the differences in ROMFs between the means scores of VCIs and 
ICTVBs on management and inexperience risks for general risk management, many 
substitute products/services for perception towards market and agency risks, etc.  
 
Table 4.5: The results of t-Independent Samples test for hypothesis H3 (N=57) 
VARIABLES t-VALUES SIGNIFICANCE VALUES 
a) General Risk Management: 
    Management risk 
    Inexperience risk 
b) Perception towards Market & Agency Risks*: 
    Many substitute products/services 
    ICTVBs and VCIs having different cash flow objective 
    ICTVBs and VCIs having different profitability objective 
    Many ventures to be monitored 
    Contractual ambiguities 
    Manipulation of profitability 
    Short-term self-interest seeking 
    Potential dishonesty 
c) Overall Investment Practices: 
    Deal origination and Screening 
    Contracting/Deal structuring 
    Monitoring/Post-investment activities 
 
2.254 
2.839 
 
-2.066 
2.638 
2.234 
2.485 
3.787 
8.917 
7.774 
6.075 
 
2.303 
2.192 
4.140 
 
0.032 
0.008 
 
0.044 
0.011 
0.030 
0.018 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
0.026 
0.033 
0.000 
 Note: * Variables for Small Market, Many Competitors, and Technical Obsolescence were significant using Mann-
 Whitney U test and Kruskal-Wallis H test. [For Small Market (M-W U value=247.00; sig.=0.052; K-W chi-square=3.779; 
 sig.=0.052), for Many? Competitors (M-W U value=226.50; sig.=0.022; K-W chi-square=5.280; sig.=0.022), and for 
 Technical Obsolescence (M-W U value=5.194; sig.=0.023; K-W chi-square=5.19; sig.=0.023)]. 
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4.6.3 General interpretation of the results of H1, H2 and H3  
 
 The results of H1 above clearly indicate that at the pre-investment stage, the 
ROMFs of both VCIs and ICTVBs are not much different. At this stage, their interests 
seem to be in alignment with each other, i.e. the desire to close the deal. To the VCIs, the 
venture businesses offered by the ICTVBs represent potentially profitable investments 
and also knowledge-sharing opportunities. As for the ICTVBs, the VCIs offer a means to 
gain additional capital now and for future expansion as well as means to spread the 
down-side risk for their venture businesses. For example, H1 is not supported by the data 
because only less than half of the variables tested have statistical significance suggesting 
most of their ROMFs are not so different at this stage.  (This appearance of insignificant 
in the ROMFs at the pre-investment stage will be discussed later in H4). 
 
However, this alignment is not necessarily the case at the post-investment stage 
and for risk management. Their ROMFs are found to be different (as indicated by the 
results of H2 and H3), which may cause management conflict between them. For instance, 
the results of H2 indicate that VCIs prefer a hands-on approach of monitoring while 
ICTVBs prefer a hands-off approach. Thus, this difference in preferences could result in 
management conflict in their business relationship. The results of H3 also suggest that for 
general risk management, VCIs are more concerned with the risk of the management 
team and its experience in running the venture business. In contrast, ICTVBs are more 
concerned about the risk of the technology and marketability of its products and services. 
Therefore, these differences could influence their managerial stance and thus affect their 
management conflict. In summary, each of them may have different preferences and may 
emphasize different techniques or criteria that they think are appropriate to their venture 
business. As a result, management conflict may arise and deter a constructive business 
relationship between them. 
 
 
4.7  TESTING OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ROMFs AND 
 MANAGEMENT CONFLICT 
 
 The Correlation analysis was used to measure the strength of association between 
the ROMFs and management conflict (i.e. for hypotheses H4, H5 and H6) and the 
procedure for this analysis was performed by correlating each of the ROMFs of VCIs and 
ICTVBs with the management conflict indicators. Again, for the purpose of this research, 
if more than half of the tested variables are found to have statistical significance (i.e. 
based on the correlation coefficients and the level of significance), they will provide the 
basis for accepting or rejecting the hypotheses tested. Given that H4, H5 and H6 are 
directional hypotheses, a one-tailed probability test was appropriate. 
 
4.7.1 Testing of hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 
 
 This section presents the results of the Pearson’s Product-Moment correlation 
used to test hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 of this research. This correlation analysis attempts 
to identify the strength and direction of the relationship between the ROMFs (of both, 
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VCIs and ICTVBs) and management conflict indicators across the full venture capital 
process.  
 
 Hypothesis H4 states that “there is a negative relationship between their ROMFs 
and management conflict at the pre-investment stage”. As mentioned earlier, a 
measurement of Pearson’s Product-Moment correlation was used to test the strength and 
direction of the relationship between their ROMFs and management conflict indicators. 
From a total of 54 variables tested, 32 or more than half of them have negative 
significance. Thus, the prediction of this hypothesis is supported by the data. Table 4.6 
shows the results of Pearson’s Product-Moment correlation (i.e. the r values) of these 
significant variables.8  The results of H4 suggest that a direct approach by ICTVBs and 
active search by VCIs for deal origination are important for both parties in order to be 
able to choose the right business partners for their venture business as early as this stage. 
Otherwise, both parties will get business partners that are not compatible with each other 
and later on will have stronger management conflict. The results also indicate that 
independent market reports are important sources of due diligence that can help both 
VCIs and ICTVBs to identify compatible business partners and perhaps could minimise 
their managerial differences, which might occur in managing their venture business later 
on.  
 
Table 4.6: The results of Pearson’s Correlation for hypothesis H4 (N=57) 
VARIABLES r VALUES SIGNIFICANCE VALUES 
a) Deal Origination and Screening 
i) Sources of Deal Origination: 
     Cold calls to VCIs directly 
     Active search by VCIs 
     Other mechanisms (e.g. trade exhibition) 
ii) Screening Criteria: 
     Size and policy of investment 
     Location of venture 
     Management team and track records 
     Markets for products/services 
b) Valuation 
i) Sources of Due Diligence: 
     Obtain independent market reports 
ii) Valuation Techniques: 
     Pay-back 
     Internal rate of return 
     Qualitative assessment 
iii) Valuation Criteria: 
     Access to market 
     Market need for products/services 
     Size of market 
     Growth potential of market 
     Technical skills 
     Profit margins 
     Uniqueness of products/services 
     Patentability of products/services 
     Marketing skills 
     Financial skills 
     Protection from competitive entry 
 
 
-0.352 
-0.522 
-0.417 
 
-0.330 
-0.248 
-0.415 
-0.295 
 
 
-0.219 
 
-0.276 
-0.327 
-0.433 
 
-0.330 
-0.275 
-0.409 
-0.418 
-0.444 
-0.458 
-0.386 
-0.579 
-0.357 
-0.377 
-0.319 
 
 
0.004 
0.000 
0.001 
 
0.006 
0.032 a 
0.001 
0.013 a 
 
 
0.050 
 
0.019 a 
0.007 
0.000 
 
0.006 
0.019 a 
0.001 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.003 
0.002 
0.008 
                                                          
8
 According to Cohen and Holiday (1982), the interpretation of the correlation coefficients is as follows 
(regardless if it is a positive or negative direction): 0.19 and below = very low; 0.20 to 0.39 = low; 0.40 to 
0.69 = modest; 0.70 to 0.89 = high; and 0.90 to 1.00 = very high. However, according to Bryman and 
Cramer (2001, p. 174) “these are rules of thumb and should not be regarded as definitive indications, since 
there are hardly any guidelines for interpretation over which there is substantial consensus”.   
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     Resistance to economic cycles 
     Protection from obsolescence 
     Protection against down-side risk 
     Opportunities for exit 
c) Deal Structuring 
i) Investment Instruments: 
     Debt (long-term loans) 
ii) Contract Agreement Provisions: 
     Registration rights 
     Go-along rights 
     Pre-emptive rights & rights of first refusal 
     Option pool, vesting schedules & buy-back 
     Other provisions (warranties/negative covenants) 
-0.241 
-0.338 
-0.261 
-0.262 
 
 
-0.365 
 
-0.277 
-0.309 
-0.265 
-0.229 
-0.267 
0.035 a 
0.005 
0.025 a 
0.024 a 
 
 
0.003 
 
0.018 a 
0.010 
0.023 a 
0.043 a 
0.022 a 
 
 Note: r values = the Pearson’s Product-Moment correlation coefficients. 
  a = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) [and at 0.01 level (1-tailed) for the others].  
 
 Hypothesis H5 states that “there is a negative relationship between their ROMFs 
and management conflict at the post-investment stage”. From a total of 30 variables 
tested, 19 or more than half have negative significance. Hence, the prediction of this 
hypothesis is supported by the data. Table 4.7 shows the results of Pearson’s Product-
Moment correlation of these significant variables. For example, submission of periodical 
reports on the progress of the venture business by ICTVBs to VCIs is important because 
they will be well informed and thus could timely take necessary action if any problem 
arises with their venture business. 
 
Table 4.7: The results of Pearson’s Correlation for hypothesis H5 (N=57) 
VARIABLES R VALUES SIGNIFICANCE VALUES 
a) Monitoring 
i) Maintaining Relationship: 
     Submit periodic reports 
     Limit to provision of capital funds only 
ii) Advice Required from VCIs: 
     Tax and legal matters 
     Personnel and recruitment policies 
     Current scientific/technological information 
iii) Information Required from ICTVBs: 
     Technology and markets 
     Managerial and Technical staffs 
     Budgets 
     Capital structure and investments 
     Business strategy 
     Management and financial accounts 
     Supply sources 
iv) Factors of an Ideal Relationship: 
     Maximum return on investment 
     Appropriate capital structure 
     Efficient risk-sharing 
     Free-sharing of information 
     Enhancement of reputation 
b) Acquiring Liquidity Preference 
     Buy-back 
     Write-off 
 
 
-0.303 
-0.364 
 
-0.261 
-0.304 
-0.393 
 
-0.382 
-0.308 
-0.279 
-0.469 
-0.341 
-0.363 
-0.297 
 
-0.314 
-0.327 
-0.251 
-0.445 
-0.243 
 
-0.233 
-0.293 
 
 
 
0.011 a 
0.003 
 
0.025 a 
0.011 
0.001 
 
0.002 
0.010 
0.018 a 
0.000 
0.005 
0.003 
0.012 a 
 
0.009 
0.007 
0.030 a 
0.000 
0.034 a 
 
0.040 a 
0.001 
 Note: r values = the Pearson’s Product-Moment correlation coefficients. 
        a = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) [and at 0.01 level (1-tailed) for the others].  
  
Hypothesis H6 states that “there is a negative relationship between their 
ROMFs and management conflict for risk management”. A total of 25 variables were 
tested and 15 or more than half of them are found to have negative significance. Thus, the 
prediction of this hypothesis is supported by the data. Table 4.8 shows the results of 
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Pearson’s Product-Moment correlation of these significant variables. For instance, the 
experience of the management team and viability of the venture business are important in 
general risk management. Otherwise, both VCIs and ICTVBs can be easily drawn into 
conflict whenever their venture business faces the slightest business difficulties. 
 
Table 4.8: The results of Pearson’s Correlation for hypothesis H6 (N=57) 
VARIABLES r VALUES SIGNIFICANCE VALUES 
a) General Risk Management: 
     Inexperience risk 
     Viability risk 
     Cash-out risk 
b) Perception Towards Market & Agency Risks: 
     Small market 
     Many competitors 
     Many substitutes products/services 
     ICTVBs and VCIs having different profitability objective 
     Many ventures to be monitored 
     Manipulation of profitability 
     Short-term self-interest seeking 
     Potential dishonesty 
c) Overall Investment Practices: 
     Deal origination and Screening 
     Evaluation 
     Contracting/Deal Structuring 
     Overall risk management 
 
-0.310 
-0.254 
-0.238 
 
-0.295 
-0.346 
-0.411 
-0.344 
-0.468 
-0.296 
-0.356 
-0.336 
 
-0.500 
-0.405 
-0.259 
-0.310 
 
0.010 
0.028 a 
0.037 a 
 
0.013 a 
0.004 
0.001 
0.004 
0.000 
0.013 a 
0.003 
0.005 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.026 a 
0.009 
Note: r values = the Pearson’s Product-Moment correlation coefficients.  
 a = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) [and at 0.01 level (1-tailed) for the others].  
 
4.7.2 General interpretation of the results of H4, H5 and H6  
 
 The correlation results (supported by the factor and multiple regression results as 
shown in Appendix ‘D’) suggest there exists a high relationship between ROMFs and 
management conflict indicators, thus, indicating some possibility for reducing 
management conflict. These are as follows. 
 
a) At the pre-investment stage - Although H1 indicated a small difference in ROMFs, 
H4 indicated a strong relationship between ROMFs and management conflict. 
One interpretation of this is that potentially they may have significant difference, 
which signifies the differences in ROMFs could be revealed in the real interactive 
communication at the pre-investment stage. Based on this interpretation, 
improvement in their ROMFs for screening and due diligence at this stage is very 
important. Both the VCIs and ICTVBs have to be very careful in selecting each 
other so that their expectations and commitments are in alignment, which may 
help to reduce management conflict at the post-investment stage and in risk 
management. The results of H4 indicate that besides their own initiative in 
searching for a good deal, the VCIs also need to do technical due diligence and 
need to obtain other independent market reports, particularly on the management 
team and technological competencies of the ICTVBs. As for the ICTVBs, they 
also have to improve their ROMFs by choosing the right VCIs not only to get 
additional capital but also to get other value-added services from the VCIs. 
Therefore, by improving their ROMFs for screening and due diligence they can 
minimize their differences in expectations and commitments, and also they can 
pool their aggregate competency for the betterment of their venture business that 
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they contracted into. Their ROMFs for evaluation also need to be improved. For 
example, the usage of product, market and environmental threat resistance as the 
evaluation criteria by both VCIs and ICTVBs is helpful to reduce their 
management conflict. These criteria (e.g. patentability of products/services, 
protection from obsolescence, technical skills, protection from competitive entry, 
and reasonable profit margins) seem to be the most relevant in evaluating their 
venture business in the ICT industry, which is known to be very risky. 
 
b) At the post-investment stage - As discussed earlier, the expertise and ROMFs 
between the VCIs and ICTVBs are apparently different. Moreover, information 
asymmetries seem to be quite ubiquitous in their relationship, particularly when 
more strategic information is needed in the early years (or for young ICTVBs) 
where VCIs have less familiarity with ICTVBs and there are more risks associated 
with the venture business. Thus, improvement in their ROMFs for monitoring 
purposes as suggested by the results of H5, i.e. the strategic information exchange 
between them, may be useful for reducing their management conflict. For 
example, the VCIs require information from the ICTVBs on matters pertaining to 
capital structure, management and financial accounts and technological aspects of 
the venture business. As for the ICTVBs, they require information on the market, 
entrepreneurship and other regulatory matters from the VCIs. Therefore, a kind of 
free-sharing of information arrangement may reduce the tendency of management 
conflict occurrence between them. In other words, a timely and full disclosure of 
strategic information will help them to take necessary managerial actions that 
could enhance the performance of their venture business. In relation to this, the 
ease of access, the making sense of, and the imputed reliability of the information 
exchange are important to both VCIs and ICTVBs in terms of monitoring, 
decision-making and others, which are capable for reducing their management 
conflict. 
 
c) Risk management - Improvement in some of their ROMFs in risk management of 
the venture business is also helpful for reducing their management conflict as 
indicated by the results of H6. Basically, for mutually beneficial contracting 
between the VCIs and ICTVBs, their attitudes towards market and agency risks 
are profoundly influential on the performance of the venture business they 
contracted into. For example, the VCIs are more concerned with agency risks (e.g. 
short-term self-interest seeking, potential dishonesty, manipulation of profitability 
by the ICTVBs, etc.) whereas the ICTVBs are more concerned with market risks 
(e.g. different cash flow and profitability objectives, many substitute 
products/services, many venture to be monitored, etc.). Thus, these differences 
will affect their managerial behavior and may represent the main source of risk 
and management conflict in their venture business. As a result, although the VCIs 
and ICTVBs may possess the right knowledge, skills and systems for enhancing 
the performance of their venture business they might still fail to reach their goals 
due to dismal attitudes that cause management conflict in their business 
relationship. 
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 Table 4.9 highlights some examples of the important ROMFs, which are helpful 
for reducing management conflict for government-related VCIs. 
 
Table 4.9: Important ROMFs for reducing management conflict 
 
VENTURE CAPITAL PROCESS IMPORTANT ROMFs EXPLANATION 
i) Pre-Investment Stage: 
a) Deal origination & Screening 
- Sources referred 
 
 
 
 
 
- Screening criteria used 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Deal evaluation 
- Sources of due diligence referred 
 
 
- Evaluation techniques used 
 
 
 
- Evaluation criteria used 
 
 
 
c) Deal structuring 
- Investment instruments used 
 
 
- Legal provisions preferred 
 
 
 
Preference for personally active search, 
referrals process and direct approach by 
ICTVBs. 
 
 
 
Preference for management team, 
production technology and market 
potential criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
Preference for own and other independent 
market reports. 
 
Preference for financial ratios (e.g. IRR, 
NPV and Pay-back) and qualitative 
assessment techniques. 
 
Preference for product differentiation, 
market attractiveness and cash-out 
potential criteria. 
 
 
Preference for preferred and common 
equity. 
 
Preference for information rights and 
other negative covenants. 
 
 
Require to build a network and reputation 
with venture businesses, VCIs and 
business communities in order to ensure 
good deals that are easily identified at this 
early stage. 
 
Require a good set of screening criteria 
for initial evaluation of the venture 
business. Most important are the 
experienced team, technological 
feasibility, solid value proposition and 
large market size. If possible, second 
opinions from other experts are needed. 
 
Require an in-depth investigation on the 
venture business, e.g. reference checks, 
financial evaluation (i.e. key revenue and 
cost drivers of the business model), 
market potential (i.e. key assumptions of 
the structure, size, target share, etc.) and 
technological feasibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
Require to close a deal (i.e. to design and 
negotiate details of the financial contract) 
in a timely framework. 
ii) Post-Investment Stage: 
d) Monitoring 
- Maintaining relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Exchanging information 
 
 
 
 
- Factors of ideal relationship 
 
 
 
e)    Method of acquiring liquidity                     
preferred 
 
 
Preference for board directorship and 
submission of periodical reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
Preference for the exchange of strategic 
business information, particularly 
technical and financial matters. 
 
 
Preference for factors on free sharing of 
information, efficient risk-sharing and 
appropriate capital structure. 
 
Preference for buy-back and secondary 
sale. 
 
 
Require a balanced approach between 
contractual (i.e. legally defined) and non-
contractual (i.e. based on trust and 
understanding) because most venture 
businesses prefer the non-contractual 
monitoring. 
 
Although full disclosure of information is 
preferable, some areas of confidentiality 
need to be retained so as not to deter a 
good business relationship. Moreover, 
VCIs should be careful not to interfere 
often in the policies of the venture 
business because any resultant conflict 
could affect their business relationship. 
 
Although IPO is preferable, VCIs need to 
respect the corporate culture of venture 
business, i.e. reluctant to dilute ownership. 
iii) Risk Management: 
e) Overall risk management 
 
 
 
f) Perceptions on market and agency 
risks 
 
 
Preference for management, inexperience 
and cash-out risks. 
  
 
Preference for balance perceptions 
towards market and agency risks. 
 
Require to ensure a committed and top-
performing management team in the 
venture business. 
 
Require VCIs to have a common concern 
on both market and agency risks for a 
better business relationship. 
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 The above table describes the key learning regarding important ROMFs for 
government-related VCIs to reduce management conflict with ICTVBs. However, it is 
also applicable for other types of VCIs with a systematic investment approach.  
 
 In general, at the pre-investment stage, VCIs have to proactively search for good 
deals by identifying the right ICTVBs to invest. Specific screening criteria are needed to 
identify their business model: required management skills (i.e. that are needed to execute 
their business model), understanding to assess the technology involved (i.e. the likely 
future technology developments and their impact on viability of their business model), 
and analysis of market potential (i.e. reflecting their market structure and size). For the 
due diligence and evaluation, VCIs have to gather as much information as possible on 
ICTVBs (i.e. their management team, organization, customer base, revenues, etc.). Then, 
VCIs have to negotiate and design a financial contract with ICTVBs, which should be 
acceptable for both parties. At the post-investment stage and for risk management, VCIs 
have to devise a monitoring system that is effective enough to monitor their investment in 
the venture business. A smooth exchange of strategic business information, among others, 
is crucial due to the differences in expertise and ROMFs of the VCIs and ICTVBs.  
 
4.8 SUMMARY 
 
 This chapter covered three aspects, analyzing the main characteristics and profiles 
of VCIs and ICTVBs, presenting several case studies, and testing the hypotheses. The 
descriptive statistics shows the emerging nature of both venture capital and ICT 
industries in Malaysia. For VCIs, the majority of them are in the process of building up 
their good track record. For ICTVBs, they are mostly at their early and growth stages of 
development and are involved in new high-technology-based businesses. Generally, their 
proliferation has been in tandem with the development of MSC since 1996. The case 
studies show the detail of the differences in their ROMFs and the management conflict 
they experienced that was observed in practical venture capital process. 
  
 The t-Independent Samples tests were used to test hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 for 
testing the differences of ROMFs of VCIs and ICTVBs that may contribute to the 
management conflict they experienced. The Pearson’s Product-Moment correlations were 
conducted to test hypotheses H4, H5, and H6 for testing the relationships between their 
ROMFs and management conflict indicators. All six hypotheses were empirically tested 
and table 4.10 summarizes the results. Brief interpretations of these results were also 
made in the context of the VCIs and ICTVBs. 
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Table 4.10: Summary of the results of all hypotheses tested 
 
HYPOTHESES NUMBER PREDICTION OF 
HYPOTHESES 
SUPPORTED? YES or NO 
 
H1 
 
 
 
H2 
 
 
 
H3 
 
 
 
H4 
 
 
 
 
H5 
 
 
 
 
H6 
 
 
There is a significant difference in 
ROMFs between VCIs and ICTVBs 
at the pre-investment stage. 
 
There is a significant difference in 
ROMFs between VCIs and ICTVBs 
at the post-investment stage. 
 
There is a significant difference in 
ROMFs between VCIs and ICTVBs 
for risk management. 
 
There is a significant negative 
relationship between their ROMFs 
and management conflict at the pre-
investment stage. 
 
There is a significant negative 
relationship between their ROMFs 
and management conflict at the post-
investment stage. 
 
There is a significant negative 
relationship between their ROMFs 
and management conflict for risk 
management. 
 
No 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
The following Chapter 5 discusses the findings of this research and the 
conclusions that could be derived from these findings. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the summary and conclusions of this research. It starts with 
a brief summary and then is followed by the discussions of the findings from the 
descriptive statistics and statistical analysis. Then the following section discusses the 
theoretical and practical implications of this research. Next, are the discussions on the 
limitations of this research and possible areas for future research on this subject.  Finally, 
the last section concludes this research. 
 
5.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The literature reviewed advocates that VCIs are known to be one of the main risk-
financiers for ICTVBs, which usually require adequate capital for their success. However, 
it is when they get involved in a financial contract that so-called management conflict is 
most likely to arise, due to their differences in nature, expectations and characteristics. 
For successful venture business, this management conflict has to be reduced. In this 
process, the ROMFs of VCIs and ICTVBs are crucial, suggesting that the two central 
concepts of this research were ROMFs and management conflict. 
 
This research focussed on managerial factors in the venture capital process and 
treated them as independent variables. The independent variables were their ROMFs at 
the pre-investment stage of the venture capital process namely: deal origination and 
screening, evaluation, contracting or deal structuring. At the post-investment stage they 
are namely: monitoring and post-investment activities, acquiring liquidity, and risk 
management. Sub-variables investigated were the sources of due diligence, techniques of 
evaluation, factors or criteria used, risk management and the perception towards market 
and agency risks, and other related aspects at each stage of the venture capital process. 
The dependent variable was management conflict with two sub-variables as indicators 
(i.e. the extent of management conflict experienced and the affected management of the 
venture business). Detailed discussion of these variables and the conceptual framework of 
analysis can be found in Chapter 3. Data on these variables were gathered from survey 
questionnaires and supplemented by direct interview exercises with selected respondents. 
 
This research uses the principal-agent analysis as the general framework that 
focuses on the business relationship between the VCIs (as principal) and ICTVBs (as 
agent) (as discussed in Chapter 1). Here, it is the VCIs who typically initiate the 
subscribing of a financial contract that will describe the terms and conditions under 
which their management relationship takes place. The nature of their financial contracting 
is voluntary, and both VCIs and ICTVBs do so by an act of conscience, thus expecting 
benefits from so doing. An applied principal-agent analysis is used to study their business 
relationship, which involves matters of preferences, judgement, perceptions, attitudes, etc 
in the venture capital process. Therefore, this approach proved amenable to providing a 
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better understanding of real financial contracting between the VCIs and ICTVBs within 
the social laboratory of the emerging venture capital and ICT industries in MSC, 
Malaysia. 
 
5.3 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
 
This research was divided into two parts. The first part focussed on descriptive 
statistics, which present the profile of VCIs and ICTVBs and several case studies. The 
second part focussed on statistical analyses, which test the six hypotheses of this research. 
The discussions of the findings are as follows. 
 
5.3.1 Findings from the descriptive statistics 
 
The profiles of VCIs and ICTVBs in the sample provided information on their 
main characteristics but were conceptually not sufficient to address the main 
investigation of this research, that is, to indicate whether their ROMFs were significantly 
different and whether their ROMFs were helpful for reducing management conflict. 
Several case studies of selected VCIs and ICTVBs were presented to show the detail of 
the differences in their ROMFs and the management conflict they experienced that were 
observed in practical venture capital process. The following findings that are worth 
observing are based on the characteristics and case studies and are discussed as follows. 
 
a) It was found that both venture capital and ICT industries in MSC, Malaysia are 
relatively new, thus, there are plenty of new learning curves that need to be 
learned by both VCIs and ICTVBs.   The majority of the VCIs and ICTVBs are 
newly incorporated and have few venture capital executives and technical 
employees respectively. The VCIs were dominated by local players, government-
related and bank-related, and only a few are privately independent. In addition, 
their actual personal experience and expertise in running a venture business in a 
risky ICT industry are found to be very limited. The ICTVBs were also mostly at 
their early and growth stages and were involved in capital intensive new 
technology-based production businesses, indicating that they needed additional 
capital, especially from the VCIs to support their venture business at that time as 
well as for future expansion.  
 
Thus, in these emerging industries, there are likely many expertise gaps and 
differences in ROMFs that exist between the VCIs and ICTVBs that had caused 
them to experience management conflict in their business relationship as indicated 
by the results of this research. Therefore, among others, efforts to converge their 
expertise and ROMFs are crucial to success. For example, acquiring technological, 
financial and managerial expertise by both the VCIs and ICTVBs is crucial to 
smoothly manage their venture business. Perhaps, after a couple of real 
experiences in the next few years, both VCIs and ICTVBs could learn and 
improve their learning curves and thus could improve their business relationship.   
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b) The VCIs seemed to be too cautious in making their investment decisions in 
ICTVBs. This can be clearly seen from the amount of time taken (i.e. between 3 
to 9 months and some are more than a year) for processing the investment. The 
numbers of actual investment made were also very few (i.e. below 5 deals) 
although they received more than 100 proposals annually. Perhaps, the VCIs are 
far more cautious or became more risk averse recently because many may have 
lost their money in the technology bubble-burst in early 2000. These VCIs also 
manage other people’s money, thus, they have to be extremely diligent and 
cautious. Another reason is perhaps the ICT industry in Malaysia is hampered by 
the limited number of brilliant ICT ideas (i.e. breakthrough technologies) that the 
VCIs are seeking for. Although there are many business ideas, they are without 
that unique technology behind them. Most of the VCIs, citing paucity of brilliant 
deals, beg the question of whether there are a sufficient number of quality ideas 
surfacing in Malaysia. Perhaps, Malaysia is not alone in this situation as other 
developing countries too have a similar situation.  
 
Surprisingly, 72% of these VCIs were also found to have preferences for a 
medium-risk type of venture business as opposed to what the literature advocated 
that they are among the main risk-financiers for ICTVBs. Perhaps, this preference 
stems partly from the fact that VCIs were found to be lacking the technological 
expertise to assist the ICTVBs because generally they come from government, 
corporate and finance backgrounds, which apparently are not suitable for assisting 
ICTVBs with building their venture businesses. They also are used to or 
comfortable with investing in other types of normal businesses that present a 
lower-risk profile for investment (e.g. manufacturing, services, etc.) in Malaysia. 
This situation could be different in the developed countries, e.g. in the U.S. where 
many VCIs were successful entrepreneurs who listed their venture businesses and 
then moved on to become VCIs. In contrast, currently, there are very few 
successful entrepreneurs who have become VCIs in Malaysia. 
 
c) There were also several investment characteristics of both VCIs and ICTVBs that 
were found to be quite peculiar, at least in the context of MSC, Malaysia. For 
example, firstly, both VCIs and ICTVBs prefer longer investment duration, 
between 5 to 6 years. Reasons for this are such as most of the VCIs manage 
public funds (i.e. government or government agencies), thus, they could afford to 
be quite patient in getting back their investment and profits. As for the ICTVBs, 
the majority of them are at their early and growth stages, which require quite a 
longer duration before they can reap a good return on their investment. Another 
reason, perhaps, currently the situation in Malaysia is that there are less developed 
divestment mechanisms for VCIs’ investment in ICTVBs, e.g. “over-the-counter” 
markets or special exchanges for ICTVBs (as discussed in Appendix ‘A’).  
 
Secondly, the ownership structure of the venture business is found to be that the 
ICTVBs hold the majority shareholding and the VCIs hold the minority 
shareholding (but it could be quite substantial, i.e. from 31% to 50%). Perhaps, 
this is partly due to the ICTVBs’ corporate culture in Malaysia that they are very 
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reluctant to dilute their majority shareholding as they have put tremendous efforts 
and a huge amount of personal wealth into their venture business. This situation is 
quite detrimental to the developmental growth of the ICTVBs in the long-term.  
 
Thirdly, their attitudes towards initial public offerings (IPO) as the method for 
acquiring liquidity for their venture businesses are apparently different. The VCIs 
preferred the IPO as it can increase their reputation as well as it can provide 
potentially huge capital gains. In contrast, the ICTVBs seemed not to be interested 
in an IPO, largely due to their corporate culture that if possible, they want to hold 
on to their majority shareholding of the venture business as long as they could. 
Finally, both VCIs and ICTVBs seemed to have quite a high expectation on the 
return on investment in the venture business, i.e. from 21% to 40%. Although it is 
natural for investors to expect high return on their investment, these rates are 
considered on the higher side in Malaysia because of its embedded structural 
deficiencies, e.g. the size of the domestic market is relatively small and thus far, 
there are not many breakthrough examples of successful home grown ICTVBs. 
 
d) The VCIs preferred both the contractual (i.e. legally defined) and non-contractual 
(i.e. based on trust and understanding) monitoring types, reflecting that they 
would like to have a hands-on approach in monitoring the venture business. In 
addition, the VCIs always require a board directorship in the venture business and 
periodical reporting by the ICTVBs. In contrast, the ICTVBs preferred the non-
contractual (i.e. based on trust and understanding) monitoring type by the VCIs, 
suggesting that they would like for a hands-off approach. Although these 
differences are understandably natural, their management conflict at the post-
investment stage and for risk management became pronounced due to these 
differences.  
 
For a better way of maintaining their business relationship, both VCIs as principal 
and ICTVBs as agent have to improve their communication between them 
(especially for the VCIs) so that they are well informed, and thus they could 
reduce the monitoring time and cost accordingly. At the post-investment stage, for 
monitoring purposes by the VCIs, the full disclosure of strategic business 
information from the ICTVBs is very important as it helps them in making 
managerial decisions as well as realigning any opportunity and threat that their 
investment in the venture business encounters. In addition, the frequency, type, 
detail, etc. of this information from the ICTVBs to the VCIs will lead them to a 
higher level of trust, understanding and a more productive business relationship. 
 
e) The extent of occurrence of management conflict experienced between the VCIs 
and ICTVBs was on the higher side, i.e. 73% experienced “Often/Constantly and 
Sometimes” as compared to 27% of “Rarely or Never”. These facts suggest that 
for emerging venture capital and ICT industries like in Malaysia, the high 
occurrence of management conflict is expected and unavoidable due to reasons as 
discussed earlier. The management conflict could be much lower in the developed 
countries with established venture capital and ICT industries. This is a serious 
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matter in MSC, Malaysia and perhaps is largely due to the corporate culture of the 
ICTVBs that are too secretive and reluctant to disclose technical information, 
even to their financiers and business partners such as VCIs. In addition, the 
ICTVBs in the sample were mostly at their early stages, whereby it can be 
inferred that they are still in the process of establishing their managerial, 
production, market capabilities, etc. 
 
5.3.2 Findings from the statistical analysis 
 
 The following findings are from the statistical analysis conducted mainly to test 
the six hypotheses of this research. The results of each hypothesis show the specific 
differences in their ROMFs and also the specific ROMFs that could be useful for 
reducing their management conflict. The discussions of these findings are as follows. 
 
a) Generally, the statistical findings of this research indicated that the conceptual 
framework used is supported by the data. The results of the data analysis (Tables 
4.3 to 4.8) did not support hypothesis H1 but supported hypotheses H2 to H6 (as 
discussed in Chapter 4). Basically, these findings demonstrated that VCIs and 
ICTVBs not only had differences in expertise but also recognized different 
managerial factors at the post-investment stage and for risk management in the 
venture capital process. Thus, these differences may be inferred as one source of 
the causes of management conflict experienced in their business relationship. The 
findings also showed that some of their ROMFs might be useful for reducing any 
management conflict experienced by them (as discussed in Chapter 4). However, 
because the conceptual framework of ROMFs and management conflict in 
venture capital financing has not been extensively applied, the findings of this 
explorative research may not be widely applicable.  
 
b) Hypothesis H1 was not supported by the data, and the results clearly indicate that 
at the pre-investment stage, the ROMFs of both VCIs and ICTVBs were not much 
different. At this stage, their interests seemed to be in alignment with each other, 
i.e. the desire to close the deal. To the VCIs, the venture businesses offered by the 
ICTVBs represented potentially profitable investments and also knowledge-
sharing opportunities. As for the ICTVBs, the VCIs offered a means to gain 
additional capital both at that time and for their future expansion. However, this 
alignment was not necessarily the case at the post-investment stage and for risk 
management. Their ROMFs were found to be different (as indicated by the results 
that H2 and H3 were supported by the data), which may cause management 
conflict between them. In managing the venture business, each of them may have 
different preferences and emphasize different techniques or criteria that they think 
appropriate to their venture business. As a result, management conflict may arise 
and deter constructive business management between them.  
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c) In general, all hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 were supported by the data and the 
results indicated that at every stage and for risk management there were inverse or 
negative relationships between their ROMFs and the management conflict 
experienced, suggesting some relation to the argument in a) above.  Some of the 
examples of specific ROMFs that can be useful for reducing management conflict 
are as follows, active search by both VCIs and ICTVBs for a deal (for sources of 
deal origination), submission of periodical reports (for maintaining relationship), 
free-sharing of information (for factors of an ideal relationship), awareness of 
inexperience risks (for general risk management), etc.  
 
5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
 
 Hopefully this research will make a valuable contribution both at the theoretical 
and practical levels, particularly regarding the business relationship between VCIs and 
ICTVBs across the full venture capital process. The discussions on the main theoretical 
and practical implications are as follows. 
 
5.4.1 Theoretical implications 
 
 There are two probable theoretical implications that can be derived from the 
findings of this research as follows: 
 
a) This research attempted to identify whether the independent variables (i.e. 
ROMFs of VCIs and ICTVBs) could be categorized as additional mechanisms for 
reducing management conflict in venture capital as a whole. This research has 
empirically established a theoretical link between ROMFs and management 
conflict in the venture capital process for ICTVBs in MSC. The results indicated 
that each of the three groups of independent variables (at the pre-investment stage, 
post-investment stage, and risk management) has its own merits in explaining the 
differences of their ROMFs, and the relationships of their ROMFs and 
management conflict experienced. However, there would be greater explanatory 
power if these groups were combined. The general interpretation here is that the 
association of the differences in ROMFs on management conflict is affected by 
the interaction of these three groups of independent variables. 
 
b) This research has also developed a framework for assessing the ROMFs on 
management conflict for successful venture businesses. According to the literature 
reviewed, the basic proxies for the occurrence of management conflict between 
the VCIs and ICTVBs are such as differences in expectations, motivations, 
commitments, dispersion of ownership structure, etc. However, this research 
proposes that the degree of differences in expertise between VCIs and ICTVBs 
and their ROMFs (as indicated by the results) is another basic proxy for the 
occurrence of management conflict in their business relationship. This framework 
(as illustrated in Figure 5.1) is felt practical and applicable for future research, 
especially for the ICT industry in developing countries. 
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Figure 5.1: Framework for assessing ROMFs and management conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on Figure 5.1 above, the strengths of the VCIs are found to be in the provision 
of capital, financial expertise and general business management, whereas the 
strengths of the ICTVBs are found in the technical knowledge and commitments to 
their venture businesses. Therefore, hypothetically these differences influenced their 
ROMFs at each stage and for risk management in the venture capital process and 
increased the problems of information asymmetries between them, which led to their 
management conflict in the business relationship.  
 
5.4.2 Practical implications 
 
There are several managerial implications that can be drawn from the findings of 
this research. The discussions on these implications are as follows: 
 
a) In Malaysia, there seem to be very few people who really understand both 
technological and financial management of venture business. This is also quite 
true for other developing countries. Therefore, there is a need for further training 
of the VCIs who are good in financial and managerial matters to learn more on 
the technological matters. Reciprocally, the ICTVBs also need to learn more 
about financial and managerial matters of venture business. If both VCIs and 
ICTVBs could improve their expertise in these main aspects, they could have a 
better opportunity to gather their aggregate competency for the betterment of their 
venture businesses.  
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Perhaps, an improvement in the incubation system in MSC could provide the 
much needed avenue for both VCIs and ICTVBs to get acquainted with each other 
at the very beginning. Central to the role of this incubation system are the 
elements of technology commercialization and entrepreneurship. It also has to 
emphasize the engagement of network partnership linkages, e.g. technology 
networks, financial networks and market networks. Thus, this incubation system 
shall assume the role of facilitator in assisting the technological and financial 
outreach programs for access to both VCIs and ICTVBs to find resources they 
need, be it technology, capital, market, management, etc. This type of incubation 
system is well established in most developed countries such as Japan, the U.K., 
Finland and others. For instance, there are networks of incubation systems (e.g. 
“Innovation Plaza”) throughout seven advanced regions established by the Japan 
Science & Technology Corporation (JST) in Japan to help ICTVBs in nurturing 
and developing their business ideas into reality. 
 
b) Real and direct communication especially on the exchange of strategic 
information between the VCIs and ICTVBs seemed to be very important for 
reducing their management conflict. The management conflict between them 
seemed very strong at the early and growth stages of the ICTVBs’ development, 
e.g. conflict relating to size of R&D, production issues, size and strategies of 
marketing and failures of meeting performance targets (as indicated in the case 
studies). This is quite normal since most ICTVBs at their early stage are not yet 
fully established, e.g. managerial and production capabilities, products/services 
track records, etc. And the VCIs also lack their understanding and familiarity with 
these new ICTVBs. In other words, fledgling ICTVBs at their early stage have too 
many unknowns, from an inexperienced management team to a fragile customer 
base to an uncertain market for initial public offerings.  
 
There was also no uniformity on the management conflict by the types of VCIs. 
For instance, because there was a lack of understanding and interactive 
communication between the government-related VCIs and the ICTVBs, they 
experienced management conflict constantly. The bank-related VCIs also require 
deeper communication with the ICTVBs to minimise their management conflict 
between them. As for the private independent VCIs, they are more concerned with 
the agency risks, which imply management conflict could take place even though 
the ICTVBs try to comply with the financial contract requirements. Perhaps, this 
is due to the fact that these private independent VCIs manage their own funds and 
their special expertise about venture businesses. 
 
c) The findings also showed the significant nexus between ROMFs and management 
conflict in managing venture business. Differences in expertise that influenced the 
differences in ROMFs are crucial because the performance of their venture 
business could be jeopardized if management conflict is not reduced. Moreover, 
the differences in their ROMFs at the pre-investment stage became more 
important at the post-investment stage and in risk management, suggesting that 
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for a constructive business relationship both VCIs and ICTVBs should reconcile 
their differences in ROMFs as early as the pre-investment stage.  
 
In order to reduce management conflict between the VCIs and ICTVBs, they 
should reassess the impacts of their ROMFs on management conflict experienced 
by improving some of these ROMFs to facilitate reducing the management 
conflict (as discussed in Chapter 4). Among the important ROMFs indicated by 
the statistical analysis were the improvements in screening and due diligence, etc. 
(at the pre-investment stage), improvements in information exchange on strategic 
financial and technological matters, etc. (at the post-investment stage), and 
improvements in their attitudes towards agency and market risks (in risk 
management). 
 
d) The findings are also relevant in enhancing the Malaysian government’s efforts in 
developing and improving the awareness about venture capital financing for the 
ICT industry in MSC.  The findings from this research, which have implications 
for the practices of government-related VCIs can be used for guidance on 
improving existing inadequacies and can help achieve greater financial 
intermediation between VCIs and ICTVBs in MSC (as discussed in Appendix 
‘B’). For example, the improvement in their ROMFs for screening, due diligence, 
and evaluation at the pre-investment stage are important and could help them to 
reduce management conflict. The improvements in their ROMFs pertaining to the 
smooth exchanges of strategic business information between them at the post-
investment and in risk management are also helpful to reduce their management 
conflict.  
 
In addition, allocation of public funds to these VCIs has been steadily increasing, 
thus, achieving excellence in the management of these funds is very important 
because the success or failure of these ICTVBs can significantly affect 
government investments. In Malaysia, these VCIs are indirectly assigned a 
leading and instrumental role in the development of ICT entrepreneurship in MSC.  
 
However, keeping in mind that both venture capital and ICT industries are just 
emerging and that the ICTVBs’ talent pools in Malaysia are limited, there is a 
need to make better use of the international expertise (as discussed in Appendix 
‘A’). For instance, foreign VCIs (e.g. from Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, etc.) should 
be encouraged to invest in Malaysian ICTVBs because at this stage, the industry 
is dominated by local VCIs that are mostly ex-corporate officials and ex-bankers 
working with financial institutions. These foreign VCIs will not only bring 
additional funds but also their expertise and experiences as well as their capability 
of diversifying the risks in investing in the ICTVBs. As for the ICTVBs, the need 
to increase their talent pools will require continuous input in increasing both the 
overall level of technological knowledge and R&D capabilities that can be learned 
from the multinational companies operating in MSC.  
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e) From the methodological point of view, the statistical results suggest that 
variables used to evaluate the ROMFs and management conflict must be 
comprehensive. The independent variables at pre-investment and post-investment 
stages of the venture capital process should be selected with appropriate sub-
variables that can probably provide better information on the impact of the 
ROMFs on management conflict. This observation is particularly relevant for ICT 
industry, which has its own peculiarities and is labeled as a risky investment 
environment. 
 
5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 The following are some limitations that this research faced, largely on the data 
collection. The discussions are as follows. 
 
a) Sample limitations -- The first limitation was related to the number of VCIs and 
ICTVBs that could be selected for the study. The number of VCIs was originally 
not large, which is in tandem with emerging nature of the industry in Malaysia. In 
addition, the number of ICTVBs that are actually involved with venture capital 
financing was not large either in comparison to the total ICTVBs operating in 
MSC. These constraints caused the small sample size that in turn could have 
affected the variance of the variables. As noted earlier, majority of the ICTVBs in 
the sample are at their early stage and several of them are at the growth stage. 
Thus, an in-depth study on the relationship between management conflict and the 
success or failure of the ICTVBs could not be fully undertaken, among others. 
 
b) Statistical limitations -- Due to the constraint of sample size, statistical limitations 
are unavoidable. A much bigger sample size might be desirable to ensure higher 
validity and generalization of the results. This research was also unable to search 
for or formulate comprehensive variables because the conceptual model on 
ROMFs and management conflict in venture capital financing has not been 
extensively validated by empirical measurement. In this research, nevertheless, 
necessary measures were taken to ensure that all requirements of the statistical 
analysis were met and that the results were also interpreted cautiously. 
 
c) Information limitations -- Another limitation of this research was the use of 
surveys, which did not permit the researcher to clarify ambiguities faced by the 
respondents in completing the questionnaire. Some of the respondents contacted 
the researcher to seek clarification on some items in the questionnaire. In addition, 
this research was unable to secure confidential information (e.g. the financial 
contract documents, etc.) from the respondents due to the existence of non-
disclosure agreements (NDA) between VCIs and ICTVBs. Although the use of 
both survey questionnaires and direct interviews with selected respondents would 
enable the researcher to gather useful data and information, which is crucial in 
social science research, it was found that due to confidentiality, the 
comprehensiveness of the data and information is still quite limited. 
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5.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Empirical research on the subject of this research is very limited, and such 
findings (i.e. particularly the statistical results) presented in this Thesis may not be 
permanent in nature. It is felt that these findings are not sufficient to provide definitive 
answers, and more research will be needed to provide clear direction and further 
knowledge on the subject. Based on several limitations of this research as explained 
above, future research should also consider the following aspects.  
 
a) It is contended from the findings of this research that management conflict is a 
serious matter in venture capital financing. Both VCIs and ICTVBs have to find 
ways and means to reduce this conflict because it could affect their business 
relationship in the venture business. The literature reviewed suggests that this 
conflict does exist in venture capital financing in the developed countries but it is 
more pronounced in the developing countries (as indicated by this research) with 
less established venture capital and ICT industries. Therefore, future research 
should study the relationship between this conflict and the actual success or 
failure of venture businesses. This is quite pertinent for ICT industry due to its 
peculiarities and risky nature. Although to gather relevant data and information 
could be quite difficult (e.g. to solicit information from the VCIs and ICTVBs 
who are willing to admit their failure, to choose what criteria to use for the 
classification of success and failure in venture business, etc), this could be 
interesting in pursuing a better understanding of this conflict in venture capital 
financing. 
 
b) It is also contended from the findings of this research that the extent of 
management conflict occurrence between the VCIs and ICTVBs seemed to 
correspond with the stages of ICTVBs’ development. For example, ICTVBs at the 
early stage encountered strong conflict due to reasons that have been discussed 
earlier. For ICTVBs at the growth stage, they experienced this conflict to a 
weaker degree. In other words, these facts suggest that the less successful 
ICTVBs (i.e. at the early stage) have a lot of conflict with the VCIs but quite 
successful ICTVBs (i.e. at the growth stage) have lesser conflict with the VCIs. 
Therefore, future research should study in detail this conflict vis-à-vis the status 
of the ICTVBs’ growth because the business relationship between the VCIs and 
ICTVBs could be different accordingly. 
 
c) It is also contended that different types of VCIs (i.e. the government-related, 
bank-related and privately independent VCIs) seemed to behave differently in 
managing their investment in ICTVBs. Perhaps, this is largely due to differences 
in their sources of funds, experiences and expectations. In addition, the 
government-related and bank-related VCIs constitute the main players in the 
venture capital industries in most of the developing countries. This is quite 
different from the developed countries where the privately independent VCIs’ 
roles are substantial. Therefore, future research should study in greater depth this 
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aspect as it can further enrich the knowledge of venture capital financing in 
general and for ICTVBs in particular. 
 
d) In Malaysia, the venture capital industry is dominated by local VCIs with limited 
expertise and experiences. In order to have vibrant venture capital financing in 
MSC, Malaysia, established VCIs from the neighbouring countries such as 
Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and Hong Kong should be encouraged to invest in the 
Malaysian ICTVBs. As discussed earlier, these foreign VCIs could bring 
additional funds, expertise and experiences to the Malaysian venture capital 
industry. Thus, future research could study the performance of venture businesses 
that receive financing from the local VCIs against the foreign VCIs because this 
could further enrich the knowledge on the implication of international financing, 
among others. 
 
e) It is also suggested that future research should identify the similarities and/or 
differences in the relationship between ROMFs and management conflict of ICT 
versus non-ICT industries. In addition, the use of a bigger cross-sectional sample 
between industries could improve generalization and statistical validity. 
Additional knowledge from this perspective will facilitate the formulation of 
guidelines for managing successful venture businesses involving venture capital 
financing. 
 
f) The model on venture capital has been developed with the perspectives of 
developed countries.  It was recognized from this research that approaching the 
complexity of venture business management only from the experiences of 
developed countries with established venture capital and ICT industries might not 
reflect the total picture of venture capital financing. Therefore, it is proposed that 
more research in developing countries will add more knowledge and provide a 
clearer perspective to evaluate venture capital financing for venture businesses. 
 
g) From the methodology point of view, it is suggested that a number of methods be 
used to study the ROMFs and management conflict, such as, direct interviews 
with specific dyad relationships between VCIs and ICTVBs. In addition, future 
research should benefit from more complete availability and comprehensive 
information. These different sources of information can provide more valid data 
on this subject. Future research should also look into a broader selection of 
independent and dependent variables to cover, such as other main elements of 
managerial factors and management conflict in venture capital financing. 
 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In conclusion, this research contributes to the substance of knowledge about 
venture capital financing in general and the implications of ROMFs on management 
conflict between VCIs and ICTVBs in particular. Relevant hypotheses have been 
proposed and tested. Probably, among the most important general conclusions that may 
be derived from the findings of this research can be briefly summarized as follows: 
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a) The roles of VCIs as principal and of ICTVBs as agent are found to be clearly 
demarcated, with the VCIs providing financial and managerial commitments and 
the ICTVBs providing technological knowledge and commitments. Their 
expertise is also clearly distinguishable, with the skill sets of each being almost 
separated, i.e. the VCIs are so-called expert on financial and managerial matters 
and the ICTVBs on the technological matters. Thus, these differences increase the 
acuteness of information asymmetries between them that may contribute to the 
management conflict. 
 
b) Theoretically, VCIs and ICTVBs should not be having management conflict in 
managing their venture businesses because they could have agreed upon the terms 
and conditions in their financial contracts. However, in reality, due to their 
differences in expertise and ROMFs (as proposed in this research), they may have 
management conflict. 
 
c) Differences in their ROMFs at the pre-investment stage become more pronounced 
at the post-investment stage and for risk management. This fact suggests that in 
order for both VCIs and ICTVBs to reduce their management conflict in the 
venture business, it is important to reconcile their differences in ROMFs as early 
as at the pre-investment stage, and then continue to improve them at the post-
investment stage and in risk management. In addition, selecting the right business 
partners upfront seems to have been crucial for both VCIs and ICTVBs. 
 
d) Improvements in some of their ROMFs are useful for reducing management 
conflict between them. For example, their ROMFs in screening, due diligence and 
evaluation at the pre-investment stage; in exchanging strategic business 
information at the post-investment stage; and in the need for a balanced attitude 
towards market and agency risks in risk management are found to be useful for 
reducing this conflict.  
 
e) The exchange of strategic business information through interactive 
communication between the VCIs and ICTVBs constituted central importance at 
the post-investment stage and risk management, particularly for monitoring 
purposes by the VCIs as principal. This matter seemed to be among the most 
important challenges of venture business management in the emerging venture 
capital and ICT industries in Malaysia and, perhaps, other developing countries 
too.  
 
In general, the findings of this research indicate that VCIs and ICTVBs have 
differences in their expertise and managerial stances, but improvement in information 
exchange on technological, financial and business strategies, among others, will reduce 
management conflict between them. Hence, this confirms that improving expertise and 
ROMFs on management conflict between VCIs and ICTVBs for successful venture 
businesses is a useful undertaking. In other words, seeking to make a constructive 
business relationship between the VCIs and ICTVBs operating with incomplete 
information, among others, in risky environments of the emerging venture capital and 
ICT industries is indeed a theoretical and practical goal.  
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APPENDIX ‘A’ 
 
A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF MALAYSIA’S VENTURE CAPITAL 
INDUSTRY1 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This appendix provides a brief overview on venture capital industries in Malaysia, 
the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. While venture capital industry is firmly 
developed in the U.S., many other countries have experienced considerably difficulty 
trying to develop a vibrant industry. This is particularly true for developing countries that 
have differences in their institutional environments. Thus, a situational analysis is made 
in the context of the general characteristics of the industries in these countries to look into 
the similarities and differences between Malaysia and these countries. In particular, the 
potential effects of institutional differences upon the development of venture capital 
financing in the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) can also be looked into.  This 
appendix is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the general characteristics of venture 
capital industries in Malaysia and the selected countries. Then, a comparison between 
those characteristics against Malaysia is made. Section 3 discusses several differences 
that could possibly affect a vibrant industry in Malaysia. Section 4 discusses several 
indirect supportive roles by the government for this industry. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes this appendix. 
 
2. VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES2 
 
2.1 Overview of the industry 
 
 On global level, this industry is experiencing considerable growth over the recent 
past. Spreading from the U.S., this industry has become a critical factor in financing 
ICTVBs. However, recent cross-country studies advocate that the development of this 
industry in each country is different due to factors such as the national, economic, 
political and social environments. Specifically, the heterogeneity of each country in terms 
of their stage of economic development, institutional systems, and business environments 
fundamentally affect the development of their venture capital industries (Aylward, 1998; 
Kenny, Han and Tanaka, 2002; Mani and Bartzokas, 2002; Lockett and Wright, 2002).3  
                                                          
1
 Part of the paper entitled ‘Venture capital financing in a technology park: A case study of the Multimedia 
Super Corridor (MSC), Malaysia’ presented by the researcher at the international workshop jointly 
organized by the Waseda University-MMU on March 3, 2004 at the Malaysia Multimedia University 
(MMU), Cyberjaya, Malaysia. It was published in the Journal of International Business and 
Entrepreneurship (JIBE), (July 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 37 – 70).  
2
 There are several reasons for selecting these countries. Firstly, the U.S. is selected due to its pioneering 
role and has a successful vibrant venture capital industry. Secondly, Japan is chosen due to its status as the 
Asia’s top industrialized country. Thirdly, Taiwan and Singapore are selected due to their rapid 
development of venture capital industries in Asia. Finally, Malaysia is the case study of this Appendix. 
However, some comparisons for specific context are also made with other countries accordingly. 
3
 For instance, in their study on the development of venture capital industry in the East Asian nations, 
Kenny, Han, and Tanaka (2002, p. 2) contend that the diversity of these nations “in terms of their national 
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This is reflected in the uneven development of venture capital industries across the world. 
For instance, in terms of size, Table A shows the uneven spread of total venture capital 
funds under management in the selected countries and Malaysia. Table B shows the 
uneven investment breakdown for the year of 2002 in these countries. Clearly, both of 
these tables indicate the distinct differences, with the largest and most active are those in 
the U.S. and followed by Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia. 
 
Table A: Selected national venture capital pools 1992 – 2002 (US$ Million) 
 
Country/Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
United States 
Japan 
Taiwan 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
30,557 
16,028 
470 
896 
147 
31,894 
17,750 
508 
1,013 
160 
34,841 
17,750* 
562 
1,833 
194 
38,465 
14,851 
696 
3,164 
437 
46,207 
11,254 
1,336 
3,981 
448 
59,615 
7,722 
1,913 
4,468 
 406 
 
Country/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
United States 
Japan 
Taiwan 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
84,180 
12,513 
3,598 
5,258 
460 
145,196 
21,729 
4,447 
7,791 
667 
233,666 
21,138 
5,852 
9,286 
587 
233,666** 
21,515 
6,261 
9,754 
811 
251,400 
22,300 
6,400 
10,200 
836   
Note: * 1993 figures; 1994 figures are not available. ** 2000 figures; 2001 figures are not available. 
Source: National Science Board – Science and Engineering Indicators 2002; 2002 PricewaterhouseCoopers/Venture 
Economics/NVCA US Money Tree Survey; and AVCJ – The 2004 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia. 
  
 
Table B: Investment breakdown by country from 1st. January to 31st. December 2002 
 
ITEM/COUNTRY U.S.     Japan     Taiwan     Singapore       Malaysia 
Amount Invested (US$ million) 
Number of Deals (disclosed) 
Number of Investees 
 
21,179.01 2,067.24    154.75      189.03          21.18 
3,011    44 (3)      9 (9)        19 (15)          11 (7) 
3,011    44         9           19              10 
   
Source: 2002 PricewaterhouseCoopers/Venture Economics/ NVCA US Money Tree Survey; AVCJ (January 2003). 
 
 In terms of sources of funds for the venture capital industry, traditionally pension 
funds, endowments, and private individuals form the main sources in the U.S. In contrast, 
corporations, banks and insurance companies are the main sources in Japan and Taiwan. 
In Malaysia and Singapore, funds from government agencies are the main sources 
followed by corporations, and banks and insurance companies. In terms of the 
distribution of investments stage-wise for venture capital industries of these countries, 
more than 50% usually went to the expansion stage (which includes mezzanine, buy-out 
and turn-around) and followed by the start-up stage. For the seed stage, only small 
fractions (i.e. less than 10%) of investments are made.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
systems of innovation, levels of entrepreneurship, political economic development, varying labor practices, 
corporate ownership regulations, educational achievement, and business cultures means that each country 
and its venture capital industry has a different evolutionary trajectory”. 
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2.2 Comparison of characteristics of the industry 
 
 A situational analysis is made to highlight the general characteristics of this 
industry in the selected countries and compares them with that of Malaysia. The 
estimation of which countries have developed a successful vibrant venture capital 
industry is still open to debate, but this will show a reasonable benchmark of this industry 
in Malaysia. For this purpose, the following dimensions are considered: a) the financial 
system, b) the primary locus of industrial innovation, c) the history of the industry, d) the 
operational characteristics of the industry, and e) the technological and business 
environments. Table C following summarizes the general characteristics of venture 
capital industries of selected countries. 
 
 
Table C: General characteristics of venture capital industries in the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Malaysia. 
 
 
DIMENSIONS U.S. JAPAN TAIWAN SINGAPORE MALAYSIA 
a. Financial system. 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Primary locus of industrial 
innovation. 
 
 
c. History of the VC industry: 
 
First public effort to foster 
enterprise creation. 
 
 
 
 
 
First venture capital organization 
involving not-for profit 
institutions. 
 
 
First private venture capital firm. 
 
 
 
Dates of important legal 
changes/public policy measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market-based/ 
separation of 
commercial & 
investment 
banking. 
 
Research 
Universities & 
Companies. 
 
 
 
1958: Small 
Business Inv. 
Act. 
 
 
 
 
1946: American 
Research & 
Development 
Corporation. 
 
1958: Draper, 
Gaither, Anderson. 
 
 
1979: Change of 
ERISA’s prudent man 
rule – pension funds 
could invest in venture 
capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank-based (with 
keiretsu 
ties)/separation of 
commercial & 
investment banking. 
 
Companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
1963: Small Business 
Inv. Companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
1975: Center for 
Promotion of R&D 
Intensive Businesses. 
 
 
1973: Japan 
Associated Finance 
Co. (JAFCO). 
 
1994: reinterpretation 
of Anti-Monopoly 
laws – private equity 
firms can hold 
majority stakes.  
1995: Loss-making 
firms can list on 
OTC. 
1997: private firms 
can effectively issue 
stock options. 
1997: change pension 
funds law – pension 
funds can invest in 
venture capital. 
 
Bank-based/separation 
of commercial & 
investment banking. 
 
 
 
Companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
1973: Industrial 
Research & 
Technology Institute 
(ITRI). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1984: Multiventure 
Investment Inc. (i.e. 
Acer subsidiary). 
 
1983: Tax incentives 
Statute encouraging 
individuals to invest in 
venture capital firms. 
1991: The above 
Statute is revised to 
allow corporate 
investors the same 
20% tax reduction 
investing in venture 
capital firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank-based/separation 
of commercial and 
investment banking. 
 
 
 
Companies & 
Government agencies. 
 
 
 
 
1998: Kent Ridge 
Digital Laboratories 
(KRDL) – a technical 
research institution for 
creating entrepreneurs. 
 
 
1985: EDB Venture 
Capital Fund – an 
initial effort by the 
government. 
 
1983: South East Asia 
Venture Investment 
(SEAVI). 
 
1999: 
Technopreneurship 
Program is launched to 
encourage high-
technology 
entrepreneurship. 
1999: 
Technopreneurship 
Investment Fund (TIF) 
with US$1.0 billion to 
invest in venture 
capital funds. 
1999: Revisions in 
bankruptcy laws, 
employer stock option 
plans and tax system to 
Bank-based/separation 
of commercial and 
investment banking; 
Islamic banking. 
 
 
Companies & 
Government agencies. 
 
 
 
 
1996: SMIDEC is 
established – planning & 
overall coordination of 
SMEs. 
 
 
 
1992: Malaysian 
Technology 
Development 
Corporation (MTDC). 
 
1984: Malaysian 
Ventures Sdn. Bhd.  
 
 
1996: MSC is 
established; 
1999: MSC Ventures –   
about US110 million 
funds for high-
technology investments. 
2001: MAVCAP -  
US131million of funds 
for ICT investments. 
2002: Malaysia Debt 
Ventures Bhd. (MDV)- 
with a US$420 million 
loan from Japanese 
government, it offers 
project debt financing 
for ICT/high growth 
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d. Operational characteristics 
of VC industry: 
Creation of public equity market 
dedicated to high-growth 
enterprises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structure of venture capital 
funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources of venture capital funds. 
 
 
 
 
Form of investment. 
 
 
Investment focus. 
 
 
 
Stage of investment. 
 
 
 
Investment duration. 
 
Hands-on/hands-off preference. 
 
Current state. 
 
Main drivers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e. Technological/Business 
environments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1971: NASDAQ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limited partnership (LP) 
with specific duration 
(normally 10 years). 
 
 
 
 
 
Endowments, pension 
funds, and wealthy 
individuals. 
 
 
Mixed but usually prefer 
Equity. 
 
ICT, biotechnology and 
medicine/health. 
 
 
All stages but Seed and 
Early stage are 
substantial. 
 
Average 5 years. 
 
Hands-on. 
 
‘Developed’ 
 
Market-driven system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology-intensive; 
Low regulation density; 
High entrepreneurial and 
technological R&D 
capacity; Developed 
independent venture 
capitalists; High 
commercialization of 
technologies & 
inventions; and High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1963: OTC; 
1999: MOTHERS 
(Market for High 
Growth and 
Emerging Stocks). 
2000: NASDAQ (a 
joint venture between 
Osaka Stock 
Exchange & Softbank 
Corp). 
 
Captive open-ended 
funds (i.e. funds 
provided by corporate 
parent firms – banks, 
securities firms & 
insurance 
companies). 
 
Corporations, banks 
and insurance 
companies. 
 
 
Mixed but usually 
prefer Loans. 
 
Manufacturing, retail 
and ICT. 
 
 
Usually later stage 
(Pre-IPO). 
 
 
Average over 5 years. 
 
Hands-off. 
 
‘Under Performer’ 
 
Bank-driven system 
and large SME sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology-
intensive; High 
regulation density; 
High technological 
R&D capacity; High 
risk averse character 
of financier; Limited 
number of 
independent venture 
capitalist; Quite low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1988: the TSE created 
a third category of 
listings with more 
lenient requirements. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Open-ended funds (i.e. 
venture capital funds 
are evergreen and need 
never liquidate their 
investment). 
 
 
 
Corporations and 
private individuals. 
 
 
 
Mixed but usually 
prefer Equity. 
 
Electronics and ICT. 
 
 
 
Start-up & Expansion 
stage. 
 
 
Average 5 years. 
 
Hands-on. 
 
‘Silicon Valley-like’ 
 
Entrepreneurial in 
electronics, PC and 
semiconductor; 
Linkages with U.S. 
Silicon Valley; 
Supportive 
government; and 
National emphasis on 
education. 
 
 
 
High regulation density 
(e.g. banks only 5% of 
the total capital in a 
single fund; insurance 
companies own 25% of 
anyone fund’s total 
capitalization; pension 
funds are forbidden 
from investing in 
venture capital); Many 
encourage venture 
capital investing. 
 
 
 
 
 
1996: SESDAQ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limited partnership 
with specific duration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporations, 
government, and banks 
& insurance 
companies. 
 
Mixed but usually 
prefer Equity. 
 
ICT and medical. 
 
 
 
Start-up & Expansion 
stage. 
 
 
Average 5 years. 
 
Hands-on. 
 
‘Silicon Valley-like’ 
 
Government-driven (as 
part of wider strategy 
to stimulate change 
towards an 
entrepreneurial, 
innovation-based 
strategy); Venture 
capital exporter; 
Linkages with U.S. 
Silicon Valley. 
 
 
High regulation density 
(but revisions were 
made to encourage 
entrepreneurship and 
venture capital 
investing); High 
technological R&D 
capacity (in hard disk 
drives & 
semiconductor 
sectors.  
2003: Cradle Investment 
Program - (a RM100 
million pre-seed fund). 
 
 
 
1997: MESDAQ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limited partnership with 
specific duration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government, 
corporation, banks & 
insurance companies. 
 
 
Mixed but usually prefer 
Equity. 
 
Traditionally in 
manufacturing but lately 
in ICT. 
 
Majority in later stage 
but lately in seed and 
early stages. 
 
Average over 5 years. 
 
Hands-on. 
 
‘Under Performer’ 
 
Government-driven and 
funded; Linkages with 
U. S. Silicon Valley. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High regulation density; 
Low technological R&D 
capacity; Less 
developed independent 
venture capitalists 
(dominated by local); 
Low deals flow. 
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deals flow. deals flow. independent venture 
capitalists; Quite high 
deals flow. 
foundry); Limited 
number of private 
venture capitalists (but 
generally are 
experienced); Low 
local deals flow.  
Source: Abbot and Hay (1995); Kuemmerle (2001); Mani and Bartzokas (2002); Kenny, Han and Tanaka (2002); 
Harding (2002); and Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia (VCFM) Survey 2003 conducted by the researcher. 
 
 
2.3  Similarities and differences 
 
Based on Table C above, the U.S. has the complete and right kind of 
characteristics for a vibrant venture capital industry. Its market-driven system, excellent 
technological and business environments, and low-regulation density for the industry 
(particularly by allowing pension funds and endowments to invest in venture capital 
funds) are seen to be the important factors for a developed industry. In contrast, although 
Japan has started quite early and has the second largest pool of venture funds in the world, 
paradoxically its industry is still labeled as ‘Under Performer’. Among the main reasons 
that may contribute to this below-expectation performance are its bank-driven system 
with high-risk averse character, high-regulation density, captive open-ended funds, and 
preference of hands-off style in managing venture businesses (Kenny, Han and Tanaka, 
2002).  
 
As for Taiwan and Singapore, their industry sizes are much smaller than those of 
the U.S. and Japan. Nevertheless, their industries are rapidly developing into ‘Silicon 
Valley-like’. Reasons that could possibly contribute to this good performance are, for 
example, the linkages with the U.S. Silicon Valley, supportive governments, and quite 
developed independent venture capitalists. One peculiar characteristic of the Taiwan 
industry is its structure of venture capital funds, i.e. evergreen open-ended funds with no 
specific duration. The Singapore case presents a successful role of its government in 
supporting a vibrant venture capital industry (i.e. similar to the Israel case). Besides a 
huge sum of money allocated by the government (i.e. US$1.0 billion), the industry is 
further promoted with revisions of laws and regulations to facilitate a vibrant venture 
capital industry. 
 
3.  MALAYSIA’S CASE 
 
In Malaysia, the industry size is the smallest among these selected countries (as 
shown in Table A). Generally, the industry has several common attributes like others for 
a vibrant industry. However, the industry’s current state is just emerging with little 
evidence of success and is also labeled as ‘Under Performer’ like Japan. Of the many 
possible differences that might have contributed to this below-expectation performance, 
this appendix highlights the following.  
 
Firstly, is the minimal presence of private equity funds for ICTVBs’ financing, 
which could be inferred as less-developed independent venture capitalists. This situation 
is different from the cases of the U.S. and Taiwan. In Malaysia, the source of funds for 
the industry has always been the government, e.g. 45% and 41% in 1999 and 2000 
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respectively, compared to corporations of about 30% and private individuals of less than 
2%. According to the industry sources, besides initiating and funding many VCIs, the 
government also provides various grant schemes for ICTVBs (as discussed in Appendix 
‘B’). Thus, inevitably these actions by the government have unintentionally discouraged 
private equity funds as well as the development of private equity financing. Private 
independent venture capitalists and business angels are also too selective in their 
investments. For instance, Boocock and Ismail (1997, p. 7) state that business angels in 
Malaysia only involved “the tightly-knit Chinese and Bumiputera communities”. Besides 
financial deregulation, there is a need of more outsourcing and co-management of the 
government venture funds, encourage Islamic-based venture capital financing, promote 
key high growth industries, among others, in order to develop private equity financing. 
  
 Secondly, is the minimal early-stage financing for ICTVBs. Traditionally, venture 
capital financing for early-stage investments in Asia is low (i.e. between 2% to 8% of the 
total yearly investments), and this is different from the U.S. whereby the amount of 
investment is quite substantial (i.e. about 20% of the total yearly investments).4   In 
Malaysia, this aspect is important because the majority of the ICTVBs are in their early 
stage of development, approximately 70% to 80% (Nazrin, 2003). For instance, the 
ICTVBs operating in MSC are quite young with 80% of them being incorporated for less 
than ten years (VCFM Survey, 2003).5 The VCIs are also selective in their investments in 
the ICTVBs. According to the same survey, 72% of the VCIs prefer medium-risk type of 
venture businesses and this is not compatible with the high-risk type of ICTVBs. Since 
the industry is still developing, factors such as VCIs’ focus on building a profitable track 
record, lack of time and fundamental expertise to nurture ICTVBs, and the need to 
balance between resources and returns might be the reasons why early-stage financing is 
minimal. Thus, if this aspect is not overcome, most likely these young ICTVBs will not 
survive due to the lack of actual financing from these VCIs. Although there are various 
grant schemes, the market-driven application criteria and the difficulty in obtaining 
information about these schemes, may still lead to low early-stage financing of ICTVBs 
in the near term (as discussed in Appendix ‘B’). 
 
Finally, the technological and business environments are different in Malaysia. 
According to Kuemmerle (2001, p. 258), the characteristics of a country’s venture capital 
industry are closely linked to the characteristics of a country’s sources of technological 
invention. This is practically true for Malaysia and other developing countries. The 
technological R&D capacity in Malaysia is comparatively lower than other selected 
countries. For instance in 1999, based on the leading indicators of technological 
competitiveness, Malaysia scores fairly well for national orientation (69.5) and 
socioeconomic infrastructure (58.9) but falls short for technological infrastructure (31.9) 
and productive capacity (44.1). In contrast, Taiwan scores much better than Malaysia 
with national orientation (90.7), socioeconomic infrastructure (74.2), technological 
                                                          
4
 However, lately this trend is changing though. For instance, investments in seed and start-up stages in 
2000 have increase drastically throughout Asia: Japan (19%); Taiwan (33%); Singapore (30%); and 
Malaysia (30%) [AVCJ: The 2002 Guide to venture Capital in Asia]. 
5
 VCFM Survey 2003 is the survey of venture capital financing in Malaysia conducted by the researcher for 
this research. 
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infrastructure (43.6), and productive capacity (53.7).6  In terms of the density of venture 
capital professionals against the total labor force, the Malaysian industry has limited 
numbers compared to other countries. For instance in 1999, the total number and density 
index per 10,000 labor forces of these professionals in Malaysia is 78 (0.084) compared 
to 1,711 (0.252) in Japan and 453 (2.331) in Singapore (Mani and Bartzokas, 2002).   
 
In the U. S., there are 9,190 venture capital professionals as at the end of year 
2002. According to the VCFM Survey (2003), the VCIs in MSC are young with seven or 
fewer venture capital executives. Therefore, it is a vicious circle indeed, i.e. with a lower 
technological R&D capacity and limited experience (which is reflected in the limited 
number of venture capital professionals) that will in turn lower the number of deals flow 
in venture capital industry in Malaysia. In addition, the business practices in Malaysia are 
quite similar to other Asian countries but differ from that of the U.S.7  For instance, 
usually ICTVBs are found to be quite reluctant to dilute ownership and to disclose 
important information when seeking external financing. These business practices are not 
compatible to the VCIs’ practices of hands-on involvement because their investments in 
these high-risk ICTVBs are at stake. 8   Therefore, these technological and business 
environments have to be improved for a vibrant venture capital financing in Malaysia. 
 
4. INDIRECT SUPPORTIVE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT FOR VENTURE 
 CAPITAL INDUSTRY  
  
 Generally, by encouraging entrepreneurship, the government is principally 
creating a more dynamic economy, which would essentially lead to an increase in private 
equity financing. As discussed above, this industry in Malaysia is relatively new and 
labeled as ‘Under Performer’ at this stage. Thus, improving financial intermediation 
between ICTVBs and VCIs is needed, and the creation of a financial environment in 
which both of them can thrive is critical, especially in MSC. 
 
                                                          
6
 According to the National Science Board, these indicators are sourced from Alan L. Porter, J. David 
Roessner, Nils Newman, and Xiao-Yin Jin, 2000, “Indicators of Technology-Based Competitiveness of 
Nations, Summary Report”. Explanation of the indicators are as follows: National Orientation (NO) 
provides evidence that a nation is taking directed action to achieve technological competitiveness; 
Socioeconomic Infrastructure (SI) assesses the social and economic institutions that support and maintain 
the physical, human, organizational, and economic resources essential to the functioning of a modern, 
technology-based industrial nation; Technological Infrastructure (TI) assesses the institutions and resources 
that contribute to a nation’s capacity to develop, produce, and market new technology; and Productive 
Capacity (PC) assesses the physical and human resources devoted to manufacturing products and efficiency 
with which those resources are employed. 
7
 Kenny, Han and Tanaka (2002, p. 14) contend that the Asian private equity is less-developed because of 
the unwillingness of the owners of firms to sell control over existing firms, e.g. the cases of Japan and 
Korea where the keiretsu and chaebol ties are still strong. 
8
 For example, JBIC (2001, pp. 39 – 44) found that there are four factors on the part of these venture 
businesses that contributed to the difficulty in obtaining financing as follows: i) reluctant in disclosure of 
information; ii) inadequate physical collateral for new loans; iii) fragile foundations in human, 
technological resources, and business strategies; and iv) fragility in managerial resources (e.g. capabilities 
of managers and making use of trade associations and industry information).  
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 At this stage, the government has been directly involved by allocating substantial 
amount of funds (RM998 million from 1996 to 2005) and initiating many VCIs. For a 
successful operation, it is felt that this industry needs the government’s indirect 
involvement through its institutional, supportive role. The literature reviewed suggests 
that government policies can affect the growth of this industry in an economy (Lerner, 
1999; Jeng and Wells, 2000).9  In this respect, government’s indirect supportive role in 
the following aspects is discussed accordingly. 
 
 Firstly, the new economy needs a knowledge-based entrepreneurs and the risk-
taking kind of venture capital financing. Very large pools of local talent and management 
are required so that there will be a situation of significant inflows of innovative ideas and 
venture business deals. Increasing the supply of a knowledge-based entrepreneurs and 
awareness about this industry will also lead to a more vibrant ICT entrepreneurship in 
MSC. Variations in entrepreneurial activities, VCIs’ investment skills, and networks of 
professional business-support intermediaries are crucial for an effective venture capital 
industry (Harding, 2000; Harrison and Mason, 2000).10   
 
 Secondly, tax incentives for VCIs’ and deregulation in the financial sector need to 
be improved. 11  Tax policies (especially capital gains taxes) have substantial impact on 
the supply of venture capital and ability of ICTVBs to finance new businesses (Carleton, 
1986; Libecup, 1986). Although flexible incentives were already given to VCIs, further 
deregulation in the financial sector may be needed.12   Table D following shows the 
expectations by VCIs and ICTVBs on what government could do to encourage faster 
growth of private sector financing, particularly for venture capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 For example, according to Kenney, Han, and Tanaka (2002), in every nation government has played some 
role in the development of venture capital because it is a very sensitive institutional form, due to the high-
risk nature of investments involved.   
10
 For instance, according to Harding (2000), there are three key features for the U.K. government in the 
development of regional venture policy: i) a program of mentoring and investor readiness training to 
stimulate effective demand for venture capital, ii) a program of venture capital guarantee schemes to share 
or spread risks on riskier investments, and iii) the supply of greater information in the venture capital 
market.  
11
 According to International Finance Group (1986), tax incentives specific to venture capital are as 
follows: i) up-front incentives (e.g. rebates, tax credits, deductions from taxes or taxable income) of 
amounts invested in venture capital institutions; ii) incentives to the venture capital institutions (e.g. tax 
reliefs, exemptions from corporate tax for a predetermined tenure) on income received from investee 
companies; and iii) post-investment incentives (e.g. tax breaks or exemptions for investors on income 
received from investment in a venture capital institution) [c.f. Sagari and Guidotti, 1992. pp. 33–34]. 
12
 For example, full tax exemption on income received for 10 years or according to the tenor of the funds, 
whichever the earlier; expansion of definition on early stage financing to includes the growth and pre-IPO 
stages; expansion of definition of venture capital companies to include corporation and joint-venture 
schemes or funds that invest in venture capital companies; and tax exemption to apply to three layers, that 
is, the company, institutional shareholders, and individual shareholders. 
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Table D: Expectations of VCIs and ICTVBs to encourage growth of private sector financing. 
 
 
1. Promote early stage financing. 
2. Financial deregulation (e.g. insurance companies, pension funds, PDS instruments, revamp incubation 
concept). 
3. Attract professionals, entrepreneurship & VC financing education, and VC experts & technologists. 
4. Provide larger funds, pooling funds from abroad, regional or cross-border deals, access to long-term capital. 
5. Private sector participation, outsourcing & co-managed funds, master-plan formulation, represented in 
government advisory boards. 
6. Further tax incentives (broader to include all stages of development & all individuals/companies investment 
in venture capital. 
7. Improve infrastructures and linkages. 
8. Better supervision (preferably by Securities Commission). 
9. Encourage Islamic-based venture capital financing. 
10. Promote key high growth industries.  
 
 Source: Survey on Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia conducted in March - April 2003. 
 
 The VCIs and ICTVBs expect government to lift present restrictions on investing 
in private equity by insurance companies and pension funds so that these institutions can 
allocate more funds to VCIs. They also expect to be able to use other instruments (e.g. 
private debt securities) without approval of the Securities Commission. Better 
supervision is also needed so that investors’ confidence (e.g. long-term and institutional 
investors) will be secured.13  In addition, early-stage financing should also be promoted. 
As for encouraging private-sector financing to flourish, more co-managed venture capital 
funds between them and the public sector should be established and directed towards 
early-stage financing. The encouragement of more foreign VCIs to invest in Malaysia 
will expedite transfer of technology and expertise, increase inflows of funds, and 
diversification of risks.  
 
 Thirdly, measures pertaining to acquiring liquidity (i.e. sale of investment) for 
VCIs’ investments need to be improved. The availability of channels for acquiring 
liquidity is a critical factor affecting the development of this industry as experienced in 
the developed countries. Black and Gilson (1998) contend that the growth of venture 
capital depends fundamentally on a vibrant public market that acts as an important means 
for new firms to raise capital and creates exit mechanisms for investors. The Malaysian 
Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation Bhd. (MESDAQ) created in 
1997, is an “over-the-counter” market specifically meant to cater to ICTVBs. However, 
MESDAQ failed to reach critical mass with only 20 venture businesses listed on it 
(against the original expectation of 100 venture businesses) due to the minimal presence 
of retail investors and foreign funds.14   The rules for MESDAQ should be ensured to 
remain flexible (but not to affect investors’ confidence and liquidity) to provide one of 
                                                          
13
 According to Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, currently there is no one-stop agency that supervises 
venture capital per se except that venture capital companies must register and submit annual reports to the 
central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). 
14
 This scenario is changing though because on March 18, 2002, MESDAQ merged with Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE). With KLSE’s stronger international profile, it is hoped that MESDAQ will be 
able to address fierce competition coming from similar markets such as in Singapore and Hong Kong. For 
the near future, MESDAQ is expected to have a total of 50 listed companies, comprising of 20 listed and 30 
waiting for approval for listing ( as of June 27, 2003). 
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the crucial channels for raising capital for homegrown ICTVBs. Other liquidity-
facilitating provisions (e.g. convertible loans, equity backed by put options and etc.) 
should also be encouraged in order to facilitate growth of venture capital. 
 
 Finally, enforcement of agreements and protection of technology should be 
assured to attract foreign VCIs. The security of ownership of intellectual property (IP) 
and a clear legal remedy for theft of IP or breach of contract are important to attract 
foreign funds, technologies, companies, and management expertise into the venture 
capital industry in Malaysia. Even though a few cyber laws have been enacted since 1997, 
their enforcement yet remains to be seen. 
 
5. SUMMARY 
 
In brief, this appendix highlights the different settings of Malaysia’s venture 
capital industry as compared to the other selected countries. Although the smallest, 
Malaysia’s venture capital industry is catching up fast with others, particularly since 1999. 
This is reflected in the increase of the size and number of venture capital funds: US$667 
million with only 28 funds in 1999 has increased to US$836 million with 44 funds in 
2002. As mentioned in the situational analysis above, Malaysia has several common 
attributes for a vibrant venture capital industry. However, it is possible to attribute part of 
its ‘Under Performer’ label to the differences in its institutional environments as 
compared to the U.S., Taiwan and Singapore. Several differences that possibly contribute 
to the below-expectation performance of venture capital financing in Malaysia are as 
follows: minimal presence of private equity funds, minimal early-stage financing, and the 
differences in the technological and business environments as discussed above. These 
differences suggest some improvements may be needed, e.g. further financial 
deregulation etc. Several indirect supportive roles of the government were also discussed, 
i.e. towards the enhancement of a vibrant venture capital financing in MSC in particular 
and Malaysia in general. 
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APPENDIX ‘B’ 
 
MULTIMEDIA SUPER CORRIDOR (MSC): PROGRESS, CHALLENGES AND 
FINANCING ENVIRONMENT1 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This appendix presents background information about the Multimedia Super 
Corridor (MSC), Malaysia and its financial environment. The MSC remains a highly 
ambitious Malaysian project and one that has overcome its share of obstacles, e.g. the 
Asian financial crisis 1997-1998 and the technology bubble-burst of April 2000. Despite 
these obstacles, which have direct and indirect impacts in its development, this project 
remains resilient and promising. Judging from the milestones in its first phase of 
development (1996 – 2003) thus far, the signposts to a Malaysian ICT and multimedia 
future are considered as being in place. Having met targets in its first phase, which 
revolved around infrastructure, systems and applications development, MSC’s challenges 
in the second phase of its development (2004 – 2010), are more demanding, such as 
human resources development and financing for ICTVBs, among others.  This appendix 
is organized as follows. The following Section provides the background and progress of 
the first phase of MSC.  Section 3 briefly reviews the challenges that MSC faces in its 
second phase of development. Section 4 presents the financial environment of MSC. 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes this appendix. 
 
2. THE MULTIMEDIA SUPER CORRIDOR (MSC) 
  
 Malaysia has been committed to technology development since its independence 
in 1957. It was clearly stated in the Rukunegara that: “building a progressive society 
which shall be oriented to modern science and technology” is one of the main 
declarations in Malaysia’s national philosophy. 2   Since then Malaysia has pursued 
technology development policy consistently over the past three decades.3  Now Malaysia 
                                                          
1
 Some parts of this Appendix are taken from papers by the same researcher, as follows; A Paper 
“Malaysia’s National Information Infrastructure: Issues and Challenges of the Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC)” that was published in the GITI Research Bulletin 2001–2002, pp. 135–148; a Paper “The 
Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC): Progress and Prospects” in the book of “Islam & 
Information-Telecommunication Technology: Diversity & Possibility of the Islamic Science & 
Technology” that was published by Waseda University/United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural 
Organization 2004, pp. 91 - 102; and a Paper “Financing ICT Companies: The Experience of Multimedia 
Super Corridor (MSC), Malaysia”, that was published in the GITS/GITI Research Bulletin 2002-3003, pp. 
140-148.  
2
 Rukunegara is Malaysia’s national philosophy that identifies five specific declarations for its citizen to 
dedicate their united efforts. These declarations are: “to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples; to 
maintaining a democratic way of life; to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be 
equitably shared; to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions; and to building a 
progressive society which shall be oriented to modern science and technology”. 
3
 Kanapathy (2001, p. 141) states that the evolution of Malaysian industrialization can be categorized into 
three phases as follows: the export-oriented industrialization (EOI) based on export-processing zones 
(EPZs) in the early 1970s, a second round of import substituting industrialization based on heavy industries 
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needs to move into a higher technology plane to sustain its competitive advantage by 
relentlessly improving its industrial technology structure and development. In relation to 
this, the development of MSC as a technology park can be seen as a nucleus for 
technology development in Malaysia.4  
 
2.1 The background of MSC 
  
 The Malaysian Cabinet agreed in 1996 that MSC be launched as a necessary 
strategy based on the following reasons: a) the recognition that the nation was being 
hollowed out as a result of its loss of comparative advantage in its traditional economic 
sectors (agriculture and manufacturing sectors), b) the need to drive the economy towards 
higher productivity through technology and high value-added economic activities, and c) 
the recognition of the fact that information-age and converging technologies presented 
the best opportunities for the nation’s socio-economic transformation. Therefore, MSC is 
a long-term strategic initiative (1996 to 2020) which involves partnership between the 
government (i.e. as the chief architect of its vision) and the private sector (i.e. as the main 
drivers for its implementation).  
  
 MSC is a huge technology park, a dedicated corridor (15 km wide and 50 km 
long) which stretches from the Petronas Twin Towers at the Kuala Lumpur City Center 
(KLCC) in the north to the new Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) in the south. 
MSC aims to attract world’s leading ICT companies to locate their businesses, undertake 
R&D, develop new products and technologies, and export from this corridor as their base. 
The development of MSC has been divided into three phases: Phase 1 (1996 – 2003), 
Phase 2 (2004 – 2010) and Phase 3 (2011 – 2020). Various policy measures have been 
introduced and implemented to support MSC. These measures are, for example, Bill of 
Guarantees, cyber laws, development of flagship applications, cyber cities – 
infrastructure and info structure, education policy and incentives and facilities for local 
ICT entrepreneurs.5  
  
 There is also an International Advisory Panel (IAP)  for MSC, acting as the main 
input providers from the so-called experts of the information age to improve the package 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the early 1980s, and the liberalization and second round of export pushing in the late 1990s and a 
sustained shift towards more market-oriented policies. 
4
 A technology park is a development to accommodate high-technology firms with R&D, production and 
sales activities, and is distinguished from science and research parks because of a greater emphasis on 
production. A research park, on the other hand, focuses on research and production is normally precluded. 
An innovation center is a facility which promotes the setting-up of new businesses engaged in the 
development and marketing of new technological products with high market risks (Komninos, 1992; 
Gower and Harris, 1996; Ferguson, 1999).  
5
 For instance, under the Bill of Guarantees, the Malaysian government commits to the following: a) 
provide a world-class physical and information infrastructures, b) allow restricted employment of local and 
foreign knowledge workers, c) ensure freedom of ownership by exempting MSC-status companies from 
local ownership requirements, d) ensure freedom to source capital globally for the MSC infrastructures, e) 
provide competitive financial incentives, f) become a regional leader in intellectual property protection and 
cyber laws, g) ensure no censorship of the Internet, h) provide competitive telecommunication tariffs, i) 
tender key MSC infrastructure contracts to leading companies willing to use MSC as their regional hub, 
and j) provide a one-stop agency (i.e. the MDC).  
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of conditions and services in MSC.6   Besides this panel, there are eight well-focused 
investment strategies developed in the form of Flagship Applications in MSC.7   The 
objectives of these flagships are to jumpstart this project by fast-tracking the development 
of infrastructures for electronic commerce, and assisting to overcome the digital divide 
problem. These flagship applications are the Electronic Government, Multi-Purpose 
Card; Smart Schools, Telehealth, R&D Clusters, Worldwide Manufacturing Web and 
Borderless Marketing (both are combined under the flagship of Electronic Business), and 
the Technopreneur Development. The development model of MSC can be illustrated in 
Figure A following. 
 
Figure A: The development model of MSC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 The progress of MSC 
 
 Since its inception date on August 1, 1996, the progress of MSC has been 
encouraging and is running ahead of schedule according to MDC. Currently, there are 
almost 7.0 million sf. net letable area (NLA) of office space constructed in MSC that 
comprises enterprise, commercial, and incubation zones. Besides these, other facilities 
and amenities infrastructures have also been built. MSC is also supported by a high-
capacity digital telecommunication infrastructure designed to meet international capacity, 
reliability and pricing needs. Currently, a total of 360 km of fiber optic network has been 
laid in MSC. This network includes high-capacity global telecommunications and 
logistics infrastructure built with 2.5 gigabits (Gbps), expandable to 10 Gbps 
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) transport system. This network also has a 5 Gbps 
international gateway with direct links to the U.S, Europe, Japan and other nations in 
Southeast Asia for seamless connectivity. In addition, every building in the designated 
                                                          
6
 IAP has met annually since 1997 and is considered as a venue for the leaders in the IT industry to 
brainstorm ideas on how best to steer Malaysia into the information age through MSC project. As at August 
2001, there are 47 members of IAP ( e.g. from Microsoft, Intel, Nokia, Softbank, Sony, Lucent, NTT, 
Stanford University, University of Cambridge, International University of Japan, etc. )  
7
 According to MDC, the flagship applications of Electronic Government, Multi-Purpose Card, Smart 
Schools and Telehealth have shown great export potential with enquiries from the Middle East, Europe and 
ASEAN countries. 

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cyber cities is wired up with fiber optic cable to enable the availability of broadband 
applications.  
 
 The number of MSC-status ICTVBs in Table A clearly shows an increasing trend, 
which has exceeded the original targets.8  The total number of approved MSC-status 
ICTVBs has now increased to 914 as of August 11, 2003. They are involved in various 
ICT businesses – 46 % in software and content development; 19% in Internet-based 
businesses; 15% in hardware/computer design and engineering; 9% in telecommunication 
and networking; 7% in education, training and consultancy; and 4% for others (e.g. life 
sciences, production, and animation). 
 
Table A: MSC-status ICTVBs as of August 11, 2003 
 
COMPANIES/YEAR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 CURRENT 
Malaysian Owned (>51%) 47 107 181 276 410 543 618 
Foreign Owned (>51%) 44 84 112 144 198 248 272 
Joint-Venture (50%-50%) 3 6 7 9 13 21 24 
World-Class 13 31 34 38 50 54 59 
Total Approved MSC-Status*  94 197 300 429 621 812 914 
*Note: Besides operational companies, these figures include cases of merged, unincorporated, dormant and revoked. 
Source: Multimedia Development Corporation. 
  
 The MSC is also fast becoming a preferred location for multinational companies 
to establish shared services facilities such as data centers, contact centers, and data 
processing centers. There are 59 multinational companies currently operating in MSC, 
and some of them are listed in Table B following. 
 
Table B: Example of multinational companies operating in MSC 
 
Nokia (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Siemens Multimedia Sdn. Bhd. 
Motorola Multimedia Sdn. Bhd. 
Lotus Development Services (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Alcatel Networks MSC Sdn. Bhd. 
Lucent Technologies (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Oracle MSC Sdn. Bhd. 
Ericson Support Center Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. 
Asia Pacific Information Service (DHL) 
Baan Education Asia Pacific 
Shell Information Technology International Sdn. Bhd. 
Rockwell Automation (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Unisys MSC Sdn. Bhd. 
IBM (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Huawei Technologies Sdn. Bhd. 
Satyam Computer Services Ltd. 
AVEVA Asia Pacific Sdn. Bhd. 
Schlumberger Technologies (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
HSBC Electronic Data Processing (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
WIPRO Limited 
 
BMW Asia Technology Center Sdn. Bhd. 
Prudential Services Asia Sdn. Bhd. 
Bloomberg (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Intel Malaysia Design Center (MSC) Sdn. Bhd. 
Reuters (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Fujitsu Telecommunication Asia Sdn. Bhd. 
BT Multimedia Sdn. Bhd. 
Sun Microsystems (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
NTT (MSC) Sdn. Bhd. 
EDS (MSC) Sdn. Bhd. 
Compaq Multimedia Sdn. Bhd. 
Microsoft Knowledge Capital Center Sdn. Bhd. 
Comptel Communications Sdn. Bhd. 
Tecnomen (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Castlewood Systems (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Marconi 3G Sdn. Bhd. 
CISCO MSC Division 
Canal+ Technologies Sdn. Bhd. 
NEC Systems Integration Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. 
TATA Consultancy Services Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. 
 (Note: Sdn. Bhd.= Private Limited) Source: Multimedia Development Corporation.  
                                                          
8
 ICTVBs with MSC-Status are entitled to the benefits and incentives provided by the Malaysian 
government’s Bill of Guarantees. Generally, to qualify for this status, ICTVBs will need to engage 
significantly in value-adding activity and employ a substantial number of knowledge workers. They also 
need to locate their principal business within MSC designated cyber cities    (i.e. Cyberjaya, Technology 
Park Malaysia, UPM-MTDC Technology Incubation Center, Petronas Twin Towers, KLCC and the E-
Village) and establish a separate legal entity for it. 
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 As for the development of Flagship Applications, out of seven launched in 1997, 
four were successfully rolled out in 2001. They are the Electronic Government (e.g. 
electronic procurement and electronic services), Government Multi-purpose Card 
(GMPC), Smart Schools and Telehealth. Table C below shows the main projects under 
the Electronic Government flagship that are currently showing remarkable progress and 
operation. 
 
Table C: Main projects under the E-government flagship 
 
PROJECTS CHARACTERISTICS CURRENT STATUS 
Generic Office Environment 
(GOE) 
 
 
 
Electronic Procurement (EP) 
 
 
 
 
 
Project Monitoring System 
(PMS) 
 
 
Human? Resources 
Management Information 
System (HRMIS) 
 
 
Electronic Delivery Services  
(E-Services++) 
 
Electronic Labor Exchange 
(ELX) 
 
e-Syariah 
 
 
*Provides a new paradigm of working in a 
collaborative environment where government 
agencies communicate, interact and share 
information. 
 
*Links the government and suppliers in online 
environment. Government agencies as buyers procure 
goods/services by browsing catalogues advertised by 
suppliers. Aimed at best value for money, timely and 
accurate payment. 
 
*Provides a new mechanism for monitoring the 
implementation of development projects, 
incorporating operational and managerial functions, 
and knowledge repository. 
*Provides a single interface for government 
employees to perform HRD functions effectively and 
efficiently in an integrated environment. Applications 
include automating both operational processes and 
information dissemination. 
*Enables direct, online transactions and interactions 
between the public, the government and large service 
providers via electronic means. 
*A one-stop center for labor market information, 
accessible to government agencies, the private sector 
and the general public. 
*Introduces administrative reforms that upgrade the 
quality of services in Syariah courts. To enhance the 
Islamic Affairs Department’s effectiveness - better 
monitoring and coordination of its agencies and 102 
Syariah courts. 
*Live services, e.g. PM’s Department, 
PSD etc. Currently developing the 
rollout plan for 14 identified 
government agencies. 
 
*Central Contract, Suppliers 
Registration, Direct Purchase modules 
have been completed. Quotation & 
Tender module is ongoing. 
Nationwide rollout in phases to all 25 
ministries. 
*All 3 phases are completed. Post-
implementation activities are ongoing 
and Handover Management is now 
being finalized. 
*15 modules have been rolled out to 
10 government agencies. Two 
modules are going through the 
Provisional Acceptance Test and 
another one waiting for PAT. 
*Live services e.g. JPJ, TNB, 
Telekom, PDRM etc. 
 
*Live services. 
 
 
*Launched in April 2002. 
 
 
Source: Multimedia Development Corporation. 
  
 A comprehensive set of cyber laws has been enacted since 1997 to support the 
diffusion of electronic commerce and the electronic government environment. These laws 
are the Digital Signature Act, 1997; The Telemedicine Act, 1997; The Copyright 
( Amendment ) Act, 1997; The Computer Crimes Act, 1997; The Communications and 
Multimedia Act, 1998; and The Optical Discs Act, 2000. This legislation is meant to 
regulate the totally new multimedia and online environment in the information age, e.g. 
to facilitate ICT and multimedia applications, to enhance IPR, and to penalize certain 
activities connected with data and computer programs. 
 
 In general, the main target of MSC in its first phase (1996 – 2003) has been 
achieved, that is, to successfully create this corridor, which consists of infrastructure, 
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systems and applications development. Although MSC is a Malaysian project, input and 
advice from the members of the IAP have contributed to the remarkable development of 
MSC. Besides this, the members also have conveyed their continued commitment of their 
companies by expanding operations here. From the milestones in its first phase thus far, 
the signposts to a Malaysian ICT future are in place. 
 
3. THE CHALLENGES OF MSC 
 
 As it was mentioned earlier, MSC is now entering the second phase of its 
development (2004 – 2010). The main objective in this second phase is to link MSC to 
other cyber cities in Malaysia and worldwide as stated in its vision. Although the 
progress in the first phase thus far seems to be encouraging, MSC faces more demanding 
challenges in its second phase, which may impede its fullest prospects.9   In the context of 
achieving its objective, the main challenges of MSC in its second phase of development 
are briefly as follows. 
 
a) Engineering the development of the linkage infrastructures of MSC to other cyber 
cities requires tremendous effort and cost. The digital divide between states in 
Malaysia is still an issue, not to be discounted, in MSC’s second phase. 
 
b) The development of human resource talents is critical to the success of MSC. In 
general, the knowledge-based and skill-based talent pools in Malaysia still have many 
shortcomings, such as the shortages of quantity and quality, brain drain and disparity 
of availability between areas. Table D following highlights the assessment of the 
current talent pool in Malaysia.  
 
  Table D: Assessment of current talent pool in Malaysia 
 
ITEM KNOWLEDGE-BASED TALENT SKILL-BASED TALENT 
Quantity 
 
 
Quality 
 
 
Relevance 
 
 
Accessibility 
 
 
 
Talent Retention 
 
Shortage at post-graduate level and in 
software engineering. 
Shortage of experienced talent. 
Not yet world class. 
 
 
Poor linkage between university and industry. 
 
 
Generally affordable. 
Limited capacity and availability. 
 
 
Brain drain to more developed countries. 
 
 
Shortage in selected areas such as “C” 
programmers. 
 
Not yet world class. 
 
 
Need to keep up with rapid changes in 
technology. 
 
Generally affordable. 
Accessible in Klang Valley and bigger 
towns. 
 
Some brain drain due to global shortage 
and better opportunities elsewhere. 
Source: Multimedia Development Corporation. 
                                                          
9
 The challenges are interrelated with the inherent characteristics of the industrial technology structure of 
Malaysia itself. Based on the model of Michael Porter’s competitive Advantage of Nations, Masuyama and 
Vandenbrink (2000, pp. 8 – 21) identify five peculiar characteristics of industrial structure of East Asian 
countries (including Malaysia) as follows: a) appearance of extreme high-tech orientation which does not 
really indicate their fundamental technological capabilities, b) dependence on external sources of 
innovation that caused a weaker home-grown technological capabilities, c) insufficient pool of knowledge 
workers to localize the innovation function, d) lack of local base of supporting industries and industrial 
clusters, and e) weakness of domestic sector due to the unbalanced treatment of the export and domestic 
sectors. 
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c) The innovation networks need to be developed further, be it horizontal or vertical 
linkages. Opportunities and facilities are needed for the ICTVBs in MSC to develop 
their ability to take technology and transfer that into a business setting. 
 
d) The development of collaboration between universities and ICT industry is also 
important. Harnessing effectively university and industry collaboration by identifying 
technology-based researches and potential businesses based on real industry demands 
is crucial for MSC. 
 
e) The continuing effort to develop ICTVBs in MSC is another important aspect. 
Matters pertaining to mentoring, training, and financing of these ICTVBs are 
critically important. 
 
f) The government as the chief architect of this project could certainly contribute by 
introducing further deregulation in various ICT policies and regulations. Areas of 
concerns are the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), regulations on the 
use of government funds for R&D, among others. In addition, deregulation brings to 
MSC’s transparency and consistency so that ICTVBs here can compete openly with 
each other, not only within national borders, but also regionally and globally. 
 
4. THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT IN MSC  
 
 Technological development contributes positively to economic development by 
increasing productivity in numerous ways; for instance, by increasing production from 
existing scarce resources, by expanding the economy resources base, and by providing 
new products, the composition of the economy is positively developed (Rosenberg, 1986; 
Higgins and Savoie (eds.), 1998). ICTVBs and VCIs are involved in this economic 
process. In the Malaysian context, the success of ICTVBs has been considered crucial in 
having a positive economic future prospect. The MSC is deeply related to this policy 
consideration and one of the main objectives of MSC is to create a successful cluster of 
ICTVBs. However, ICTVBs are strongly influenced by external factors, especially the 
financial environment because in many cases, it determines their destiny.  
 
4.1 The demand of funds 
 
 On the demand side, the requirement for funds by ICTVBs is growing. Potentially, 
there is a very broad range of ICTVBs involved in various technological focuses, of 
different sizes and at different stages of growth. Financing requirements vary 
considerably because their needs and barriers are different when seeking external 
financing. The proliferation of ICTVBs in MSC (as discussed above) indicates the 
demand of funds will also increase.  
 
 The variety of needs and barriers regarding their financing requirements can be 
derived as follows. Based on MSC Impact Survey 2002, for MSC-Status ICT ICTVBs, a 
profile of their paid-up capital is as follows: 50% (230 ICTVBs) have paid-up capital of 
less than RM500 thousand, 16% (75 ICTVBs) have RM500 thousand to RM1.0 million, 
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21% (96 ICTVBs) have RM1.0 million to RM5.0 million, and 13% (60 ICTVBs) have 
more than RM5.0 million (RM stands for Ringgit Malaysia, i.e. the local currency). 
Although 66% of these ICTVBs are small (less than a million paid-up capital), they are at 
important stage of their growth and require financing from various sources to grow larger. 
A profile of their growth stages is as follows: 4% (18 ICTVBs) are at seed stage, 29% 
(133 ICTVBs) are at start-up stage, 59% (270 ICTVBs) are at growth stage, 7% (34 
ICTVBs) are at Pre-IPO stage, and 1% (6 ICTVBs) are at Post-IPO stage. The majority 
of them (92%) are at growth stage and below, that is, in the critical stage of building their 
track records and proven products or services. Thus, they require adequate funds for these 
purposes. According to the same survey, these ICTVBs require RM700 million of 
venture funds for the period of 2002 to 2005. Judging from their technology focus, these 
ICTVBs are involved in new technology-based production, which normally has many 
intangible assets (e.g. trade secrets and applied knowledge) and are also considered as 
high-risk new businesses. Thus, their readiness to disclose important information and 
dilution of ownership are barriers when seeking financing. According to BNM (1999), 
investment activity has been held back due to reasons such as reluctance to dilute 
ownership and lack of awareness on venture capital financing.  In brief, the above 
demand overview implies that financing of ICTVBs is increasingly important for MSC.  
 
4.2 The supply of funds 
  
 On the supply side, the financing options for ICTVBs can be categorized into 
three sources: i) private equity financing, ii) debt financing, and iii) developmental grants 
financing. Each of these sources will be briefly discussed below. (Discussion on self-
financing and commercial project financing is excluded, as there is no reliable data 
available).  
  
 Private equity financing usually conveys a dilution of ownership in a company 
(as borrower) to an equity investor. Basically, an equity investor gives up the right to a 
predetermined repayment schedule and a preferential claim on borrower’s assets in 
exchange of a share of future profits. This source can be obtained from informal and 
formal VCIs. High net worth individuals or business angels are examples of informal 
VCIs. In Malaysia, most business angels are from property and construction sectors and 
generally do not invest in ICTVBs at an early-stage. The venture capital industry is 
relatively new and is currently a government-funded kind of financial segment (Ariff and 
Lim, 2001; Mani and Bartzokas, 2002). Based on the survey of this research, 65% of the 
VCIs in the sample were incorporated less than 7 years and 67% of them employed fewer 
than 7 venture capital executives, reflecting its emerging nature in Malaysia. At this stage, 
these VCIs are risk averse and focusing on building profitable track records thus would 
minimize their investment’s exposure in high-risk ICTVBs. In addition, the costs 
associated with the initial evaluation and monitoring are high, thus stringent financing 
covenants are imposed by the VCIs in order to counter adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Hence, ICTVBs may have some difficulties in getting financing from 
them. 
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 According to the BNM Annual Report 2001, there was RM2.00 billion of venture 
funds in the capital market (of which RM1.13 billion resided with ICT focused funds) at 
the end of 2001. The VCIs increased in number to 36 in 2001 which invested in 180 
ICTVBs, as compared to 31 in 2000 which invested in 159 ICTVBs. According to MDC 
there are 19 active VCIs currently in ICT industry of which 9 are government initiated 
and managing government agencies’ funds of more than RM950 million.10   For venture 
funds, government allocated RM220 million for 1996 to 2000 and another RM778 
million for 2001 to 2005.  
 
 Debt financing can be obtained from informal sources (i.e. loans from partners, 
family members, friends, and trade creditors) and also formal sources (i.e. government’s 
schemes through special development finance institutions, commercial banks and finance 
companies). Besides government’s allocation of almost RM500 million, funding from 
bilateral sources (e.g. OECF and the Japanese government) are also allocated to these 
schemes. This source of financing requires some collateral and repayments of principal 
and interest over a specified tenure of the loan. Specific obligations are created for 
ICTVBs to repay the loan on a predetermined repayment schedule. If there is failure of 
repayment on the loan, the financiers can recover the outstanding debt (i.e. principal plus 
interest and other penalties) even if the ICTVBs are forced into bankruptcy. Besides the 
above features, application is based on market-driven criteria (e.g. specific sector, 
eligibility, limitation of loan amount, and commercial term and condition). Certain 
schemes require ICTVBs to have a good track record, which makes this condition not 
achievable for some of them. Currently, there are seven schemes available for ICTVBs 
and these schemes are managed by specific institutions.11  Due to the market-driven 
application criteria it can be inferred that ICTVBs may have some difficulties in getting 
financing from these sources. In addition, commercial banks and finance companies 
involved may also lack necessary skills to evaluate the technicalities of ICTVBs for 
funding purposes.  
  
 Developmental grants financing is another financing option for ICTVBs in 
MSC. In order to provide equality in financing technological and business developments 
of ICTVBs, the government has introduced specialized grant schemes for them. Total 
                                                          
10
 These companies are Amanah Ventures Sdn. Bhd.; BPMB-NIF Modal Teroka Sdn. Bhd.; BI Walden 
Management Sdn. Bhd.; CAV Private Equity Management Sdn. Bhd.; DTA Ventures Management Sdn. 
Bhd.; FirstFloor Capital Sdn. Bhd.; Intelligent Capital Sdn. Bhd.; iSpring Venture Management Sdn. Bhd.; 
Malaysia Venture Capital Management Bhd.; Mayban Ventures Sdn. Bhd.; MCM Technologies Bhd.; 
MSC Venture Corporation Sdn. Bhd.; Netval Ventures Sdn. Bhd.; OptixLab Sdn. Bhd.; OSK Venture 
Equities Sdn. Bhd.; Photonics Venture Capital Sdn. Bhd.; PNB Nomura Jafco Management Sdn. Bhd.; 
Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Bhd.; and Technology Asia Ventures Sdn. Bhd. [Sdn. Bhd. Stands for 
private limited]. 
11
 These schemes are as follows: a) New Entrepreneurs Fund 2 – managed by Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM) through participating financial institutions; b) Fund For Small And Medium Industries 2 – managed 
by BNM through participating financial institutions; c) Graduate Entrepreneurs Fund – managed by 
Ministry of Entrepreneur Development; d) JBIC Fund (SMI – OECF) – managed by Bank Pembangunan & 
Infrastruktur Malaysia Berhad (BPIMB), Bank Industri & Teknologi Malaysia Berhad (BITMB), and 
Malaysia Industrial Development Finance Berhad (MIDFB); e)Fund For Medium And Large Industries – 
managed by BPIMB; f) Direct Access Guarantee Scheme (Conventional only) – managed by the Credit 
Guarantee Corporation (CGC) Malaysia Berhad; and g) MAVCAP Debt Ventures. 
  
121 
funds allocated were RM1.10 billion from 1996 to 2000 and another RM1.90 billion from 
2001 to 2005. These schemes cover a wide spectrum of activities (e.g. R&D, marketing, 
and acquisition of intellectual property). Basically, no equity dilutions or collaterals are 
needed to obtain these grants, and also no principal and interest repayments are involved. 
Currently, there are ten grant schemes offered to these ICTVBs.12   There are a few 
problems related to this financing source (e.g. the difficulty in obtaining information 
about the availability of the grants, the stringent and market-driven application criteria, 
and the lack of clarity regarding level of funds and their associated terms). The approval 
process may also take longer time because there are many different agencies to contact. 
Usually, ICTVBs funded by grants are assumed to have minimal private-sector links and 
commercial value.  
 
 In brief, the differences between the above mentioned financing options available 
to the ICTVBs in MSC are summarized in Table E following. 
 
  Table E: Summary of differences of the financing sources. 
 
Matters/Types Venture Capital Financing Debt Financing Grant Schemes 
Financing 
Objective 
 
Holding Period 
 
Collateral 
 
Criteria 
 
 
Impact on Balance Sheet 
 
Impact on Cash Flow 
 
 
Monitoring 
 
 
 
Value Add 
 
 
 
Exit Mechanism 
Capital gains 
 
Mid-to-long term 
 
No 
 
Potential returns on investment 
 
 
Reduce leverage 
 
Dividend pay out 
 
 
Seat on Board of Directors, 
monthly/quarterly operational 
reports 
 
Management assistance, strategic 
alliance through contact etc. 
 
 
IPO, trade sale, buy back 
Interest and principal 
 
Short-to-mid term 
 
Yes 
 
Interest spread and security 
 
 
Increase leverage 
 
Interest/principal repayment 
 
 
Loan servicing 
 
 
 
None 
 
 
 
Principal repayment 
 
Development 
 
— 
 
— 
 
— 
 
 
— 
 
— 
 
 
— 
 
 
 
— 
 
 
 
— 
 
 Source: MDC, (2002),”Funding Guide & Directory for ICT/Multimedia Industry”, 1st. Edition, May 2002. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 These grants are as follows: a) Commercialization of R&D Fund (CRDF) – managed by Malaysian 
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC); b) Demonstrator Applications Grant Scheme (DAGS) – 
managed by MIMOS Bhd.; c) E- Commerce Grant For Small & Medium Scale Industries – managed by 
Small & Medium Industries Development Corporation (SMIDEC); d) The Industry R&D Grant Scheme 
(IGS) – managed by Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment (MOSTE); e) Intensification of 
Research in Priority Areas (IRPA) – managed by MOSTE; f) Market Development Grant (MDG – formerly 
known as ITAF 4) – managed by Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE); g) 
MSC R&D Grant Scheme (MGS) – managed by MDC; h) Rosettanet Grant (RNG) – managed by 
SMIDEC; i) Technology Acquisition Fund (TAF) – managed by MTDC; and j) Technology Acquisition 
Fund For Women (TAF – W) – managed by MTDC. 
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4.3 Characteristics 
  
 Based on discussion above, the financial environment in MSC can be 
characterized as follows.  
 
 Firstly, financial intermediation between financiers and ICTVBs is low. Judging 
from the sources and amounts of funds available, these companies should not be facing 
any problems, but they still seem to have difficulties in getting actual financing from 
these sources. On the part of ICTVBs, their business culture pertaining to exchange of 
information and dilution of ownership in their financial contracting should be changed as 
it can affect the availability of their financing sources. This is important in order to fulfill 
their financing needs and to remove barriers from these sources. On the part of financiers, 
the market-driven application criteria, lack of knowledge about technicalities of ICTVBs 
for funding purposes and risk aversion of equity investors could be among the main 
obstacles. Financing from business angels and VCIs are found to be selective and 
minimal. For instance, as for VCIs, 298 ICTVBs or 32% that were invested in 2003 are 
considered low in comparison to the total MSC-status ICTVBs of 914. The total amount 
invested also is far less than the amount of funds available (e.g. RM227 million or 11% in 
2003 in comparison to RM2.1 billion worth of funds available in the industry). Figure B 
following shows a longer time taken for investment decisions to be made by the VCIs to 
invest in the venture businesses (i.e. 88% for 3 months to more than a year).  
 
         Figure B: Distribution of average time taken for investment decision (N=57) 
 
Source: Survey on Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia conducted in March – April 2003. 
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In addition, 72% of the VCIs in the survey preferred medium-risk type of venture 
businesses (Figure C), and this is not compatible with high-risk ICTVBs. These facts 
imply that actual financial intermediation from the VCIs to ICTVBs was low in MSC.  
 
Figure C: Distribution of type of business risk preferred (N=18) 
 
Source:? Survey on Venture Capital Financing in Malaysia conducted in March – April 2003. 
  
 Secondly, the supply of funds was substantial from the public sector. The 
government was directly involved by allocating a substantial amount of funds (as 
discussed above). Financing source from the public sector seemed to be in line with 
government’s policy to develop ICT industry and to create a critical mass of ICTVBs in 
MSC. However, these sources have certain setbacks (discussed in the next two 
characteristics). The government’s direct involvement can be clearly seen by the numbers 
of VCIs initiated (i.e. 9 active venture capital companies in ICT industry) and amount of 
funds allocated (i.e. RM950 million or 84% of total amount of RM1.13 billion 
specialized in this industry). 
  
 Thirdly, the number of private corporations financing ICTVBs is minimal. The 
involvement of private corporations to provide financing is important to expand sources 
of financing and to diversify the risk of investment.13   For example, at present, there are 
only a few private VCIs associated with financial institutions (e.g. Mayban Ventures, 
Amanah Ventures etc.) but none with large private corporations. This is different from 
developed countries where large corporations are involved in providing financing to these 
                                                          
13
 According to industry sources, besides government initiated and funded VCIs, there is minimal 
involvement from private corporations in providing financing to ICTVBs. 
High-risk
22%
Low-risk
6%
Medium-risk
72%
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ICTVBs through their corporate venture capital companies (Ehrlich et al, 1994; McNally, 
1995; Abetti, Masaki, and Rice, 2000). 14 
 
 Finally, the existence of government developmental grant schemes has 
unintentionally turned into a double-edged sword. These grant schemes provide more 
financing options to ICTVBs, but they indirectly encourage them to be more complacent, 
by targeting this source of financing because no repayments of principal and interest are 
needed.  Also, these schemes have made the private sector see no urgency for them to 
provide similar schemes to foster the technological and business developments of 
ICTVBs. 
  
 In brief, improving financial intermediation between ICTVBs and financiers is 
necessary.  On the part of ICTVBs, they need to improve their knowledge about 
financing options that are suitable to their technological and business developments. 
Their business culture (i.e. pertaining to ownership dilution and disclosure of 
information) should also be changed in view of their diversified financing needs. On the 
part of financiers, the market-driven application criteria and the lack of expertise about 
technicalities of ICTVBs for funding purposes could be among the reasons why financing 
is still an issue in MSC. Overall, the supply of funds largely came from the public sector. 
The financial environment and its characteristics in MSC (as discussed above) are 
illustrated in Figure D following. 
 
  Figure D: MSC’s financial environment and its characteristics 
 
 
Quadrant          Characteristics              Magnitude            Direction 
 
 
Demand 
 
 
 
 
Supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 According to McNally (1995), corporate venture companies (CVC) investment involves a corporate 
organization making minority equity investments in smaller unquoted companies and is often referred to as 
corporate venturing. 
 
Proliferation of ICTVBs; 
of various sizes and at 
various growth stages. 
 
Demand for funds is 
increasing. 
Financing Needs: variety 
Financing barriers: variety 
ICT industry is emerging. 
Improved financial 
intermediation between 
financiers and ICTVBs 
may be needed. 
 
Equity financing 
Debt financing 
Development grants 
 
 
Supply of funds has been 
dominated by public 
sector & private sector 
financing has been 
minimal.  
Venture capital is new & 
unsuccessful at this stage. 
Further indirect support 
from government may be 
needed. 
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5. SUMMARY 
 
 In this appendix, the background and progress of MSC were discussed based on 
the experiences in its first phase of development (1996 – 2003). From the indicators that 
were discussed, MSC continues to grow from strength to strength – from a merely palm 
oil estate in 1996, it has transformed into the technology park it is today. MSC may not 
be the Silicon Valley, but at least it is a technology park that Malaysians can be proud of. 
Besides spearheading Malaysia’s industrialization, MSC is now a place where ICTVBs 
can work and develop their businesses, a platform that moreover is known globally. 
However, the challenges of MSC in its second phase of development (2004 – 2010) are 
more demanding and important that may impede MSC’s prospects to become a 
successful technology park and to leapfrog the nation into a leader in the information-age. 
In brief, although MSC cannot provide a true blueprint for others to imitate and is no way 
without its obstacles and problems, there are aspects in its development that can be 
learned from. This appendix also highlighted that the endogenous development strategy 
of MSC (i.e. focuses on the generation of local technological and ICT entrepreneurial 
developments) can be smoothly implemented by improving its financial environment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
126 
APPENDIX ‘C’ 
 
REVIEW OF THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND RELATED CONCEPTS1 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This appendix provides a brief overview on the literature of the Theory of the 
Firm, particularly the management of investment at microeconomic firm level. This 
review will not be comprehensive; however, it can be considered as the general 
background theory for this research as it acts as the point of departure into the framework 
of venture capital financing. Studies on the separation of ownership and control, 
Stakeholder Theory, and ICTVBs will also be briefly reviewed. 
 
 Reasons that account for why the Theory of the Firm and its related concepts 
identified above are relevant for this research are as follows: i) to understand what a firm 
actually is in economic and strategic management terms because venture capital is very 
much related to a firm developing process; ii) to relate the central foundations in the 
Theory of the Firm (i.e. the institutional analysis of economic organization of the firm) 
with venture capital, especially on the contractual issues in the business relationship; and 
iii) to differentiate ICTVBs and their funding mechanisms from ordinary firms. These 
reasons imply that empirical study in venture capital may add robustness to the general 
Theory of the Firm, particularly when the setting consists of firms in developing 
countries. 
 
 This appendix is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, capital 
investment and corporate strategy of the firm. Section 3 and 4 discuss the concept of 
separation of ownership and control and the stakeholder theory respectively. Section 5 
describes ICTVBs and their characteristics. Then, Section 6 synthesizes the Theory of the 
Firm and its related concepts in the context of VCIs and ICTVBs contracted into venture 
business. Section 7 and 8 discuss the agency theory and principal-agent analysis which 
form the focal theory of this research. Finally, Section 9 summarizes this appendix. 
 
2. THEORY OF THE FIRM   
 
 The basic Theory of the Firm is normative, which relates to the firm’s behaviour 
in the market place. The main tenets of this theory are: i) the entrepreneur-owner is an 
economic man who decides in a perfectly rational way; ii) the uncertainty about the 
business environment is none; iii) the market place has perfect information; and iv) the 
profit maximization is the sole objective of the firm. However, this basic theory has been 
the subject of debates by economists (Marris, 1964; Cyert and March, 1963; Machlup, 
1967; Simon, 1979). For instance, many of them strongly contend that this basic theory 
                                                          
1
 Some parts of this Appendix are taken from a paper by the same researcher, entitled “Venture capital 
financing: Stakeholders’ characteristics and agency conflict in ICT industry, Malaysia” submitted to the 
Journal of Developing Economies, IDE-JETRO (under review).  
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should only be evaluated strictly on its predictive power and not on the realism of its 
assumptions.  
 
 Most organizational theorists argue for the need of a managerial and behavioural 
Theory of the Firm. For instance, Marris (1964) suggests a managerial theory that 
recognizes the existence of multiple objectives of the firm. According to Simon (1960) 
who examines the human decision-making behaviour in the context of problem-solving, 
there are three phases involved: i) intelligence activity, screening the environment for 
decisions to be made; ii) design activity, analyzing courses of action; and iii) choice 
activity, choosing a specific action. Simon further contends that decision-makers 
normally adopt the principle of bounded-rationality as opposed to perfect rationality in 
the decision-making process. Another observation about the firm is by Cyert and March 
(1963) whereby they view the firm as a coalition of stakeholders from within and outside 
itself and thus the firm actually does not operate in a vacuum. In other words, the firm 
does not have an objective of its own, but the various objectives of these stakeholders are 
negotiated through a bargaining process. 
  
 The above literature implies that the managerial and behavioural theories of the 
firm emphasize the internal processes and behavioural factors that affect the management 
and decision-making of the firm. This argument is supported by the fact that in reality, 
management decisions of the firm are very much dependent on the actual or expected 
business environment, for example, market growth rates and risks, technical opportunities 
and risks, competitors’ presence and reactions, barriers of entry and others (Williams and 
Scott, 1965; Mintzberg, 1983; Porter, 1985; Bromiley, 1986).  
 
2.1 Capital investment of the firm 
 
 Capital investment can be defined as both the decision and act of outlaying 
present costs or cash outflows in the expectation of future returns or cash inflows. In 
reality, capital investment decisions are ubiquitous in every aspect of our life. In a broad 
and customary sense, Clendenin (1960, pp. 2–4 ) defines an investment as “any asset or 
property right acquired or held at present for the purpose of conserving capital gain or 
earning an income in the future”. Clendenin further contends that “the moral of any 
investment is the way to get money is to work for it and the way to have money is to keep 
it by investing soundly”. According to Baumol (1977, pp. 597–599) investment can be 
referred to as “the production or acquisition of any real capital assets”. Baumol further 
states that capital budgeting refers to the investment decision-making procedures of firm 
which involve the selection of projects, the timing of investment, the determination of 
investment amount within any given time frame, and the financial means for the 
completion of the projects. 
   
 Basically, in the literature of economics, the studies on investment decisions are 
divided into two categories: i) the microeconomics model of the Theory of the Firm’s 
investment or marginalism, which includes the managerial and behavioural theories, and 
ii) the macroeconomics model or aggregate investment level. However, this research 
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excludes the treatment of the macroeconomics since the interest here is in the 
microeconomics of the firm’s investment level.  
 
 In terms of investment approach, the criterion of Net Present Value Rule (NPVR) 
has been relied upon by the neo-classical macroeconomic theory of investment. Basically, 
an investment project is accepted if the difference between the present value of the 
anticipated future cash inflows and profits of the project exceeds its present value of the 
cash outflows and costs.2  However, NPVR has been criticized recently on the basis of 
the existence of capital market imperfections and as investment criterion it is not 
sufficient enough to be used for capital investment decision-making.  
 
 The notion of the existence of capital market imperfections has been supported by 
substantial theoretical and empirical models that imply the inter-dependency of 
investment and financing decisions of the firm. In reality, the financing mix of internal 
and external funds, the financial structure and availability in which the firm operates can 
affect its investment decision-making due to the uncertain prospects of the imperfect 
capital markets. The literature also suggests that various factors can affect the investment 
and financing decisions of the firm, such as, the risk environment, problems of 
asymmetric of information, bankruptcy and agency risks, access to sources of financing, 
government regulations and tax regimes, etc. (Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss, 1984; 
Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Gertler, 1992). 
  
There is variation in the impact of uncertainty between different firms and 
industries, which requires a more thorough criterion besides NPVR to be used in 
investment decision-making of the firm. In relation to this, Meyer and Glauber (1964, p. 
247) state that “a need seemingly exists for an entirely new approach to the problem of 
constructing a theory of investment that is adequate to explain differences among 
business firms with different strategies and objectives”.  
 
In one of the studies on this aspect, Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 3–7) state that 
there are three important characteristics which interact to determine the optimal 
investment decisions as follows: i) there is the concept that investment is partially or 
completely irreversible, ii) there is uncertainty over the future returns from the 
investment, and iii) there is some leeway about the timing of the investment. In relation 
to these characteristics, they proposed a basic new theory of irreversible investment under 
uncertainty–“real options”–which emphasizes the option-like features of investment 
opportunities. Under the real-options approach, uncertainty (e.g. about the future interest 
rates, risks environment, profits, tax regimes, etc.) has more critical effects on the 
investment decision-making of the firm than the interest rate per se as proposed by the 
neo-classical investment theories. For instance, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) in their study 
which categorized firms according to their degree of financial constraint, found that 
                                                          
2 For instance, refer to the works of Modigliani and Miller (1958), Jorgenson (1963) and Tobin (1969).? In 
the Modigliani–Miller theorem, a perfect capital market is assumed
,
 which implies that the firm’s cost of capital is independent from its financial structure. Hence, 
the investment decision could be treated separately from the finance decision, as the firm is not exposed to any financing constraints. In the Jorgenson model, the 
firm’s desired capital stock is calculated by equating its marginal product with the user cost. While in the Tobin model, the present value of the expected future 
profits of an investment project is compared with its purchase price (the Tobin’s Q). 
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investment decisions of the least financially constrained firms are the most sensitive to 
the availability of cash flow. 
 
2.2 Corporate strategy of the firm   
  
  From the perspective of corporate strategy framework, the management of the 
firm has direct implications on its competitive position in the environment in which it 
operates and hence is deemed to be strategic in nature, which requires serious 
considerations of many factors (Williams and Scott, 1965; Ansoff, 1965; Thomas, 1983; 
Bromiley, 1986). For instance, in the context of opportunities and threats provided by the 
business environment, a management decision to invest in new technologies will increase 
productivity and has an impact on the firm’s performance and its market value. As for 
strategic decision-making, Robbins (1982) defines it as the art of making choices. 
According to Garvin and Roberto (2001, p. 110) decision-making is not an event but an 
inquiry approach which involves “a very open process designed to generate multiple 
alternatives, foster the exchange of ideas, and produce a well-tested solution”.  
 
 The strategy formulation of the firm also is influenced by various factors, both 
internally and externally. Basically, these factors can be categorized into five main 
groupings as follows: i) the internal strengths and weaknesses of the firm, based on its 
resources; ii) the business environments of the firm; iii) the personal values (e.g. 
motivations, needs, and goals) of top management that are directly involved in the 
strategy formulation process; iv) the broader societal expectations, such as non-economic 
and other social responsibilities; and v) the corporate vision, mission and objectives of 
the firm (Andrews, 1971; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980). This implies that 
these factors interact with each other to influence the choice of strategy made by the 
firm.3   It also reflects that a firm has to take into account various factors in its strategic 
management so that the success of the firm is possibly secured. 
 
3. THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL  
 
 In the context of the theoretical framework of separation of ownership and control 
of the firm, Berle and Means (1967) first raised these subjects to explain the development 
of modern organizations in the U.S. They found that ownership of the firm is often 
widely dispersed over various stakeholders who caused the entrepreneur-owners to have 
difficulties in controlling the firm without incurring additional costs related to acquiring, 
                                                          
3
 In terms of methods of strategy formulation, for instance, Mintzberg (1973) states that there are three 
modes of strategy-making, namely: i) the entrepreneurial mode whereby the entrepreneur-owner takes bold 
and risky decisions in search of new growth opportunities and is normally found in small or start-ups firms 
where the motivation is to make a market impact; ii) the adaptive mode whereby decision-making is 
negotiated among the stakeholders, involving serial steps based on the firm’s responses to input on past 
decisions and is normally found in large, established firms, which do not require drastic strategy for market 
competitiveness; and iii) the planning mode whereby decisions are integrated and complement each other 
to form planned strategies and is normally found in very large firms with clear operational objectives and 
that can afford the costs of formal analysis. However, Mintzberg argues that these modes are not mutually 
exclusive because there is often a mixture in the strategy-making, depending on a particular firm and its 
circumstances. 
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analyzing and acting on certain information needed. Jensen and Meckling (1976) view 
the firm as a nexus of contracts and employed Agency Theory to describe the relationship 
between the entrepreneur-owner or shareholders (as principal) and the managers (as 
agent) with many circumstances for potential conflict.4  Fama and Jensen (1983) extend 
the Agency Theory by asserting that separation of ownership and control is the efficient 
form of organization for most firms.   
 
 However, there is still no consensus on the issue of separation of ownership and 
control in relation to the economic Theory of the Firm. In the Neo-classical approach, 
effective control of the firm is exercised by all stakeholders through voting strength to 
elect and deselect the firm’s directors and managers. The management of the firm too can 
be hired or fired depending on its performance and behaviour, which is acceptable or not 
to the controlling stakeholders. All stakeholders also have the right to dispose of their 
shareholdings if the firm is not pursuing and operating strategic management functions 
compatibly with their objectives. Mostly, the firm will be controlled by the ownership 
interest of its stakeholders and is unlikely ever to be fully controlled by the managers 
(Simon, 1960; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Francis, 1980). 
 
 On the contrary, the Managerialist approach proposes that the control of the firm 
is exercised by professional managers. Due to the wide dispersal of the ownership 
structure of the firm, the stakeholders apparently lose their power to exercise control and 
thus the managers are the people who really control the management of the firm. For 
instance, in the selection of goals and objectives of the firm, the managers will follow 
their personal inclination, prestige and other motives instead of the stakeholders’ and the 
firm’s priorities (Baumol, 1959; Cyert and March, 1963; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 
1970).  
 
In the Marxism approach, it is proposed that the non-owner managers exercise 
the actual functions of the capitalist themselves. Hence, this implies that if the managers 
are assumed to be in control, it is the capitalist system that ensures their strategic 
management functions are in tandem with the stakeholders’ priorities. This approach also 
concurs with the idea of a managerial revolution but argued that this does not result in 
substantial qualitative changes of capitalism’s nature (Miliband, 1973; Hilferding, 1981). 
 
 Nevertheless, these approaches briefly explained above can be considered as an 
‘ex post approach’ since they originate from factual observation of the dispersed 
ownership structure of the firm. In relation to this, Pitelis (1987) stresses that these 
approaches started from the notion of dispersed shareholding and then attempted to 
devise implications on control by narrowing the fixed shareholding percentages held by 
the stakeholders or by examining the ability of managers to be independent of all or 
certain stakeholders. In addition, Demsetz (1988, p. 199) contends that there are strong 
                                                          
4
 The nexus of contracts approach underlies a significant portion of the agency-cost literature and the 
monitoring school of transaction-cost economics. The implication of this approach is that the theory of the 
firm (with the firm taken as a separate institution or substantive entity) would be replaced with a theory of 
contract (with the firm taken as legal entity). 
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linkages between management and owner interests, which imply that ownership and 
control are not so separate after all. 
  
 Due to the unresolved issues of separation of ownership and control in the 
approaches above, it is felt appropriate to have some definitions on the concept of control. 
Litterer (1965, p. 233) defines “control is concerned not only with the events directly 
related to the accomplishment of the major purposes, but also with maintaining the 
organization in a condition in which it can function adequately to achieve these purposes”. 
Berle and Means (1967, p. 66) state that “control has generally been defined to refer to 
the actual power to select the board of directors, either by mobilizing the legal right to 
choose them, controlling a majority votes directly or through some legal device, or by 
exerting pressure which influences their choices”. They also stress that “control refers to 
the power of determining the broad policies guiding a corporation and not the actual 
influence on its day-to-day affairs”. Another definition of control is given by Beed (1972, 
p. 147) who suggests the possibility of external control on the directors, such as, a 
function of buyers or suppliers, sources of capital or equity ownership, etc., where new or 
existing directors can be influenced by these elements.  
 
4. THE STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
 
   Another important concept of the firm, which is in line with the separation of the 
ownership and control issues as discussed above, is the stakeholder theory.5  This theory 
proposes that because there are various groups that can be influenced by the performance 
of the firm, they should be accounted for in the setting of the firm’s objectives and also in 
the managing of the strategic management functions of the firm. In other words, besides 
the fundamental economic objectives, the firm also has other additional responsibilities in 
relation to its diverse stakeholders. Basically, shareholders, managers, employees, buyers, 
suppliers, financiers and society at large are included in the definition of stakeholder 
whereby their support is important to the firm’s existence. 
 
 According to Ansoff (1965) the objective of the firm should be derived from 
balancing the conflicting objectives of its diverse stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, 
investors, suppliers, buyers, vendors and employees). Ansoff further stresses that the 
reason for the emergence of the stakeholder theory is due to the complication in 
balancing the firm’s responsibilities and constraints in relation to these stakeholders. 
Along similar lines, Dill (1975) contends that stakeholders are one of the critical 
challenges faced by the firm because they seek to influence the strategic decision of the 
firm. Dill also states that these stakeholders are sophisticated and more concerned with 
their quality of life. This argument is also supported by Ackoff (1981, p. 30) who defines 
stakeholders as “all those inside or outside an organization who are directly affected by 
what it does”. Ackoff further contends that the objective of a firm is to serve all of its 
stakeholders by trying to improve their quality of life.  
 
 Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders in an organization as any group or 
individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of the firm’s objectives. 
                                                          
5
 This theory or approach was first developed by the Stanford Research Institute (RSI) in 1963. 
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Freeman also states that the stakeholder theory, together with other theories (e.g. system 
theory, corporate social responsibility and organizational theories), can be deployed to 
develop an approach to strategic planning. In relation to this, Chakravarthy and Lorange 
(1991, pp. 17–18) identify three steps in the stakeholder management as follows: i) to 
map a firm’s stakeholders, ii) to understand the power and stake of each stakeholder, and 
iii) to ensure enough allocation of resources for stakeholder management activities. 
 
5. THE ICTVBs AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 Since this research focuses on ICTVBs, a brief overview of their characteristics 
and their financial resource shortage is felt warranted. ICTVBs can be broadly defined as 
business start-ups with entrepreneurial activities in the high-technology economic sector.6  
The literature on growth Theory of the Firm suggests various factors affecting growth, 
such as, managerial resources (Penrose, 1959), market density (Porter, 1980; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989), and strategy or culture and internal capabilities (Boeker, 1997; Garnsey, 
1998). However, the growth process of ICTVBs often varies from a normal firm.  
 
 In terms of characteristics of ICTVBs, according to Pfirrman, Wupperfield and 
Lerner (1997, p. 14) usually they undertake complex innovation projects with high 
innovation and business risks. ICTVBs also have a high demand for capital to maintain 
liquidity. The Bank of England (2001) states that the key features of ICTVBs are as 
follows: i) their successes are related to difficult-to-value growth potential; ii) their 
products and services are untested in the markets; and iii) their collateral for funding are 
normally intangible assets.7  These characteristics imply that ICTVBs’ growth involves 
uncertainty, risk, and lot of financing to support them. In relation to this, Alexander (2000, 
p. 31) contends that besides finding adequate financing, the other components required 
for a successful ICTVBs are as follows: i) a unique technology or business concept, ii) a 
visionary and experienced management, iii) a competent workforce, iv) a significant 
market opportunity, and v) a supportive business-technical environment and 
infrastructure. 
 
 The growing literature on ICTVBs also suggests that due to their inherent peculiar 
characteristics coupled with capital market imperfections, they face a financing resource 
shortage or ‘equity gap’ to support their financing needs.8  Basically, the ‘equity gap’ is 
                                                          
6
 The terminology of ICTVBs is used in this research. However, the terminology of New Technology-based 
Firms (NTBFs) is widely referred to in the literature. NTBFs were firstly defined by Arthur D. Little as 
“independently owned businesses established for not more than 25 years and based on the exploitation of 
an invention or technical innovation which implies substantial technological risks” ( cf. Mani and 
Bartzokas, 2002, p. 11 ). 
7
 According to Houben and Kakes (2001, p. 4), the dominant characteristics of these businesses can be 
summarized as follows: i) their investments are subject to considerable uncertainty and have a ‘high risk, 
high return’ profile; ii) their fixed costs are large in comparison to variable costs making their cash flow 
significantly negative at the initial growth stages; iii) their products/services are subject to rapid 
obsolescence and their assets are intangible making them not suitable to serve as collateral; iv) their 
production relies heavily on human capital; and v) the information asymmetries between them and 
investors are relatively large. Therefore, these characteristics have implications on their capital structure. 
8
 “Equity gap” is a prominent feature in most countries. In the U.S., this gap refers to venture business 
seeking less than US$500,000. And in the U.K., this term is synonymous to the Macmillan Gap in the 
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not a new phenomenon since ICTVBs have always had to finance their business ideas, 
initially, for as long as possible with their own funds. However, when their own funds 
dry-up and they need external financing to make their business ideas into a reality, then 
they face this financial resource shortage. 
 
 In brief, ‘equity gap’ refers to the situation whereby ICTVBs encounter difficulty 
in raising their required external financing from the formal financial institutions such as 
commercial banks, finance companies, etc. For instance, Gompers and Lerner (1999, pp. 
127–128) succinctly argue that there are four critical factors that may limit access to 
financing for ICTVBs as follows: i) the uncertainty which affects the willingness of 
investors to extend funds, ii) the problem of asymmetric of information, iii) the nature of 
assets for collateral, and iv) the conditions in the financial and product markets. These 
rationales imply that the cost of access to capital is higher for ICTVBs compared to 
normal firms and that they face a shortage of long-term capital–either in the form of share 
issues or bank loans. In other words, it is not easy for ICTVBs to get their business 
adequately financed by external equity or debt in the conventional capital market. 
However, the literature suggests that informal financial institutions such as family 
members and close friends, business angels, VCIs and corporate venture capitalists are 
the common sources of risk-financing for ICTVBs (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Reid, 
1989; Ehrlich et al., 1994). 
 
 Generally, the financial sources for ICTVBs depends on many factors, such as, 
their risk profile, assets and projected cash inflows, proven track and market records, 
their business preferences, among others. Most studies typically suggest that their 
financial sources are largely dependent on their stage of development (Van Osnabrugge 
and Robinson, 2000; Bank of England, 2001; Houben and Kakes, 2001). There are four 
main stages in the ICTVBs’ growth process as follows: i) seed stage (includes R&D), ii) 
start-up stage (includes market introduction), iii) growth stage, and iv) maturity stage.  
 
 Figure A below illustrates typical financial sources for ICTVBs. Usually, at the 
seed stage they are small in size and have no track record or collateral. Their business 
generally has a negative cash flow. At the start-up stage, they are still quite small but 
have limited track and market records. However, at this stage they are capable of 
demonstrating their growth potential to the prospective investors. Next is the growth 
stage whereby they grow from small to medium and have proven track and market 
records. At this stage also, they have collateral and positive cash flow to attract potential 
investors. Finally, at the maturity stage they are considered established and their size 
grows from medium to large. They are also capable of providing good track and market 
records to investors for financing purposes. Investors basically know the risk of investing 
in these venture businesses at this stage. In brief, the amount of external finances 
normally increases with each progressive stage of ICTVBs’ development, indicating that 
the more mature and larger in size, their inherent riskiness decreases and the problems of 
securing external financing usually decrease. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1930s which originated from Lord Macmillan’s report in 1931. He was then the Chairman of the 
Committee on Finance and Industry. This gap refers to the funds below £250,000–£400,000 pounds level 
(cf. Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000, pp. 38–39). 
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 Figure A: The financial sources of ICTVBs 
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Source: Adapted from Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000, p. 37). Angel Investing: Matching 
Start-up Funds with Start-up Companies. Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers. 
 
 
6. SYNTHESIS OF THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
 
 In the context of venture businesses that VCIs and ICTVBs have contracted into, 
several understandings that can be derived from the above literature on the Theory of the 
Firm and its related concepts are as follows: 
 
a) The decision for any capital investment by the VCIs and ICTVBs has direct 
implications on their competitiveness and hence is deemed to be strategic in nature. 
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b) The venture businesses’ operations are actually controlled by a mixture of controlling 
stakeholders (in this research, the entrepreneur-owners (ICTVBs) and the financiers 
(VCIs)). 
 
c) The complexity of managing venture businesses could be further complicated by the 
nature of differences in expectations, expertise and ROMFs between VCIs and 
ICTVBs as the key stakeholders. 
 
d) The separation of ownership and control in venture businesses can create a likely 
situation for management conflict between VCIs and ICTVBs as the key stakeholders. 
 
e) The success of venture businesses requires a set of strategic managerial factors that 
are coherent with both VCIs and ICTVBs as the key stakeholders. 
 
These understandings are important in a business relationship because in essence both 
parties act as decision-maker and also act as manager of the venture business. Therefore, 
this implies that the strategic managerial factors of the VCIs and ICTVBs as the key 
stakeholders will affect the management of the venture business.  
 
7. AGENCY THEORY 
 
This research uses the framework of an applied principal-agent analysis, thus a 
brief discussion on Agency Theory as the focal theory is also felt warranted. In 
economics literature, on one side, ICTVBs are characterized in dynamic variants as, for 
instance, risk-takers, decision-makers, innovators, organizers, and managers of economic 
resources. However, ICTVBs seldom have adequate financing to see the success of their 
business ideas without relying on external financiers. On the other, VCIs are among the 
specialized financial institutions providing risk-financing to these ICTVBs. Both VCIs 
(as principal) and ICTVBs (as agent) are the key stakeholders in the venture business that 
they contracted into, thus, an agency relationship exists between them. The literature 
reviewed suggests several theories in explaining this agency relationship. Some of these 
theories are as follows: a) Agency Theory, b) Procedural Justice Theory, c) Transaction 
Cost Theory, and d) Social Embeddedness Theory.9 
  
Basically, Agency Theory emphasises the possibility of different interests 
between the principal and agent and relies upon the assumption of market efficiency 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). This theory 
suggests that the way to overcome any opportunistic tendencies of the financier (i.e. the 
principal) and borrower (i.e. the agent) is to monitor the borrower.? As mentioned above, 
this theory assumes both the principal and the agent may have divergent self-interests; 
therefore, if the agent is to succeed in acquiring needed resources (e.g. capital), it has to 
                                                          
9
 The debate on which theory is the most appropriate to be considered as the general theory is ongoing. In 
relation to this, Fiet (2000, pp. 21–22) argues that this “unfinished business” is related to the issue where 
“two requirements for building a general theory are that its assumptions be both internally consistent and 
valid”. This situation is not in line with the task at hand of this research. Hence, considering the purposes 
and the limitations of this research, the synthesis of these theories is felt more important than the creation of 
a new general theory.  
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provide the principal with incentives to compensate for their different interests. 
According to Barney et al. (1996) this theory also suggests that the agent can substitute 
monitoring for bonding if it lacks necessary capital, but it can substitute bonding for 
monitoring if it has enough capital. The theoretical assumption of this theory is 
summarized in Table A below. 
 
Table A: Theoretical assumptions of Agency Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Source: Adapted from Fiet, (2000, p. 18). “The Theoretical Side of Teaching   
                Entrepreneurship”. Journal of Business Venturing. Vol. 16. 
 
From the assumptions in the above table, it can be inferred that besides being capable of 
explaining how to best organize a business relationship, this theory also argues that due 
to the asymmetries of information and uncertainty, agency conflict may arise.10  In fact, 
according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the problem underlying this theory is 
information asymmetries, which originate from the complication when ICTVBs as the 
borrower (or the agent) has more information about its venture business than the outside 
investors such as VCIs (or the principal).  
 
On the other hand, the Procedural Justice Theory suggests how the difference in 
interests between the principal and agent may be overcome. It suggests that preserving an 
effective ongoing relationship between the principal and agent requires them to be able to 
maintain the perception that their partners are acting fairly in compensating them for 
contributed work. The Transaction Cost Theory presumes that venture businesses 
actually come into existence when markets fail to be informationally or allocationally 
efficient. This theory also suggests that one way to overcome any opportunistic 
tendencies of both the principal and agent is to monitor the agent. According to Hart 
(1995, p. 23), this theory propagates that the principal and agent will write a contract that 
is incomplete due to three factors as follows: i) the difficulty in planning for all future 
                                                          
10
 According to Fiet (2000, p. 20), the key decision criteria under this theory are “Agents have separate and 
possibly divergent interests from those of the principals. Monitoring may be utilized to detect agent 
behaviour that is harmful to principals. It may be further reduced through incentive alignment, being 
careful to not shift excessive risk for loss of compensation for work performed to the agent. Risk of loss is 
more efficiently borne by principals who can diversify their risk of loss”. 
      Assumption            Description 
 
Primary Domain Relationships in which principal and agent may have partially differing 
goals and risk preferences. 
 
Key Ideas Principal-agent relationship should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs. 
 
Unit of Analysis Contract between principal and agent. 
 
Level of Analysis Usually individual but relationships can criss-cross the entire economy. 
 
Human and/or Self interest; Bounded rationality; Risk aversion 
Environmental 
Constraints 
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contingencies, ii) the difficulty in negotiating a contingencies plan, and iii) the difficulty 
in writing down a contingencies plan. Under the Social Embeddedness Theory, the agent 
acquires needed resources through exchange relationships with their principal and over 
time these relationships may socialize the exchangers so that they become trustworthy, 
which lowers the acquisition costs. 
  
 It is contended earlier (as discussed in Appendix ‘A’ and appendix ‘B’) that 
venture capital and ICT industries in Malaysia are just emerging and there is an 
information gap regarding their financial aspects. Thus, based on these circumstances and 
some basic assumptions of the theories as discussed above, the Agency Theory is 
considered appropriate because it is capable of addressing management conflict 
pertaining to expectation and information problems faced by the both VCIs and ICTVBs 
in the venture business that they contracted into. The Social Embeddedness Theory is not 
suitable because this theory assumes that once socialization between the parties takes 
place, the embedded relationships will serve as the mechanism to govern the management 
relationship against any opportunistic and shirking acts. The Transaction Cost Theory on 
the other hand, assumes market failure, and this approach promotes efficiency 
transactions as a basis for organizing the management relationship. This approach is also 
not suitable because it asserts more on the asset specificity and less on the behavioural 
aspect of the management relationship. The Procedural Justice Theory suggests the 
reward process in a wide variety of exchange relationships as the unit of analysis. This is 
not coherent with this research because the unit of analysis is the management 
relationship in the financial contracting between the VCIs and ICTVBs of the venture 
business.11 However, it should be noted that other theories do have their advantages and 
disadvantages.   
 
8. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS 
 
For this research, to analyze the business relationship of the VCIs and ICTVBs, 
an applied principal-agent analysis has been selected as the framework. Basically, in an 
agency relationship (i.e. principal-agent relationship), one party acts on behalf of another 
party. In this research, the VCIs are treated as the principal and the ICTVBs as the agent. 
By virtue of their majority shareholding of the venture business, the ICTVBs are legally 
considered as the principal in the business context. However, this status changes into an 
agent in their financial contract when the VCIs invest additional equity which is badly 
                                                          
11
 In the financial and organizational contracting literatures, basically there are two approaches to 
understanding the determinants of contractual provisions. According to Gompers and Lerner (1999, pp. 31-
35) these approaches are the Costly Contracting Theory and the Supply and Demand Hypothesis, and they 
state that “both approaches assume that observed contracts are optimal given the contractual environment. 
The two hypotheses should be viewed as complements. Both effects may be at work simultaneously”. They 
further state that “the Costly Contracting Theory predicts that contracting parties should balance the 
benefits of restricting activities with the cost of negotiating the provisions, writing the contractual clauses, 
and monitoring compliance. The Supply and Demand Hypothesis suggests that when the demand for 
venture capital services is high, relative to a fixed supply of venture capital providers, the number of 
restrictions should decline”. However, this research is not an investigation into the determinants of the 
contractual provisions per se but an attempt to examine the broader differences of ROMFs of both, the 
VCIs and ICTVBs and the relationship between these ROMFs and management conflict experienced across 
the full venture capital process. 
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needed by the ICTVBs now and for future expansion although they still hold majority 
shareholding of the venture business (as explained in Chapter 1). Due to the asymmetries 
of information in this kind of relationship, many agency conflicts, pertaining to the 
managerial aspects of the venture business, between the parties are involved.  
 
Under this framework the researcher approaches both the VCIs (as principal) and 
ICTVBs (as agent) in order to investigate their actual recognition of managerial factors in 
their business relationship. The justifications for using this framework are as follows: 
 
a) This framework is capable of viewing the actual complexity of managing the venture 
business and real world financial contracts of venture capital financing. 
 
b) This framework is capable of investigating both the views of VCIs and of ICTVBs 
simultaneously. 
 
c) This framework is appropriate to clearly expound the actual principal-agent 
relationship of the VCIs (as the financier and principal) and the ICTVBs (as the 
borrower and agent) in venture capital financing. 
 
In conclusion, this framework seemed to be an established framework that could analyze 
well the business relationship of the VCIs and ICTVBs in venture capital financing 
(Sahlman, 1990; Amit et al., 1990; Sappington, 1991; Reid, 1998). For example, Reid 
(1998, p. xvii) succinctly argues that this framework “provides a powerful overarching 
framework for analyzing contractual relations between parties in which both risk and 
incomplete knowledge of actions are involved”. 
 
9. SUMMARY 
 
 This appendix provides the background theory of this research, that is, the Theory 
of the Firm and its related concepts. The literature reviewed covers several concepts that 
formed the main aspects of the understanding of the two central concepts of this research, 
that is, recognition of managerial factors (ROMFs) and management conflict in managing 
venture businesses. In other words, this appendix also highlights the governing factors 
that increase the complexity of managing venture business financially contracted into by 
the VCIs (as principal) and ICTVBs (as agent). 
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APPENDIX ‘D’ 
 
THE DATA THEORY AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYED  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This appendix provides an overview on the data theory. It also explains the data 
collection instruments, the chronological events of the field study and the statistical 
analysis employed for this research. This appendix is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews the data theory in general and the justifications for using the triangulation 
approach for this research. Then, Section 3 justifies the usage of questionnaire surveys 
and interviews and shows the chronological events of the field study. Section 4 explains 
the operational aspect of the analysis on the data and information collected and the 
specific statistical tests employed in this research. Finally, Section 5 summarizes this 
appendix. 
 
2. QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITAVIVE METHODOLOGIES 
   
 In essence, qualitative methodology is featured by a strong intention by the 
researcher to investigate the social world from the viewpoint of the subjects and actors 
that are being studied. Proponents of this methodology contend that due to the main 
purpose of seeing through the eyes of research participants or inside view, techniques 
such as observation, case studies and interviews are appropriate to be used. Through 
these techniques, the managerial and behavioural aspects could be better understood in 
the perspective of actual practices and procedures used by a particular firm, group or 
society, organization and venture business (Smith, 1975; Miles, 1983; Van Maanen, 
1983; Jick, 1979; Sekaran, 1992; Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
 
 Through qualitative methodology, the researcher is capable of having a close 
proximity to the situation which could in turn allow greater sensitivity to the multiple 
sources of data. Jick (1979, pp. 145–146) stresses that, for an example, at one stage, 
qualitative methodology is employed as the critical counter-aspect of quantitative 
methodology and, at another stage, the analysis benefits from the perceptions gathered 
from the “personal touch”, real experiences, and first-hand observations of the qualitative 
methodology. This argument was supported by Miles (1983, pp. 117–118) who states that 
qualitative methodology has special qualities in contributing to minimize the researcher’s 
incapacity, narrowness, bias, and to produce clearer findings. Miles further stresses that at 
the end of the analysis, the findings have a quality that gives vigour to research reports. 
However, there are some critiques to qualitative methodology. For instance, according to 
Bryman (2001, pp. 282–283), some of the common critiques of qualitative methodology 
are that they are too subjective, difficult to replicate, generalization problems, and lack 
transparency. 
 
 On the other hand, quantitative methodology is always perceived as a more 
preferred and positive research approach to social research by applying the objectivity of 
a natural science. As the methodological literature proponents suggest that the distinctive 
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qualities of positivism on quantitative methodology are objectivism (showing more 
weight on objectivity through the distance between the researcher and the respondents), 
operationalization and generalization (through questionnaire survey concepts that are 
easily to be operationalized and generalized), reliability and consistency (through the 
usage of independent measurement for the similar phenomenon), replicability (through 
the usage of same research design and instruments in or for another perspective), and 
validity and causality (through the usage of statistical analysis) (Giddens, 1974; Smith, 
1975; Bryman and Cramer, 1990; Sekaran, 1992; Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; Burns, 
2000). 
 
 Nevertheless, there are also critiques on quantitative methodology. Bryman (2001, 
pp. 77–78) highlights four criticisms on quantitative methodology as follows: i) 
quantitative researchers fail to distinguish people and social institutions from the ‘world 
of nature’; ii) the measurement process possesses an artificial and spurious sense of 
precision and accuracy; iii) the reliance on instruments and procedures hinders the 
connection between research and everyday life; and iv) the analysis of relationships 
between variables creates a static view of social life that is independent of people’s lives. 
Table A below illustrates the main contrasting features between qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies. 
 
Table A: Some common contrasts between quantitative and qualitative research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Bryman (2001, p. 285). “Social research methods” .New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 Considering the strengths and opportunities of both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies highlighted above, it is in the opinion of the researcher that the best 
approach for this research is a combination of methodologies or the so-called 
triangulation approach.1  According to Denzin (1970, pp. 310–340), triangulation refers 
to an approach that uses multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data, and 
methodologies, but the emphasis tends to be on methods of investigation and sources of 
                                                          
1
 Triangulation was originally conceptualized by Webb et al. (1966) as an approach to the development of 
measures of concepts, whereby multi-methods would be used in the development of measures, resulting in 
greater confidence in findings [cf. Bryman (2001, p. 274)]. 
 
 QUANTITATIVE   QUALITATIVE 
 
 Numbers    Words 
 Point of view of researcher  Points of view of participants 
 Researcher distant   Researcher close 
 Theory testing   Theory emergent 
 Static    Process 
 Structured   Unstructured 
 Generalization   Contextual understanding 
 Hard, reliable data   Rich, deep data 
 Macro    Micro 
 Behavior    Meaning 
 Artificial settings   Natural settings 
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data. Denzin further stresses that the greater the triangulation, the greater the confidence 
in the observed results and findings. Along similar understanding, Bryman (2001, p. 274) 
states that triangulation entails using more than one method or source of data in study of 
social phenomena. In the past, triangulation was widely used in navigation. 
 
 In the above context, Hughes (1976, pp. 276–277) also argues that multi-methods 
and references can strengthen and complement each other and encourage a more orderly 
connection of both theory and research. This implies that what research discovers and 
how it is discovered depend on how the researcher engages in the phenomena studied 
(Yin, 1989; Silverman, 1985; Jean Lee, 1992; Bryman, 2001). In reality, the choice of a 
research methodology also normally depends on various elements such as the nature and 
scope of the study being conducted, resources available, and limitations (for example, 
cost, timeframe and related restrictions). In relation to this, Phillips and Pugh (2000, p. 
51) assert that “All research involves working within particular constraints, but those of a 
PhD are very stringent. They include clear limitations on finance, physical resources, 
administrative back-up and, above all, time”. 
 
Paralleling the triangulation approach selected for this research (as discussed 
above) a case study is also employed.2  Denscombe (1998, pp. 32–34) states that “case 
studies focus on one instance (or a few instances) of a particular phenomenon with a view 
to providing an in-depth account of events, relationships, experiences or processes 
occurring in that particular instance”. Case studies also can be employed for the purposes 
of theory testing as well as theory-building. Hence, the choices of a case study whereby 
MSC is the location and the case for this research is felt appropriate for the task at hand. 
Besides providing an avenue to investigate in-depth the business relationship between the 
VCIs and ICTVBs, this approach also gives the opportunity to enrich the knowledge in 
the real world of financial contracting and management of venture business between them. 
 
3. DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS AND THE FIELD STUDY 
 
 According to Selltiz et al. (1962, p. 243), questionnaire surveys and interviews 
provide data and information on what a person knows, believes or expects, feels or wants, 
intends or does or has done, and his explanation or reasons for any of the preceding. This 
view is supported by Williamson, Karp and Dalphin (1977, pp 165–166) where they 
argue that standardized questionnaire and intensive interviewing are appropriate 
techniques for data collection because the researcher has opportunities to probe 
extensively for any sensitive data or information as well as to obtain comprehensive 
knowledge of the matters under investigation. In relation to this understanding, Sommer 
and Sommer (1980, p. 63) concur with the usage of both standardized questionnaires and 
interviews because according to them, on one side, the questionnaire is actually a written 
interview and on the other side, an interview can be considered as an oral questionnaire. 
From the above literature, it indicates that both interview and questionnaire surveys are 
                                                          
2
 Case studies are appropriate for exploratory and descriptive or explanatory researches because this 
approach gives the researcher the opportunity to capture a greater depth and breadth of detail on the 
subject’s activities (Yin, 1994; Denscombe, 1998; Burns, 2000).  
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appropriate instruments for data collection of this research. 3   Table B itemizes the 
chronology of events of the field study for this research. 
 
Table B: The field study’s chronology of events  
 
(MARCH 2002 ~ APRIL 2003) 
March/April 2002 
The data collection instrument (Survey Questionnaire) was pre-tested in the Pilot Study. Discussions with some of the main players in 
the local venture capital industry were also conducted. 
 
13 Nov 2002 
Contacted individually (through e-mail) the VCIs in Malaysia which are involved in ICT/Multimedia and Life Sciences alerting them 
about the proposed Field Study and requesting their cooperation, especially their list of investees’ addresses and contact persons. 
 
21 Nov 2002 
Seek further assistance from the President of the Malaysian Venture Capital Association (MVCA) for the Field Study. 
 
9 Dec 2002 
MVCA circulated (through e-mail) to its members about this Field Study and reaffirmed about the genuineness of Researcher and this 
research as well as requesting its members cooperation accordingly. 
 
December 2002 
The directory of VCIs and Investees (i.e. addresses and contact persons) was prepared for mailing out the Survey Questionnaire.  
 
January 2003 
True copies of the Survey Questionnaire, both, for the VCIs and ICTVBs were prepared. 
 
3 Feb 2003 
The first Letter of Introduction from the Supervisor for this research was ready. 
 
9 Feb 2003 
The list of respondents to be sent the Survey Questionnaire was finalized. 
 
17 Feb 2003 
Discussion with the Head of the Venture Capital Unit, Ministry of Finance Malaysia about the research and requested his assistance 
on this Field Study. 
 
25 Feb 2003 
The second Letter of Introduction from the Deputy Minister of Finance, Malaysia was ready. Cover letter from the Ministry of 
Finance, Malaysia for the Survey Questionnaire was also ready. 
 
26 Feb 2003 
The Survey Questionnaire was coded and mailed to the respective respondents with a due date of March 31, 2003. 
 
15 Mar 2003 
Direct Interviews with selected respondents were conducted. 
 
21 Mar 2003 
Reminder letter to all respondents were sent. This was followed through by phone as well as e-mail, requesting their cooperation and 
reminding them about the due date. 
 
3 Apr 2003 
Direct Interviews were further conducted with selected respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 However, for the advantages and disadvantages of these survey instruments, please refer for e.g. 
Oppenheim, 1966; Dillman, 1974; Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; Sekaran, 1992; and Bryman, 2001. 
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4. ANALYSIS OF DATA AND INFORMATION 
 
 As it was mentioned above, this research used the triangulation approach; 
therefore, both qualitative and quantitative analyses were employed in analyzing the data 
and information collected. The crucial steps taken were as follows: 
  
a) The completed survey questionnaires were coded and recorded into a databank in the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 11 program. 
 
b) Responses for open-ended questions in the survey questionnaires were compiled 
accordingly before a clustering on the responses was done in order to obtain the most 
commonly grouped responses across the variables that are being investigated. 
 
c) Any irregularities (for example, data entry errors, non-response and unintelligible 
errors) were cleaned-up before computation. The reliability of indicators, especially 
those tapped by empirical measurement, need to be examined. Basically, reliability 
concerns the extent to which measuring procedures yield the same results on repeated 
trials. The data theory provides a number of methods to test the reliability of the 
measurement but this research employed Cronbach’s alpha (i.e. the internal 
consistency method) to determine the reliability estimates of the variables.4   This 
method requires minimum administration and also is a commonly used test to provide 
an estimate of internal reliability on the measurement. 
 
d) Before the statistical analyses were performed, a reliability test on all variables used 
in this research was conducted to examine their internal consistency.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha ranges in value from 0 to 1. The higher the alpha level, the more reliable is the 
data. Table C following shows the Cronbach’s alphas of all variables that are to be 
investigated.  From this table, although the alpha values are above 0.70 levels (i.e. the 
accepted level for social science research) the results suggest that inconsistency may 
exist in the responses by the respondents on certain variables as indicated by the 
relatively lower alpha values, e.g. variables for maintaining relationship (0.70), 
perception towards market and agency risks (0.70), sources of deal origination (0.71), 
etc. Among the highest alpha values that indicate high consistency of the responses 
by the respondents are variables such as valuation criteria (0.93), information 
required from ICTVBs (0.91), areas of expertise (0.86), etc.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Among the popular methods for reliability testing are retest method, split-half reliability method, Guttman 
method, Parallel and Strictly Parallel method, internal consistency method, and alternative form method 
(Sekaran, 1992; Bryman, 2001; Foster, 2001). For example, the Cronbach’s alpha is based on the average 
correlation of items within a test if the items are standardized. If the items were not standardized, it is based 
on the average covariance among the items. Bryman (2001, p. 71) states that Cronbach’s alpha “essentially 
calculates the average of all possible split-half reliability coefficients. A computed alpha coefficient will 
vary between 1 (denoting perfect internal reliability) and 0 (denoting no internal reliability). The figure 
0.80 is typically employed as a rule of thumb to denote an acceptable level of internal reliability, though 
many writers accept a slightly lower figure, e.g. 0.60 or 0.70 for social science research. 
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Table C: Results of reliability test on all variables investigated (N=57) 
 
VARIABLES CRONBACH’S ALPHAS 
A)Dependent variables: 
Affected management elements & extent of agency conflict 
experienced. 
B)Independent variables: 
Sources of deal origination. 
Screening criteria. 
Sources of due diligence. 
Valuation techniques. 
Valuation criteria. 
Investment instruments. 
Contract agreement’s provisions. 
Maintaining relationship. 
Advice required from VCIs. 
Information required from ICTVBs. 
Factors of an ideal relationship. 
Liquidity methods. 
C)Risk management: 
General risk management. 
Perception towards Market/Agency risks. 
Overall investment practices. 
D) Areas of expertise. 
 
 
0.75 
 
 
0.71 
0.83 
0.75 
0.73 
0.93 
0.73 
0.74 
0.70 
0.72 
0.91 
0.81 
0.72 
 
0.83 
0.70 
0.81 
0.86 
 
e) The data were then analyzed using several identified statistical tests as discussed 
below. 
 
 In order to support the results and findings of this research, statistical analysis was 
conducted to give empirical evidence and reliability. Since the measurement level of the 
variables in the survey questionnaires was a mixture of interval/ratio, ordinal and nominal 
scales, a combination of parametric and non-parametric statistical tests were used.5   The 
data were analyzed using the combined total sample of 57 respondents (i.e. 18 VCIs and 
39 ICTVBs).? The descriptive statistics were employed to describe the aggregate view of 
the data and case studies. Specific statistical tests were then employed for testing the 
hypotheses in this research.  
 
 The t-Independent Samples test is used to determine if the means of two unrelated 
samples differ. It does this by comparing the differences between the two means with the 
standard error of the difference in the means of different samples.6   Therefore, to test the 
differences in the ROMFs between the VCIs and ICTVBs (i.e. for hypotheses H1, H2 and 
H3), this test was employed because it is appropriate since the respondents of this 
research were divided in two groups (i.e. the VCIs and the ICTVBs). In other words, this 
test is selected to determine whether the difference between means for the scores of VCIs 
and ICTVBs is significant. For the purpose of this research, if more than half of the tested 
                                                          
5
 For close-ended questions with variables of interval-nominal scales, the use of contingency table analysis 
(cross-tabulation) in conjunction with chi-square (as a test of statistical significance) and Cramer’s V (to 
quantify the strength of association) could be used. For variables with dichotomous scales, a multiple 
dichotomy analysis could be used for analysis. And for open-ended questions, a multiple response analysis 
is commonly used for the analysis (Norusis, 1983; Bryman, 2001; Coakes and Steed, 2001; Foster, 2001) 
6
 According to Bryman and Kramer (2001, p. 140), the formulae for this test is as follows:  
[t= sample one mean – sample two mean divided by standard error of the differences in means]. 
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variables are found to be statistically significant (i.e. based on the t-values and level of 
significance), they will provide the basis for accepting or rejecting the hypotheses tested. 
 
  The Correlation analysis was used to measure the strength of association between 
the ROMFs and management conflict (i.e. for hypotheses H4, H5 and H6) in this research.  
Methods for assessing the level of correlation between variables under investigation are 
the Pearson Product-Moment correlation (i.e. Pearson’s r) and the Means test (and also 
the Spearman’s Rank Order test, i.e. Spearman’s rho). The procedure for this analysis 
was performed by correlating each of their ROMFs with the management conflict 
indicators. Again, for the purpose of this research, if more than half of the tested variables 
are found to be statistically significant (i.e. based on the correlation coefficients and the 
level of significance), they will provide the basis for accepting or rejecting the hypotheses 
tested. To investigate further the extent of the variance that could be accounted for by the 
ROMFs on management conflict, the Factor and multiple regression analyses were 
conducted. 
 
 Before hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 were tested, means tests were conducted to 
determine the general relationship between their ROMFs and management conflict 
indicators. Most of the variables tested were statistically significant (i.e. 27, 18, and 13 
variables were found to be significant at the pre-investment and post-investment stages 
and for risk management respectively). Table D below shows the results of means test of 
these variables. 
 
Table D: Results of means test for the general relationship between ROMFs and management 
conflict (N=57) 
 
VARIABLES F VALUES SIGNIFICANCE VALUES 
a) Pre-Investment Stage 
i) Sources of Deal Origination: 
     Cold calls to VCIs directly 
     Active search by VCIs 
     Other mechanisms (e.g. trade exhibitions) 
ii) Screening Criteria: 
     Production technology involved 
     Management team and track records 
     Markets for products/services 
     ROI’s rate 
     Acceptable investment duration 
iii) Sources of Due Diligence: 
     Reliance on personal references 
iv) Valuation Techniques: 
     Internal rate of return 
     Accounting rate of return 
v) Valuation Criteria: 
     Size of market 
     Growth potential of market 
     Technical skills 
     Uniqueness of products/services 
     Patentability of products/services 
     Management skills 
     Financial skills 
     References of investor/entrepreneur 
     Mergers and acquisitions potential 
vi) Deal Structuring: 
     Debt (short-term loans) 
     Debt (long-term loans) 
vii) Contract Agreement Provisions: 
 
 
7.843 
21.122 
13.479 
 
3.119 
3.066 
5.592 
2.576 
2.599 
 
3.615 
 
2.712 
4.256 
 
3.496 
3.884 
3.912 
3.780 
9.805 
3.672 
3.739 
3.263 
3.320 
 
3.051 
2.953 
 
 
 
0.007 
0.000 
0.001 
 
0.023 
0.024 
0.001 
0.014 
0.019 
 
0.011 
 
0.040 
0.005 
 
0.013 
0.008 
0.008 
0.016 
0.000 
0.032 
0.016 
0.018 
0.027 
 
0.025 
0.028 
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     Registration rights 
     Go-along rights 
     Pre-emptive rights & rights of first refusal 
b) Post-Investment Stage 
i) Monitoring type preferred 
ii) Maintaining Relationship: 
     Submit periodic reports 
     Limit to provision of capital funds only 
iii) Advice Required from VCIs: 
     Business & Entrepreneurialship 
     Tax and legal matters 
     Personnel and recruitment policies 
     Current scientific/technological information 
iv) Information Required from ICTVBs: 
     Technology and markets 
     Capital structure and investments 
     Management and financial accounts 
v) Factors of an Ideal Relationship: 
     Appropriate capital structure 
     Efficient risk-sharing 
     Free-sharing of information 
vi) Acquiring Liquidity: 
     Mergers and acquisitions 
     Buy-back 
     Write-off 
c) Risk Management 
i) General Risk Management: 
     Management risk 
     Competitive risk 
     Viability risk 
     Cash-out risk 
ii) Perception Towards Market & Agency Risks: 
     Small market 
     Many competitors 
     Technical obsolescence 
     Many substitute products/services 
     ICTVBs and VCIs having different cash flow objective 
     ICTVBs and VCIs having different profitability objective 
     Many ventures to be monitored 
     Contractual ambiguities 
     Manipulation of profitability 
     Short-term self-interest seeking 
     Potential dishonesty 
iii) Overall Investment Practices: 
     Deal origination and Screening 
     Evaluation 
     Contracting/Deal structuring 
4.574 
5.792 
4.159 
 
7.297 
 
5.546 
8.385 
 
2.900 
2.582 
6.915 
3.010 
 
2.987 
3.839 
2.553 
 
2.712 
3.289 
5.649 
 
3.161 
4.484 
5.624 
 
 
3.974 
3.803 
2.760 
2.789 
 
3.045 
8.886 
5.957 
4.759 
3.132 
4.334 
4.191 
5.181 
5.482 
4.889 
6.438 
 
7.188 
3.149 
2.609 
 
0.037 
0.019 
0.046 
 
0.002 
 
0.022 
0.005 
 
0.031 
0.048 
0.000 
0.038 
 
0.027 
0.008 
0.050 
 
0.040 
0.018 
0.001 
 
0.021 
0.007 
0.001 
 
 
0.007 
0.009 
0.037 
0.036 
 
0.025 
0.000 
0.001 
0.005 
0.022 
0.004 
0.005 
0.001 
0.001 
0.002 
0.000 
 
0.000 
0.022 
0.046 
 
  
 To examine H4, H5 and H6 further, factor and multiple regression analyses were 
conducted. Factor analysis is a data reduction technique used to reduce a large number of 
variables to a smaller set of underlying factors that represent sets of statistically related 
variables.7   According to Coakes and Steed (2001, p. 155) when the researcher’s goal is 
to construct a reliable test, this technique is an additional means of determining whether 
sub-variables are tapping into the same construct. This research uses R Factor Analysis 
                                                          
7
 According to Hair et al. (1998, p.90), factor analysis is a generic name given to a class of multivariate 
statistical methods whose primary purpose is to define the underlying structure in a data matrix. This 
analysis addresses the problem of analyzing the structure of the inter-relationships among a large number of 
variables by defining a set of common underlying dimensions, known as factors. They state that Q Factor 
Analysis forms groups of respondents or cases based on their similarity on a set of characteristics. The R 
Factor Analysis analyzes relationships among variables to identify groups of variables forming latent 
dimensions. 
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with the objective to reduce statistically the large variables that explain the independent 
variables (i.e. the ROMFs) and the dependent variable (i.e. the management conflict) and 
to confirm and finally rename the factors in a conceptually meaningful way. 
 
The R factor analysis analyzes relationships among variables to identify groups of 
variables forming latent factors. For this analysis, Principal Component Analysis for 
extraction method and Varimax for rotation method were used. All of the variable sets 
were statistically significant with Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
range between 0.635 to 0.841 and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity chi-square values range 
from 305.468 to 823.663.8    The R factor analysis produced eight factors each for the 
differences in ROMFs (of both VCIs and ICTVBs) at pre-investment and post-investment 
stages, seven factors for risk management, and four factors for management conflict 
indicators. The factor loadings of these factors are shown in Table E below.9  
 
Table E: Results of the R factor analysis for all variables (N=57) 
 
FACTORS FACTOR 
LOADINGS 
EIGEN VALUES 
A) Pre-Investment Stage: 
1. Screening & Due Diligence: 
               Size and policy of investment 
               Market for products/services 
               Own market evaluation 
               Independent accountant’s reports 
               Independent market reports 
               Management team/track record 
2. Location of venture 
3. Qualitative assessment 
4. Time taken for investment decision to be made 
[KMO=0.841   Bartlett’s (chi-square)=470.829    
Total variance=65.32%] 
5. Market & Product Criteria: 
               Uniqueness of products/services 
               Market needs for products/services 
               Access to market 
               Growth potential of market 
6.Environment Threat Resistance Criteria: 
               Protection against down-side risk 
               Resistance to economic cycles 
7. Managerial Capabilities Criteria: 
               Management skills 
               References of investor/entrepreneurs 
8. Cash-out Potential: 
               Merger/acquisition potential 
               Opportunities for exit 
[KMO=0.832   Bartlett’s (chi-square)=743.887    
Total variance=73.60%] 
 
 
 
 
 
0.824 
0.805 
0.794 
0.775 
0.773 
0.751 
0.761 
0.717 
0.908 
 
 
 
0.830 
0.772 
0.713 
0.706 
 
0.855 
0.790 
 
0.853 
0.790 
 
0.847 
0.714 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.357 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.098 
1.785 
1.211 
 
 
5.123 
 
 
 
 
3.134 
 
 
2.892 
 
 
2.099 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The KMO measure is used to measure the sampling adequacy. According to Kaiser (1974), measures in 
the 0.90s are marvelous, in the 0.80s as meritorious, in the 0.70s as middling, in the 0.60s as mediocre, in 
the 0.50s as miserable, and below 0.50 as unacceptable. Therefore, the minimum acceptable level is 0.50. 
The Bartlett’s test of sphericity is a test to assess the relationships among variables and to be statistically 
acceptable; the significance level should be 0.50 or lower. 
9
 According to Comfrey (1973), any loading greater than 0.71 is excellent, 0.63 as very good, 0.55 as good, 
0.45 as fair, and 0.32 as poor. In addition, Bryman and Cramer (1990) state that conventionally variables 
that correlate less than 0.30 with a factor should be excluded from consideration. 
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B) Post-Investment Stage: 
1. Business, Managerial, Technical, and Financial Matters: 
               Business strategy information 
               Technology and market information 
               Supply sources information 
               Managerial and technical staff information 
               Budgets information 
               Management and financial account information 
               Capital structure and investments information 
2. Scientific, Technological, and Entrepreneurialship Matters. 
3. Public policies and institutions Matters. 
[KMO=0.820   Bartlett’s (chi-square)=350.893    
Total variance=65.21%] 
4. Factors of Ideal Relationship: 
               Enhancement of reputation 
               Efficient of risk-sharing 
               Increasing of motivation 
5. Acquiring Liquidity: 
               Write-off 
               Debt (long-term loans) 
6. Maximum return on investment. 
7. Issues of common equity. 
8. Initial public offering (IPO). 
[KMO=0.635   Bartlett’s (chi-square)=305.468    
Total variance=69.63%] 
 
C) Risk Management: 
1. Management Risk: 
               Management risk 
               Monitoring stage 
               Inexperience risk 
2. Cash-out Risk: 
               Cash-out risk 
               Evaluation stage 
               Viability risk 
3. Business Risk: 
               Deal origination and screening 
               Type of business venture 
[KMO=0.822   Bartlett’s (chi-square)=301.955    
Total variance=69.45%] 
4. Market Risk: 
               Many competitors 
               Potential new competitors 
               Small market 
               Unattractiveness of industry 
               Many substitute of products/services 
               Weak demand 
5. Agency Risk (Personal traits): 
                Short-term self-interest seeking 
                Manipulation of profitability 
                Potential dishonesty 
                Contractual ambiguities 
6. Agency Risk: 
               Different cash flow objectives 
               Different profitability objectives  
7. Many ventures to be monitored. 
[KMO=0.642   Bartlett’s (chi-square)=654.642    
Total variance=77.52%] 
 
D). Management Conflict Indicators: 
1. Organization and Management System: 
               Affected corporate strategy 
               Affected organization structure  
               Affected corporate mission and objectives 
               Affected management system 
               Affected incentive and reward system 
2. Control and Decision-making: 
               Affected information and control 
               Affected decision-making process 
3. Financial and Investment Matters: 
 
 
0.916 
0.827 
0.805 
0.770 
0.768 
0.763 
0.741 
0.818 
0.879 
 
 
 
0.829 
0.828 
0.789 
 
0.801 
0.793 
0.710 
0.744 
0.869 
 
 
 
 
 
0.823 
0.776 
0.718 
 
0.838 
0.794 
0.759 
 
0.797 
0.756 
 
 
 
0.802 
0.802 
0.763 
0.753 
0.735 
0.701 
 
0.939 
0.933 
0.879 
0.744 
 
0.934 
0.915 
0.804 
 
 
 
 
 
0.915 
0.873 
0.834 
0.824 
0.724 
 
0.802 
0.797 
 
 
4.991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.893 
1.593 
 
 
3.116 
 
 
 
2.527 
 
 
1.333 
1.651 
1.470 
 
 
 
 
3.063 
 
 
 
2.886 
 
 
 
1.690 
 
 
 
 
4.086 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.585 
 
 
 
 
1.900 
 
 
1.282 
 
 
 
 
4.028 
 
 
 
 
 
3.951 
 
 
3.102 
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               Financial account 
               Budgets 
               Management account 
               Capital structure and investments 
4. Technological and Market Matters: 
               Technology 
               Markets 
               Technical staff 
[KMO=0.694   Bartlett’s (chi-square)=823.663    
Total variance=73.55%] 
0.849 
0.820 
0.819 
0.802 
 
0.875 
0.860 
0.840 
 
 
 
 
2.158 
N=57; KMO=Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy; Bartlett’s Test of sphericity; Significance at 0.000 levels. 
 
Based on the latent factors derived from the R Factor Analysis above, multiple 
regression analysis was used to assess further the relationships between the independent 
and dependent variables.10   In this analysis, each independent variable was regressed 
against the dependent variable in order to identify which had the strongest relationship. 
This analysis also would provide the information on the coefficient of multiple 
determination (R2), which would indicate the strength of each of the independent 
variables in explaining the dependent variable. In order to identify the best model to 
explain the dependent variable, the Stepwise method and Backward elimination 
procedure was used. This procedure initially generates a regression equation which 
includes all the independent variables selected but sequentially removes variables from 
the regression model. Independent variables with the smallest insignificant partial F-test 
are then removed from the model. The remaining variables are then regressed against the 
dependent variable. Thus, this procedure will stop when all the independent variables 
remaining in the model are significant at the pre-specified alpha level. Then, this process 
will produce a model which consists of variables with a significant F-test at the pre-
specified alpha level. 
  
 Based on factors derived above, the magnitudes of relationship were further tested 
with multiple regression analysis. The results of this analysis were illustrated in Figure A 
below.11 ? The combined effect of all variables at pre-investment and post-investment 
stages and for risk management shows that 45%, 29%, and 26% respectively of the 
variance of management conflict experienced by them.12 The association of management 
conflict is explained by the three independent variables of differences in ROMFs at the 
pre-investment and post-investment stages and risk management. Based on the beta 
                                                          
10
 The observations on Durbin-Watson D Statistics, tolerance values, F ratios and T Statistics and their 
significance levels are important in regression analysis. According to Norusis (1983, p. 165), the Durbin-
Watson D Statistics is a measure of residual error autocorrelation and tolerance is a measure of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables tested. Small tolerance values (i.e. closer to 0) will 
create computational problems. Multicollinearity can also be measured based on R2 value. For the results to 
be acceptable, the Durbin-Watson D Statistics should be well within the range of 1.5 to 2.5. According to 
Maddala (1977), the Durbin-Watson D Statistics value is the most crucial as the results of a regression 
cannot be used if it fails to meet this statistics satisfactorily although all other tests, e.g. T, R2, and F values 
are satisfactory. 
11
 Similar to the results of the correlation analysis, the multiple regression results are also not that strong 
statistically. However, these results indicate that the association between ROMFs and management conflict 
did exist. A specific causality test (e.g. Granger’s, Sim’s, SEM, Path analysis, etc.) was not conducted in 
this research. 
12
 These are based on the R2 values. For a more conservative estimate, the adjusted R2 values are as 
follows: 39%, 26% and 23% respectively. Statistically, these adjusted R2 values take into account the 
number of subjects and the number of independent variables involved. 
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coefficients, Business, Managerial, and Finance matters at the post-investment stage have 
the greatest influence with a beta value of 0.484; followed by Screening and Due 
Diligence (beta value of 0.377) at the pre-investment stage; and Agency risks and 
Contractual Ambiguities (beta value of 0.348), and Cash-out risk, Viability risk and 
Evaluation (beta value of 0.310) for risk management. However, the general 
interpretation here is that the association of the differences in ROMFs on management 
conflict is affected by the interaction of these three sets of independent variables. 
 
Figure A: Results of multiple regression analyses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     ???                                                      
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    *Beta coefficients of Stepwise (backward method) of  
      Regression analyses 
 
  
  
 Non-parametric tests were also used to supplement the parametric tests in this 
research. Basically, a non-parametric statistical test is a test whose model does not dictate 
conditions about parameters of the population from which the sample was drawn. This is 
due to most of non-parametric tests assuming the observations were independent and the 
variables under investigation have underlying continuity. Furthermore, these tests do not 
make restrictive assumptions about the shape of a population distribution (i.e. whether it 
is normal curve or other specific shapes) and were applicable to both ordinal and nominal 
data scales too. They also do not require any kind of laborious computation and thus it is 
much easier to do and understand. The tests that were used to identify any significant 
differences in the ROMFs of VCIs and ICTVBs are the Median test, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, the Kruskal-Wallis H test and Mann-Whitney U-test (Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
W test). To investigate the direction and the strength of the relationships between the 
Post-Investment Stage: 
 
 Business, managerial, and finance matters 
(*.484); and 
 
 Scientific, technological, and entrepreneurialism 
matters (*-.234)      
 
[R=0.538; R2=0.289] 
Pre-Investment Stage: 
 
 Screening & due diligence (*.377); 
 
 Product & market criteria (*-.258); and 
 
 Environmental threat resistance criteria (*-.285) 
 
[R=0.674; R2 =0.454] 
Risk Management: 
 
 Agency risks-self-interest, dishonesty, and 
contractual ambiguities (*.348); and 
 
 Cash-out risk, viability risk, and evaluation  
(*.310) 
 
[R=0.511; R2=0.261] 
 
 
 
Management Conflict 
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independent and dependent variables, the Means test and the Spearman Rank Order test 
were also conducted.  
 
5. SUMMARY 
 
 This appendix identifies the methodology approach and justifies the 
statistical tests for this research. It also shows the chronological events of the field study 
conducted for this research. 
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APPENDIX ‘E’ 
 
 
 
February, 2003 
 
 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
 
RE: MR. SOHAIMI BIN MOHD SALLEH (I/C No: 590318-03-5047) 
FIELD STUDY (DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH SURVEY) 
 
I am happy to introduce Mr. Sohaimi bin Mohd Salleh. He is a senior officer in the 
Administrative and Diplomatic Service (ADS) Malaysia, who has been sent by the 
Malaysian Public Services Department to study for his PhD at the Waseda University, 
Japan. He joined the ADS since 1984 and has served the Treasury, Ministry of Finance 
until 2000 prior to his study leave. In the Treasury, he was a Principal Assistant Secretary 
and among his duties were the financial policy, capital market, management and 
supervision of MOF (Inc.) companies. 
 
2. Mr. Sohaimi is currently undertaking and completing his PhD research on venture 
capital financing. I was made to understand that the objective of his research is to study 
the correlationship between the investment practices/procedures and agency problems in 
the financial contracting relationship between venture capital firms ( as principals ) and  
Information & Communication Technology (ICT) companies ( as agents ) operating in 
Malaysia. 
 
3. While this research is being undertaken in pursuit of an academic objective, the 
additional knowledge about venture capital financing in Malaysia could be useful to the 
Government and is a purposeful exercise. I hope you would be kind enough to give your 
assistance and to allow Mr. Sohaimi to gather the relevant information needed for his 
research.? Your cooperation is highly appreciated. Thank you. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
(DATO’ DR. HAJI SHAFIE BIN MOHD SALLEH) 
Deputy Minister of Finance, Malaysia. 
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February 3, 2003 
 
 
 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
 
 
Re: Mr. Sohaimi bin Mohd Salleh (T01A703-7) 
Field Study (Data Collection and Research Survey) 
 
I am writing this letter to confirm that Mr. Sohaimi bin Mohd Salleh is a registered PhD 
candidate working on major research project under our supervision at the Graduate 
School of Global Information and Telecommunication Studies (GITS), Waseda 
University, Japan. The objective of his research is to study the correlationship between 
the investment practices/procedures and agency problems in venture capital financing.  
 
The framework of this study is the so-called an applied Principal-Agent Analysis.  
Among the areas to be covered are the managerial practices at each stage of the venture 
capital financing process, risks management and agency problems in the financial 
contracting relationship between the venture capital firms ( as principals ) and the 
Information & Communication Technology (ICT) companies ( as agents ) operating in 
Malaysia. 
 
We do hope you would provide assistance to Mr. Sohaimi bin Mohd Salleh to carry out 
his research project in Malaysia. 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation.  
 
 
      Yours sincerely, 
 
       
      Toshiharu Kitamura 
      Supervisor, 
      Professor, Waseda University. 
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MINISTRY OF FINANCE, MALAYSIA 
Loan Management & Finance Policy Division,  
Level 5, Center Block, Precinct 2,  
Fed. Government Administrative Center, 
62592 W.P. Putrajaya, Malaysia.  
Tel: 603-8882-3527 Fax: 603-8882-3578                       
 
 
WASEDA UNIVERSITY, JAPAN 
Graduate School of Global Information & 
Telecommunication Studies, 
29-7 Building, 1-3-10 Nishi-Waseda,  
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051, Japan. 
Tel: 81-3-5286-9839   Fax: 81-3-5286-3832 
 
 
A STUDY OF THE INVESTMENT PRACTICES TO MITIGATE 
AGENCY PROBLEMS IN VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING 
 
 
 
 
Survey Questionnaire 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
This Questionnaire is designed to gather information and data about the investment 
practices or procedures to mitigate agency problems in venture capital financing. An 
applied Principal-Agent framework is used for the study and focused on the managerial 
practices in the financial contracting relationship between venture capital firms (as principals) 
and ICT companies (as agents) operating in Malaysia. This will enable us to piece together the 
wonder of venture capital financing from both points of view.   
 
Complete confidentiality is assured with this survey. The information that you provide us 
will be used in an aggregate form only. Individual firm identity and profile will be 
completely anonymous. All information supplied in this Questionnaire will NOT be used 
for any other purposes except those of this research project.   
 
The Questionnaire is divided into five (5) parts as follows: 
Part 1 – Basic Information 
Part 2 – Investment Practices or Procedures 
Part 3 – Risk Management 
Part 4 – Information on Agency Relationship 
Part 5 – General Information 
 
Most of the questions in this survey simply require you to rank or rate by circling the 
appropriate number/answer. Some questions require a few words of explanation. Please 
feel free to make any additional comments anywhere in the Questionnaire that you think it is 
necessary, as your candid personal opinion will greatly enhance the success of this study. In 
normal circumstances, the Questionnaire should take only 45 to 60 minutes of your valuable 
time to complete. Please complete this Questionnaire as incomplete Questionnaire creates 
difficulties for data analysis. 
  
Please return the completed Questionnaire (by using the self addressed and stamped 
envelope provided) at your earliest convenience.    
 
For your co-operation and assistance, thank you very much.  
 
SOHAIMI MOHD SALLEH 
February 2003. 
E-mail add: sohaimimy@yahoo.com  
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FSQN.PRIN.:                  
PART 1: BASIC INFORMATION 
[The following questions seek basic information about your firm.] 
1. Date of incorporation._____________. 
2. Number of employees: 
a. Total_____________.  b.  Venture capital executives______________. 
[For questions 3, 4, 5, and 6, please give a range or estimations.] 
3. Total value of venture capital funds: ( in RM million )  
?  a.  Managed ____________________?? b.  Invested _________________  
?  c.  Available to invest ___________________________  
4. Number of proposals ( per year basis ): 
a. Received ________  b.  Reviewed ________  c.  Invested ________ 
5. How many investees are currently included in your portfolio? ___________ firms 
6. Percentage of equity stake per investment made : 
a. Minimum ____________%      b.  Maximum ____________% 
 
PART 2: INVESTMENT PRACTICES 
[The following questions seek information on managerial practices or procedures at Pre-
Investment stages of the venture capital financing process namely Deal origination and 
Screening, Evaluating, Contracting; and Post-Investment stages namely Monitoring, and 
Acquiring Liquidity.] 
SECTION A: Deal Origination and Screening 
 
7. How does the potential venture proposal brought to your attention? [You may circle one or 
more]. 
a. Active search for deals by your firm. 
b. Cold calls from entrepreneurs. 
c. Through a referral process (e.g. venture capital community, investees, banks etc.) 
d. Other mechanisms (please specify) ________________________________________ 
 
8. When screening a venture proposal, how much importance do you consider the following 
criteria? [Please rate each of them with a circle according to the scale provided 
below]: 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
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Criteria              Rating  
    a. The size of the investment and your investment policy…………. 1    2    3    4     5 
    b. The production technology of the prospective investee………. ...1    2    3    4     5 
    c. The location of the venture………………………………............... 1    2    3    4     5 
    d. The stage of financing required………………………………........ 1    2    3    4     5 
    e. The management team of the prospective investee………......... 1    2    3    4     5 
    f. The markets for products/services of the prospective investee… 1    2    3    4     5 
    g. Other (please specify)………………………………………………. 1    2    3    4     5 
       
SECTION B: Evaluating Venture Proposal 
 
9. How many years ahead do you plan your investment? _________ year(s) 
10. What is the acceptable investment duration for you? ____________ year(s). 
11. In considering a venture proposal, what percentage of Return on Investment (ROI) do you 
regard as acceptable? _____________% 
 
12. If the venture proposal’s ROI marginally lower than the above percentage (Question 11), 
can the proposal still be accepted if it offers long-term prospects? [Please circle either 
one.] 
a. Yes b. No  
 
    If the answer above is ‘YES‘, then what happen to your ROI target? [Please circle                                          
 either one.] 
a. The ROI target rate is temporarily adjusted to suit the proposal. 
b. The ROI target rate is permanently adjusted to suit the proposal. 
c. The ROI target rate is left unadjusted and the decision is an exception. 
 
13. How long does it take on average, to prepare and investigate on a venture proposal before 
making the decision to invest? [Please circle either one.] 
a. Less than three months. 
b. From three to six months. 
c. From six to nine months. 
d. From nine months to one year. 
e. More than one year. 
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14. What sources of due diligence information do you usually use? [Please rank the 
following sources with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
?? Most irrelevant 
?? Irrelevant 
?? Somewhat essential 
?? Essential 
?? Most? essential 
Sources              Ranking  
    a. Carry out own market evaluation……………………………………1    2    3    4     5 
    b. Always obtain independent market reports……………………….. 1    2    3    4     5 
    c. Place great reliance on personal references……………………… 1    2    3    4     5 
    d. Always have independent accountant’s report…......................... 1    2    3    4     5 
    e. Other (please specify)...…………………………………………….. 1    2    3    4     5 
      ____________________________ 
       
15. What evaluation techniques do you usually use to evaluate a venture proposal? [Please 
rank each of the following with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
?? Most irrelevant 
?? Irrelevant 
?? Somewhat essential 
?? Essential 
?? Most essential 
Evaluation Techniques                             Ranking  
 a. Pay-back……………………………………………………….. 1    2    3    4     5 
 b. Internal Rate of Return……………………………………….. 1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Net Present Value……………………………………………. .1    2    3    4     5 
 d. Accounting rate of return………………………………………1    2    3    4     5 
 e. Qualitative assessment………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 f. Other (please specify)…………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 ____________________________ 
 
16. Listed below are evaluation criteria which are associated in evaluating a venture proposal. 
How important do you consider each of them? [Please rate them with a circle according 
to the scale provided below]: 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
Criteria           Rating   
   Market Attractiveness: 
 a. Access to market…………………………………………….. 1    2    3    4     5 
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 b. Market need for products/services…………………………. 1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Size of market.................................................................... 1    2    3    4     5  
 d. Growth potential of market………...................................... 1    2    3    4     5    
Product Differentiation: 
 a. Technical skills................................................................... 1    2    3    4     5  
 b. Profit margins…………………………………………………. 1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Uniqueness of products/services………………………........1    2    3    4     5 
 d. Patentability of products/services……………………………1    2    3    4     5 
Managerial Capabilities: 
 a. Management skills…………………………………………….1    2    3    4     5  
 b. Marketing skills………………………………………………...1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Financial skills………………………………………………….1    2    3    4     5 
 d. References of entrepreneur……………………………….....1    2    3    4     5 
Environmental Threat Resistance: 
 a. Protection from competitive entry……………………………1    2    3    4     5 
 b. Resistance to economic cycles…………………………...... 1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Protection from obsolescence………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 d. Protection against down-side risk…....................................1    2    3    4     5 
   Cash-out Potential: 
 a. Opportunities for exit…………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 b. Merger/Acquisition potential…………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 
17. Please indicate other facts and information you collect about the prospective investees in 
making your decision to invest. 
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION C: Contracting or Deal Structuring. 
 
18. What types of investment instruments do you usually employ when investing in your 
investee firms? [Please rank the following items with a circle according to the scale 
provided below]: 
?? Not preferred at all 
?? Not preferred 
?? Somewhat preferred 
?? Preferred 
?? Most preferred 
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Types of Instruments          Ranking  
 a. Issues of common equity.…………………………… 1    2    3    4     5 
 b. Issues of preferred equity.……………………………1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Debt (short-term loans)...……………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 d. Debt (long-term loans).………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 e. Other (please specify)…………………………………1    2    3    4     5 
_______________________________ 
 
19. In your financial contract agreement with your investees, what are the provisions normally 
included? [Please circle one or more of the following items, where applicable.] 
 
a. Form and terms of investment. 
b. Puts and calls option. 
c. Registration rights. 
d. Go-along rights. 
e. Preemptive rights and right of first refusal. 
f. Information rights. 
g. Option pool, vesting schedules and buy-back provisions. 
h. Board structure and Employment contracts. 
i. Other (please specify)_________________________________ 
 
SECTION D: Monitoring and Post-investment Activities. 
 
20. Which of the following types of monitoring of your investees that you prefer the most? 
[Please circle either one.] 
a. Specific contractual monitoring (e.g. legally defined). 
b. Non-contractual monitoring (e.g. trust or understanding). 
c. Both of the above.  
 
21. How do you maintain your relationships with your investees? [Please circle one or more 
of the following items, where applicable.] 
 
a. Directors/management staff of our firm held executive position in the investee firms. 
b. We provide management consulting services. 
c. We provide marketing assistance services. 
d. Personal relationships with the investee firms. 
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e. We require periodic reports from the investee firms. 
f. We limit our involvement to provision of capital funds only. 
g. Other (please specify)_________________________________________________ 
 
22. Listed below are types of information and advice/contact usually offered by venture 
capital firms to their investees. [Please rate each of them with a circle according to the 
scale provided below]: 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
Information/Advice/Contact          Rating   
 a. Business/entrepreneurialship advice and information………1    2    3    4     5 
 b. Tax and legal matters…………………………………….........1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Personnel and recruitment policy……………………………...1    2    3    4     5 
 d. Public policies and institutions…………………………………1    2    3    4     5 
 e. Current scientific/technological development information…..1    2    3    4     5 
 f. Other (please specify)……………………………………………1    2    3    4     5  
__________________________________ 
 
23. Below is a list of categories of information that may be required by you FROM YOUR 
INVESTEES. [Please rank each of them with a circle according to the scale provided 
below]: 
?? Not applicable at all 
?? Not applicable 
?? Somewhat applicable 
?? Applicable 
?? Most applicable 
Category of Information           Ranking  
    a. Technology and market………………………………………......... 1    2    3    4     5 
    b. Managerial and technical staff……………………………………...1    2    3    4     5 
    c. Budgets………………………………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
    d. Capital structure and investments……………………………....... 1    2    3    4     5 
    e. Business strategy………………………………………………....... 1    2    3    4     5 
    f. Management and financial accounts…………………………........ 1    2    3    4     5 
    g. Supply sources…………………………………………………....... 1    2    3    4     5 
    h. Other (please specify)..………………………………………......... 1    2    3    4     5 
 _____________________________ 
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24. Listed below are factors in determining the ideal relationship with your investees.                                
[Please rate each of them with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
 
  Factors              Rating   
 a. Maximum Return on investment rate………………….1    2    3    4     5  
 b. Appropriate capital structure………………………….. 1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Efficient risk-sharing……………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 d. Free sharing of information……………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 e. Increasing of your motivation…………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 f. Enhancement of your reputation………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 g. Other (please specify).....……………………………….1    2    3    4     5 
    ___________________________ 
 
SECTION E: Acquiring Liquidity 
 
25. The following is a list of methods for acquiring liquidity (i.e. sale of investment). [Please 
rank each of them with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
?? Not preferred at all 
?? Not preferred 
?? Somewhat preferred 
?? Preferred 
?? Most preferred 
Methods      ??  ? Ranking  
 a. Initial public offering…………………………………………... 1    2    3    4     5  
 b. Mergers and acquisitions…………………………………….. 1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Secondary sale………………………………………………....1    2    3    4     5 
 d. Buy-back…………………………………………………………1    2    3    4     5 
 e. Write-off……………………………………………………….....1    2    3    4     5 
 f. Other (please specify)………………………………………......1    2    3    4     5 
___________________________ 
 
PART 3: RISK MANAGEMENT 
[The following questions seek information on risk management practices.] 
  
26. What type of business venture you prefer the most? [Please circle either one.] 
 a. High-risk  b. Medium-risk  c. Low-risk 
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27. In terms of overall risk management of a venture, how do you rate the following risks 
listed below based on its strategic importance to you? [Please rate each of them with a 
circle according to the scale provided below]: 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
 
Types of Risk                                   Rating  
a. Management risk (e.g. less effort, not articulate, unfamiliar )................1    2    3    4     5 
b. Inexperience risk (e.g. poor leadership and track record)………………1    2    3    4     5 
c. Competitive risk (e.g. low growth rate, return in………………………….1    2    3    4     5 
longer time, unanticipated competition) 
d. Viability risk (e.g. no product protection, industry not …………………..1    2    3    4     5 
familiar, no prototype developed) 
e. Cash-out risk………………………………………………………………...1    2    3    4     5 
 (e.g. not highly liquid, product has no market acceptance) 
 
28. How do you view the following statement in terms of Market risks (i.e. could be caused to 
unforeseen competitive conditions) and Agency risks (i.e. could be caused by the 
divergent interests of investors and investees)?? “IF THIS MATTER IS NOT ADDRESS 
PROPERLY, IT COULD CAUSE MY INVESTMENT IN A VENTURE TO LOSE MONEY”. 
[Please rate each of the following items with a circle according to the scale provided 
below]: 
?? Strongly disagree ( i.e. problem is completely manageable ) 
?? Disagree ( i.e. problem is largely manageable ) 
?? No opinion ( i.e. neither agree nor disagree ) 
?? Agree ( i.e. problem will cause venture to lose money ) 
?? Strongly agree ( i.e. problem could result in bankruptcy ) 
 
Market Risks:         ??           ?         Rating  
 a. Unattractiveness of the industry………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 b. Weak demand…………………………………………………….1    2    3    4     5 
 c. Small market………………………………………………………1    2    3    4     5  
 d. Many competitors…………………………………………………1    2    3    4     5 
 e. Many potential new competitors……………………………......1    2    3    4     5 
 f. Technical obsolescence…………………………………............1    2    3    4     5  
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 g. Many substitute products/services…………………………....1    2    3    4     5 
 h. Other  (please specify)……………………………………….…1    2    3    4     5 
 ____________________________  
Agency Risks: 
 a. Investees and venture capitalists having……..………………1    2    3    4     5   
  different cash flow objective. 
 b. Investees and venture capitalists having……..………………1    2    3    4     5 
    different objectives for profitability. 
 c. Many ventures to be monitored……………………….……….1    2    3    4     5 
 d. Contractual ambiguities…………………………………………1    2    3    4     5 
 e. Manipulation of profitability……………………………….........1    2    3    4     5 
 f. Short-term self-interest seeking…………………………..........1    2    3    4     5 
 g. Potential dishonesty……………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
 h. Other (please specify)……………………………………..........1    2    3    4     5    
 _______________________________ 
 
PART 4: INFORMATION ON AGENCY RELATIONSHIP 
[The following questions seek information on agency problems ( i.e. problems related to 
the managing of your business ventures e.g. sorting problems, agency costs, operating-
cost problems etc.) in your relationship with your investees.] 
 
29. Listed below is a list of areas of expertise required to the managing of your venture 
businesses. How would you rate your expertise (i.e. knowledgeable) in each area against 
your investees? [Please rate each of them with a circle according to the scale provided 
below]: 
 
?? Very poor 
?? Poor 
?? Neither good nor poor 
?? Good 
?? Very good 
 
Areas of Expertise     ??            ?        Rating  
    a. Technology………………………………………………………….......1    2    3    4     5 
    b. Markets…………………………………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
    c. Managerial staff…………………………………………………….......1    2    3    4     5  
    d. Technical staff…………………………………………………….……..1    2    3    4     5 
    e. Budgets………………………………………………………….............1    2    3    4     5        
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    f. Capital structure and investments…………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
    g. Business strategy……………………………………………….. ….1    2    3    4     5 
    h. Management account………………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
    i. Financial account..…………………………………………………... 1    2    3    4     5 
    j. Supply sources………………………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5     
    k. Other (please specify)……………………………………………… 1    2    3    4     5            
      ______________________________   
 
30. Listed below is a list of management elements. To what extent is your involvement affects 
these elements of your investee firms? [Please rate each of them with a circle by using 
the scale provided below]: 
 
?? Little or no influence 
?? Some influence 
?? Quite a bit of influence 
?? A great deal of influence 
?? A very great deal of influence 
 
Management Elements     ?    ?? Rating  
    a. Corporate mission and objectives……………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
    b. Corporate strategy………………………………………………….......1    2    3    4     5 
    c. Organization structure…………………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
    d. Management system……………………………………………….......1    2    3    4     5 
    e. Decision-making process……………………………………………….1    2    3    4     5 
    f. Information and control…………………………………………………..1    2    3    4     5 
    g. Incentive and reward system…………………………………………...1    2    3    4     5 
    h. Other (please specify)…………………………………………………...1    2    3    4     5 
 _____________________________ 
  
31. To what extent do you think that you have experienced agency problems with your 
investees? [Please circle either one.] 
a. Never 
b. Rarely 
c. Sometimes 
d. Often/constantly 
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32. Overall, how would you rate the importance of your investment practices/procedures at 
each financing stages to the agency problems’ mitigation efforts (i.e. can limit or modify 
your exposure to agency problems with your investees)? [Please rate each of the following 
with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
 
Practices/Procedures at:    ??  ?? Rating     
?   a. Deal Origination & Screening stage……………………………….…1    2    3    4     5 
      b. Evaluation stage……………………………………………................1    2    3    4     5 
      c. Contracting & Deal Structuring stage…………………………..........1    2    3    4     5 
      d. Monitoring & Post-Investment stage…………………………………1    2    3    4     5 
      e. Overall Risk Management…………………………………................1    2    3    4     5 
 
PART 5: GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
33.  What are your expectations for the future of the venture capital industry in Malaysia? 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
34. What should the Government do to encourage faster growth in private investment, 
particularly for venture capital industry? 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
35. What should the Government do to further assist venture capital firms operating in Malaysia? 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
As a token of our appreciation for your kind assistance, we would like to send you a copy of 
summary of the results of this research. Could you please provide us with your address: 
 
 Mail to : 
 
 
 [THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR KIND COOPERATION] 
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APPENDIX ‘F’ 
 
 
 
February, 2003 
 
 
 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
 
 
RE: MR. SOHAIMI BIN MOHD SALLEH (I/C No: 590318-03-5047) 
FIELD STUDY (DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH SURVEY) 
 
I am happy to introduce Mr. Sohaimi bin Mohd Salleh. He is a senior officer in the 
Administrative and Diplomatic Service (ADS) Malaysia, who has been sent by the 
Malaysian Public Services Department to study for his PhD at the Waseda University, 
Japan. He joined the ADS since 1984 and has served the Treasury, Ministry of Finance 
until 2000 prior to his study leave. In the Treasury, he was a Principal Assistant Secretary 
and among his duties were the financial policy, capital market, management and 
supervision of MOF (Inc.) companies. 
 
2. Mr. Sohaimi is currently undertaking and completing his PhD research on venture 
capital financing. I was made to understand that the objective of his research is to study 
the correlationship between the investment practices/procedures and agency problems in 
the financial contracting relationship between venture capital firms ( as principals ) and  
Information & Communication Technology (ICT) companies ( as agents ) operating in 
Malaysia. 
 
3. While this research is being undertaken in pursuit of an academic objective, the 
additional knowledge about venture capital financing in Malaysia could be useful to the 
Government and is a purposeful exercise. I hope you would be kind enough to give your 
assistance and to allow Mr. Sohaimi to gather the relevant information needed for his 
research.? Your cooperation is highly appreciated. Thank you. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
(DATO’ DR. HAJI SHAFIE BIN MOHD SALLEH) 
Deputy Minister of Finance, Malaysia. 
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February 3, 2003 
 
 
 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
 
 
Re: Mr. Sohaimi bin Mohd Salleh (T01A703-7) 
Field Study (Data Collection and Research Survey) 
 
I am writing this letter to confirm that Mr. Sohaimi bin Mohd Salleh is a registered PhD 
candidate working on major research project under our supervision at the Graduate 
School of Global Information and Telecommunication Studies (GITS), Waseda 
University, Japan. The objective of his research is to study the correlationship between 
the investment practices/procedures and agency problems in venture capital financing.  
 
The framework of this study is the so-called an applied Principal-Agent Analysis.  
Among the areas to be covered are the managerial practices at each stage of the venture 
capital financing process, risks management and agency problems in the financial 
contracting relationship between the venture capital firms ( as principals ) and the 
Information & Communication Technology (ICT) companies ( as agents ) operating in 
Malaysia. 
 
We do hope you would provide assistance to Mr. Sohaimi bin Mohd Salleh to carry out 
his research project in Malaysia. 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation.  
 
 
      Yours sincerely, 
 
       
      Toshiharu Kitamura 
      Supervisor, 
      Professor, Waseda University. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
This Questionnaire is designed to gather information and data about the investment 
practices or procedures to mitigate agency problems in venture capital financing. An 
applied Principal-Agent framework is used for the study and focused on the managerial 
practices in the financial contracting relationship between venture capital firms (as principals) 
and ICT companies (as agents) operating in Malaysia. This will enable us to piece together the 
wonder of venture capital financing from both points of view.  
 
Complete confidentiality is assured with this survey. The information that you provide us 
will be used in an aggregate form only. Individual firm identity and profile will be 
completely anonymous. All information supplied in this Questionnaire will NOT be used 
for any other purposes except those of this research project.  
 
The Questionnaire is divided into five (5) parts as follows: 
Part 1 – Basic Information 
Part 2 – Investment Practices or Procedures 
Part 3 – Risk Management 
Part 4 – Information on Agency Relationship 
Part 5 – General Information 
 
Most of the questions in this survey simply require you to rank or rate by circling the 
appropriate number/answer. Some questions require a few words of explanation. Please 
feel free to make any additional comments anywhere in the Questionnaire that you think it is 
necessary, as your candid personal opinion will greatly enhance the success of this study. In 
normal circumstances, the Questionnaire should take only 45 to 60 minutes of your valuable 
time to complete. Please complete this Questionnaire as incomplete Questionnaire creates 
difficulties for data analysis. 
  
Please return the completed Questionnaire (by using the self addressed and stamped envelope 
provided) at your earliest convenience.    
 
For your co-operation and assistance, thank you very much.  
 
SOHAIMI MOHD SALLEH 
February 2003. 
E-mail add: sohaimimy@yahoo.com 
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???????????????????????????? FSQN.AGEN.:      ??????  
PART 1: BASIC INFORMATION 
[The following questions seek basic information about your firm.] 
1. Date of incorporation._____________. 
2. Number of employees: a. Total________.  b. Technical staff __________. 
3. Which is your main line of business? [You may circle one or more.] 
a. Computer/System Security.  
  
b. System Integration.  
  
c. Telecommunications/Networking. 
  
d. Data Centre/Support Centre/Heavy User.
  
e. Software Development – Engineering & 
Specialized Business Applications. 
f. Internet-based Business – Application 
Service Providers; E-Commerce Solution 
Providers; Web Hosting & Web On-line ???
Publishing. 
g. Consultancy. 
h. Content Development. 
i. Education and Training. 
j. Hardware Design/Electronics. 
k. Life Sciences/Biotechnologies. 
l. Production/Post-Production/Animation.
[For questions 4, 5, and 6 below, please give a range or estimations.] 
4. What is the size of your business (in RM million) in terms of: 
a. Annual sales _____________ 
b. Net assets (i.e. fixed assets + current assets – liabilities) _______________________ 
5. What is your current debt/equity ratio (i.e. your debt or loan capital divided by your equity or 
share capital)? _______________ 
6. What is your current Rate of return (i.e. net profit after tax divided by total owners’ capital 
employed including reserves and retained profits)? _____________ %. 
 
PART 2: INVESTMENT PRACTICES 
[The following questions seek information on managerial practices or procedures at Pre-
Investment stages of the venture capital financing process namely Deal origination and Screening, 
Evaluating, Contracting; and Post-Investment stages namely Monitoring, and Acquiring Liquidity.] 
SECTION A: Deal Origination and Screening 
7. How do you bring your venture proposal to the venture capital investors’ attention? [You may 
circle one or more]. 
a. Cold calls to them directly. 
b. Through a referral process (e.g. venture capital community, investees, banks etc.) 
c. Other mechanisms (please specify) ________________________________________ 
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8. When preparing your venture proposal, how much importance do you consider the 
following criteria? [Please rate each of them with a circle according to the scale provided 
below]: 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
Criteria              Rating   
    a. The size of the investment and your investment policy……. …….1    2    3    4    5 
    b. The production technology involved………………………….. …….1    2    3    4    5 
    c. The location of the venture………………………………..................1    2    3    4    5 
    d. The stage of financing required………………………………...........1    2    3    4    5 
    e. Your management team and the track record……….....................1    2    3    4    5 
    f. The markets for products/services…………………………………....1    2    3    4    5 
?  g. Other (please specify)………………………………………………...1    2    3    4    5 
       
SECTION B: Evaluating Venture Proposal 
[For questions 9, 10, and 11, please give a range or estimations.] 
9. How many years ahead do you plan your venture proposal? _________ year(s) 
 
10. In your venture proposal, what percentage of Return on Investment (ROI) do you usually 
forecast? _____________% 
 
11. What is the acceptable investment duration for you? ____________ year(s). 
 
12. How long does it take on average, to prepare and negotiate on a venture proposal before 
the decision to invest was made by your venture capital investor? [Please circle either one.] 
a. Less than three months. 
b. From three to six months. 
c. From six to nine months. 
d. From nine months to one year. 
e. More than one year. 
 
13. What sources of due diligence information do you usually use in your venture proposal? 
[Please rank each of the following with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
 
?? Most irrelevant 
?? Irrelevant 
?? Somewhat essential 
?? Essential 
?? Most essential 
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Sources                        Ranking  
    a. Carry out own market evaluation………………………………….1     2     3     4     5       
    b. Always obtain independent market reports………………….......1     2     3     4     5 
    c. Place great reliance on personal references……………………..1     2     3     4     5 
    d. Always have independent accountant’s report…........................1     2     3     4     5 
     (Management accounting adviser) 
    e. Other (please specify)………………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
      _____________________________ 
 
14. What evaluation techniques do you usually use in your venture proposal? [Please rank 
each of the following with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
?? Most irrelevant 
?? Irrelevant 
?? Somewhat essential 
?? Essential 
? Most essential
 Evaluation Techniques                               Ranking  
a. Pay-back……………………………………………………….....1     2     3    4     5 
b.   Internal Rate of Return………………………………………….1     2     3     4    5  
c.   Net Present Value……………………………………………….1     2     3     4    5 
d.   Accounting rate of return……………………………………….1     2     3     4    5 
e.   Qualitative assessment…………………………………………1     2     3     4    5 
f.    Other (please specify)…………………………………………..1     2     3     4    5 
 ___________________________ 
 
15. Listed below are suggested evaluation criteria for a venture proposal. How important do 
you consider each of them? [Please rate them with a circle according to the scale provided 
below]: 
 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
? Very important
Criteria             Rating  
   Market Attractiveness: 
 a. Access to market……………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
 b. Market need for products/services……………………........1     2     3     4     5 
 c. Size of market....................................................................1     2     3     4     5 
 d. Growth potential of market………......................................1     2     3     4     5 
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   Product Differentiation: 
 a. Technical skills.......................................................................1    2    3    4    5 
 b. Profit margins.……………………………………………………1    2    3    4    5 
 c. Uniqueness of products/services.………………………..........1    2    3    4    5 
 d. Patentability of products/services……………………………...1    2    3    4    5 
   Managerial Capabilities: 
 a. Management skills………………………………………….......1    2    3    4    5 
 b. Marketing skills…………………………………………………..1    2    3    4    5 
 c. Financial skills……………………………………………………1    2    3    4    5 
 d. References of investor…….……………………………………1    2    3    4    5 
   Environmental Threat Resistance: 
 a. Protection from competitive entry…………………………......1    2    3    4    5 
 b. Resistance to economic cycles………………………….........1    2    3    4    5 
 c. Protection from obsolescence………………………………….1    2    3    4    5 
 d. Protection against down-side risk…......................................1    2    3    4    5 
   Cash-out Potential: 
 a. Opportunities for exit……………………………………………1    2    3    4    5 
 b. Merger/Acquisition potential……………………………………1    2    3    4    5 
 
16. Please indicate other facts and information you give to the venture capital investor in order 
to support your venture proposal. 
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION C: Contracting or Deal Structuring. 
17. What types of investment instruments do you usually prefer for the venture capital 
investor to invest in your firm? [Please rank the following items according to the scale 
provided below]: 
?? Not preferred at all 
?? Not preferred 
?? Somewhat preferred 
?? Preferred 
?? Most preferred 
 Types of Instruments                            Rating   
a. Issues of common equity……………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
b.  Issues of preferred equity……………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
c.  Debt ( short-term loans )………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
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d.  Debt ( long-term loans )……………………………………....1     2     3     4     5 
e.  Other  (please specify)………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
 __________________________ 
 
18. In your financial contract agreement with the venture capital investor, what are the 
provisions normally included? [Please circle one or more of the following items, where 
applicable.] 
a. Form and terms of investment. 
b. Puts and calls option. 
c. Registration rights. 
d. Go-along rights. 
e. Preemptive rights and right of first refusal. 
f. Information rights. 
g. Option pool, vesting schedules and buy-back provisions. 
h. Board structure and Employment contracts. 
i. Other (please specify) ______________________________________
 
SECTION D: Monitoring and Post-investment Activities. 
19. Which of the following types of monitoring by your venture capital investor do you prefer the 
most? [Please circle either one]: 
a. Specific contractual monitoring (e.g. legally defined). 
b. Non-contractual monitoring (e.g. trust or understanding). 
c. Both of the above. 
 
20. How do you maintain your relationship with your venture capital investor? [Please circle 
one or more of the following items, where applicable.] 
a. We allow their Directors/management staffs to hold executive position in our firm. 
b. We require management consulting services from them. 
c. We require marketing assistance services from them. 
d. We maintain personal relationships with them. 
e. We submit periodic reports to them. 
f. We limit our involvement to provision of capital funds only. 
g. Other (please specify)____________________________________ 
 
21. Listed below are types of information and advice/contact usually offered by venture 
capital investors to their investees. [Please rate each of them with a circle according to the 
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scale provided below]: 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
 Information/Advice/Contact                  Rating                
a. Business/entrepreneurialship advice & information………….1     2     3     4     5 
b. Tax and legal matters……………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
c. Personnel and recruitment policy………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
d. Public policies and institutions………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
e. Current scientific/technological development information……1     2     3     4     5 
f.  Other (please specify)……………………………………….......1     2     3     4     5  
__________________________________ 
 
22. Below is a list of categories of information that may be required by your venture capital 
investor FROM YOU. [Please rank each of them with a circle according to the scale 
provided below]: 
?? Not applicable at all 
?? Not applicable 
?? Somewhat applicable 
?? Applicable 
? Most applicable
Category of Information           Ranking  
    a. Technology and markets…………………………………….........1     2     3     4     5 
    b. Managerial and technical staff.……………………………….......1     2     3     4     5 
    c. Budgets………………………………………………………….......1     2     3     4     5 
    d. Capital structure and investments…………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
    e. Business strategy……………………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
    f. Management and financial accounts………………………….......1     2     3     4     5 
    g. Supply sources………………………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
    h. Other (please specify)..……………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
 _____________________________ 
 
23. Listed below are factors in determining the ideal relationship with your venture capital 
investor. [Please rate each of them with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
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 Factors                        Rating  
   a. Maximum Return on investment…………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
   b. Appropriate capital structure……………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
   c. Efficient risk-sharing…………………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
   d. Free sharing of information…………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
   e. Increasing of your motivation………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
   f. Enhancement of your reputation……………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
   g. Other (please specify)..……………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
     _____________________________ 
 
SECTION E: Acquiring Liquidity. 
24. The following is a list of methods for acquiring liquidity (i.e. sale of investment). [Please 
rank each of them with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
?? Not preferred at all 
?? Not preferred 
?? Somewhat preferred 
?? Preferred 
? Most preferred
 Methods       Ranking    
a. Initial public offering……………………………………………….1     2     3     4     5  
b. Mergers and acquisitions…………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
c. Secondary sale…………………………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
d. Buy-back……………………………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
e. Write-off………………………………………………………........1     2     3     4     5 
f.  Other  (please specify)……………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
 ___________________________ 
 
PART 3: RISK MANAGEMENT 
[The following questions seek information on risk management practices.]  
25. What type of business venture can your firm be considered as? [Please circle either one.] 
 a.  High-risk.  b.  Medium-risk. c.  Low-risk. 
 
26. In terms of overall risk management of a venture, how do you rate the following risks 
listed below based on its strategic importance to you? [Please rate each of them with a circle 
according to the scale provided below]: 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
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 Types of Risk                                  Rating                
a.  Management risk (e.g. reacts to risk badly,………………......1     2     3     4     5  
 less effort, not articulate, unfamiliar) 
       b.  Inexperience risk (e.g. poor leadership & track record)..…….1     2     3     4     5 
       c.  Competitive risk (e.g. low growth rate, good return………......1     2     3     4     5 
 only in longer time, unanticipated competition) 
d. Viability risk (e.g. no product protection,………………………1     2     3     4     5 
 industry not familiar, no prototype developed) 
e. Cash-out risk (e.g. not highly liquid, product………………….1     2     3     4     5  
 has no market acceptance) 
 
27. How do you view the following statement in terms of Market risks (i.e. could be caused to 
unforeseen competitive conditions) and Agency risks (i.e. could be caused by the divergent 
interests of the venture capital investors and investees).  
 
“IF THIS MATTER IS NOT ADDRESSED PROPERLY, IT COULD CAUSE MY VENTURE 
TO LOSE MONEY”.  
[Please rate each of the following items with a circle according to the scale provided 
below]: 
?? Strongly disagree ( i.e. problem is completely manageable ) 
?? Disagree ( i.e. problem is largely manageable ) 
?? No opinion ( i.e. neither agree nor disagree ) 
?? Agree ( i.e. problem will cause venture to lose money ) 
?? Strongly agree ( i.e. problem could result in bankruptcy ) 
 
 Type of Risk                               Rating           
Market Risks: 
 a. Unattractiveness of the industry……………………………1     2     3    4    5 
 b. Weak demand………………………………………………..1     2     3    4    5 
 c. Small market………………………………………………….1     2     3    4    5 
 d. Many competitors…………………………………………….1     2     3    4    5 
 e. Many potential new competitors…………………………….1     2     3    4    5 
 f. Technical obsolescence………………………………….......1     2     3    4    5 
 g. Many substitute products/services………………………….1     2     3    4    5 
 h. Other (please specify)..………………………………………1     2     3    4    5 
   ____________________________  
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Agency Risks: 
 a. Investees and venture capitalists having…….……………1     2     3    4    5 
   different cash flow objective. 
 b. Investees and venture capitalists having…….……………1     2     3    4    5 
   different objectives for profitability. 
 c. Many ventures to be monitored…………………………….1     2     3    4    5 
 d. Contractual ambiguities……………………………………..1     2     3    4    5 
 e. Manipulation of profitability……………………………….....1     2     3    4    5 
 f. Short-term self-interest seeking…………………………......1     2     3    4    5 
 g. Potential dishonesty……………………………………….....1     2     3    4    5 
 h. Other (please specify)…………………………………….....1     2     3    4    5 
   ____________________________ 
 
 
PART 4: INFORMATION ON AGENCY RELATIONSHIP 
[The following questions seek information on agency problems (i.e. problems related to 
the managing of your venture e.g. sorting problems, agency costs, operating-cost 
problems etc.) in your agency relationship with your venture capital investor.] 
 
28. Listed below is a list of areas of expertise required to the managing of your venture 
business. How would you rate your expertise (i.e. knowledgeable) in each area against your 
venture capital investor? [Please rate each of them with a circle according to the scale 
provided below]: 
?? Very poor 
?? Poor 
?? Neither good nor poor 
?? Good 
?? Very good 
Areas of Expertise                            Rating   
    a. Technology………………………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
    b. Markets……………………………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
    c. Managerial staff…………………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5  
    d. Technical staff…………………………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
    e. Budgets…………………………………………………………...1     2     3     4     5         
    f. Capital structure and investments………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
    g. Business strategy………………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
    h. Management account……………………………………………1     2     3     4     5 
    i. Financial account..………………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
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    j. Supply sources……………………………………………………1     2     3     4     5     
    k. Other (please specify)…………………………………………...1     2     3     4     5            
      ______________________________   
   
29. Listed below is a list of management elements. To what extent is the involvement of your 
venture capital investor affects you in these elements? [Please rate each of them with a circle 
by using the scale provided below]: 
?? Little or no influence 
?? Some influence 
?? Quite a bit of influence 
?? A great deal of influence 
?? A very great deal of influence 
Management Elements            Rating  
    a. Corporate mission and objectives………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
    b. Corporate strategy…………………………………………………...1     2     3     4     5 
    c. Organization structure……………………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
    d. Management system………………………………………………...1     2     3     4     5 
    e. Decision-making process……………………………………...........1     2     3     4     5 
    f. Information and control……………………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
    g. Incentive and reward system………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
    h. Other (please specify)………………………………………………..1     2     3     4     5 
??? _____________________________ 
  
30. To what extent do you think that you have experienced agency problems with your venture 
capital investor? [Please circle either one.] 
a. Never 
b. Rarely 
c. Sometimes 
d. Often/constantly
 
31. Overall, how would you rate the importance of your investment practices/procedures at 
each financing stages to the agency problems’ mitigation efforts (i.e. can limit or modify your 
exposure to agency problems with your venture capital investor)? [Please rate each of the 
following with a circle according to the scale provided below]: 
?? Not important at all 
?? Not important 
?? Somewhat important 
?? Important 
?? Very important 
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Practices/Procedures at:     Rating     
?   a. Deal Origination & Screening stage……………………………..1      2      3     4     5 
      b. Evaluation stage………………………………………….............1      2      3     4     5 
      c. Contracting & Deal Structuring stage……………………………1      2      3     4     5 
      d. Monitoring & Post-Investment stage…………………………….1      2      3     4     5 
      e. Overall Risk Management………………………………….........1      2      3     4     5 
 
32. Generally, how would you rate the importance of the venture capital investor to the fortunes 
of your firm? [Please circle either one.]  
 
a. Not important at all. 
b. Not so important. 
c. Slightly important. 
d. Important. 
e. Very important.  
 
PART 5: GENERAL INFORMATION 
33. What are your expectations for the future of the venture capital industry in Malaysia? 
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. What should the Government do to encourage faster growth in private investment, 
particularly for venture capital industry? 
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. What should the Government do to further assist entrepreneurial ICT companies operating 
in Malaysia? 
??????????????????????????????????????????
?__????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????  
 
As a token of our appreciation for your kind assistance, we would like to send you a copy of 
summary of the results of this research. Could you please provide us with your address: 
 Mail to : 
 
 
[THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR KIND COOPERATION] 
  
  
182 
REFERENCES 
 
Abdulai, D.N. (2000). “Moving towards a knowledge-based economy: The road  ahead 
 for Malaysia” in D. N. Abdulai, (ed.), Malaysia and the K-economy. Kuala 
 Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications.  
 
Abetti, P. A., Masaki, K., and Rice, M. P. (2000). “Emerging trends in the Japanese 
 venture capital industry”. Institutional Investor Journals: The Journal of 
 Private Equity, Winter, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 39 – 49. 
 
Ackoff, R. L. (1981). Creating the corporate future: Plan or be planned for. New York: 
 John Wiley & Sons.  
 
Admati, A.R. and Pfleiderer, P. (1994). “Robust financial contracting and the role of 
 venture capitalists”. The Journal of Finance, Vol. XLIX, No. 2, June, pp. 371 
 – 402. 
 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). “The market for “lemons”: Qualitative uncertainty and the 
 market mechanism”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, pp. 488 – 500. 
 
Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1972). “Production, information costs and economic 
 organization”. American Economic Review, Vol. 62, pp. 777 – 795. 
 
Alexander, J. G. (2000). “Finding capital for technology start-ups”. The Industrial 
 Physicist, American Institute of Physics, October, pp. 31 – 34. 
 
Amar, V. B. (2000). New businesses. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Amit, R., Glosten, L. and Muller, E. (1990). “Entrepreneurial ability, venture 
 investments, and risk sharing”. Management Science, Vol. 36, pp. 1232 –  1245. 
 
Andrews, K. R. (1971). The concept of corporate strategy. Homewood, Illinois: Dow 
 Jones Irwin Inc.   
 
Ansoff, H. I. (1965). Corporate strategy. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company Inc.  
 
Ariff, M. and Lim C. C. (2001). “Mobilising domestic and external resources for 
 economic development: Lessons from the Malaysian experience”.    Asia-Pacific 
 Development Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, June, pp. 41 – 68. 
 
Ayres, I. and Cramton, P. (1994). “Relational investing and agency theory”. Cardozo 
 Law Review, Vol. 15, p. 1033. 
 
Bank Negara Malaysia [BNM] (1999). The central bank and the financial system in 
 Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: BNM, pp. 540 – 544. 
 
______________. Annual reports. Kuala Lumpur: BNM.  
 
  
  
183 
Barney, J. B., Busenitz, L. W., Fiet, J. O. and Moesel, D. (1989). “The structure of 
 venture capital governance: An organizational economic analysis of 
 relations between venture capital firms and new ventures”. Academy of 
 Management Proceedings, pp. 64 – 68. 
 
______________(1996). “The substitution of bonding for monitoring in venture 
 capitalist relations with high technology enterprises”. Journal of High 
 Technology Management Research, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 91 – 105. 
 
Barry, C. B., Muscarella, C. J., Peavy III, J. W. and Vetsuypens, M. R. (1990). “The 
 role of venture capital in the creation of public companies”. Journal of 
 Financial Economic, Vol. 27, pp. 447 – 471. 
 
Baumol, W. J. (1959). Business behaviour, value and growth. New York: MacMillan.  
 
______________(1977). Economic theory and operations analysis. London, 
 Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice/Hall International, Inc., Fourth 
 Edition.  
 
Beed, C. S. (1972). “The separation of ownership and control” in M. Gilbert (ed.), The 
 Modern Business Enterprise. Penguin Book. 
 
Berglof, E. (1994). “A control theory of venture capital finance”. Journal of Law, 
 Economics, and Organization, Vol. 10, pp. 247 – 267. 
 
Berle, A. J. and Means, G. C. (1967). The modern corporation and private property. 
 New York: Hartcourt Brace and World. 
 
Bernanke, B. and Gertler, M. (1989). “Agency costs, net worth, and business 
 fluctuations”. American Economic Review, Vol. 79, pp. 14 – 31. 
 
Black, B. S. and Gilson, R. J. (1998). “Venture capital and the structure of capital 
 markets: Banks versus stock markets”. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
 47, pp. 243 – 277. 
 
Boeker, W. (1997). “Strategic change: The influence of managerial characteristics and 
 organizational growth”. The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1, 
 pp. 152 – 170. 
 
Boocock, G. and Ismail, A. W. (1997). “The financing practices and problems of 
 growth-oriented small firms in Malaysia”. Journal of International Business & 
 Entrepreneurship, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 1 – 28. 
 
Bromiley, P. (1986). Corporate capital investment: A behavioural approach. New York: 
 Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bryman, A. (2001). Social research methods. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
  
  
184 
Bryman, A. and Cramer, D. (1990). Quantitative data analysis for social scientist, 
 Routledge. 
 
______________(2001). Quantitative data analysis with SPSS Release 10 for 
 Windows: A guide for social scientist. Routledge. 
 
Burns, R. B. (2000). Introduction to research methods. Sage Publications. 
 
Busenitz, L. W., Moesel, D. D. and Fiet, J. O. (1997). “The impact of post-funding 
 involvement by venture capitalists on long-term performance outcomes”. A 
 Paper presented at the Babson College-Kauffman Foundation Research 
 Conference. Babson College, Babson Park, Mass., April, pp. 16 – 19. 
 
Carleton, W. T. (1986). “Issues and questions involving venture capital” in G. 
 Libecup, (ed.), Advances in the study of entrepreneurship, innovation, and 
 economic growth: A research annual, Volume 1, pp. 59 – 70. JAI Press Inc. 
 
Chakravarthy, B. S. and Lorange, P. (1991). Managing the strategy process: A 
 framework for a multibusiness firm.  Prentice Hall International. 
 
Chan, H. W. (1999). Singapore – The preferred base for venture capital. An empirical 
 study on the determinants of demand for venture capital funds. Unpublished 
 Master Dissertation. U.K.: Manchester School of Management, University of 
 Manchester. 
 
Chan, Y. S., Siegel, D. and Thakor, A. V. (1990). “Learning corporate control and 
 performance requirements in venture capital contracts”. International 
 Economic Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 365-381. 
 
Chandler, A. (1982). Strategy and structure. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, (12th. 
 Printing).  
 
Clendenin, J. C. (1960). Introduction to investments. New York, Toronto, London: 
 McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., (Third Edition). 
 
Coakes, S. J. and Steed, L. G. (2001). SPSS: Analysis without anguish (Version 10.0 
 for Windows). John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd. 
 
Cohen, L. and Holliday, M. (1982). Statistics for social scientists. London: Harper & 
 Row.   
 
Comfrey, A. L. (1973). A first course in factor analysis. London: Academic Press. 
 
Cumming, D. J. (2000). “Is the optimality of conventional venture capital financial 
 contracts generalisable”. Mimeo, University of Alberta. 
 
______________(2001). “The determinants of venture capital portfolio size: 
 Empirical evidence”. Working Paper, University of Alberta. 
 
  
  
185 
Cumming, D. J. and MacIntosh, J. G. (2001). “Economic and institutional  determinants 
 of venture capital investment duration”. Mimeo, University of Alberta. 
 
______________(2000). “Venture capital exits in Canada and the United States”. 
 Working Paper, University of Alberta and University of Toronto. 
 
Cyert, R. and March, J. (1963). A behavioural theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, 
 New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.   
 
Demsetz, H. (1988). “Ownership, control and the firms”. The Organisation of 
 Economic Activity, Vol. 1. Basil Blackwell. 
 
Denscombe, M. (1998). The good research guide – For small-scale social research 
 projects. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press.  
 
Denzin, N. K. (1970). The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological 
 methods. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1st. Edition.  
 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). “Introduction: entering the field of qualitative 
 research” in N.K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook of qualitative 
 research. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.  
 
Dill, W. (1975). “Public participation in corporate planning: Strategic management in 
 Kibbitzer’s world”. Long Range Planning, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 57 – 63. 
 
Dillman, D. A. (1974). “Increasing mail questionnaire response: A four state 
 comparison”. American Sociological Review, October, pp. 744 – 756. 
 
Dixit, A. K. and Pindyck, R. S. (1994). Investment under uncertainty. Princeton, New 
 Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
 
Ehrlich, S. B., De Noble, A. F., Moore, T. and Weaver, R. R. (1994). “After the cash 
 arrives: A comparative study of venture capital and private investor 
 involvement in entrepreneurial firms”. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 9, 
 pp. 67 – 82. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). “Agency theory: An assessment and review”. Academy of 
 Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 57 – 74. 
 
Fama, E. (1980). “Agency problems and the theory of the firm”. Journal of Political 
 Economy, Vol. 88, No. 21, pp. 288 – 307. 
 
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. C. (1983). “Separation of ownership and control”. Journal of 
 Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 327 – 349. 
 
Ferguson, R. (1999). What’s in a location? Science parks and the support of new 
 technology-based firms. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Ultuna: Swedish 
 University of Agricultural Sciences. 
 
  
  
186 
Fiet, J. O. (1995). “Risk avoidance strategies in venture capital markets”. Journal of 
 Management Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, July, pp. 551 – 574. 
 
______________ (2000). “The theoretical side of teaching entrepreneurship”. Journal 
 of Business Venturing, Vol. 16, pp. 1 – 24. 
 
Francis, A. (1980). “Families, firms and finance capital: The development of UK 
 industrial firms with particular reference to their ownership and control”. 
 Sociology, Vol. 14. 
 
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Pitman 
 Books. 
 
Fried, V. and Hisrich, R. (1994). “Toward a model of venture capital investment 
 decision making”. Financial Management, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 28 – 37. 
 
Foster, J. J. (2001). Data analysis using SPSS for Windows Version 8 to 10: A 
 beginner’s guide. Sage Publications. 
 
Garnsey, E. (1998). “A theory of the early growth of the firm”. Industrial and 
 Corporate Change, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 523 – 556. 
 
Garvin, D. A. and Roberto, M. A. (2001). “What you don’t know about making 
 decisions”. Harvard Business Review, Vol. 79, No. 8, September, pp. 108 – 
 116. 
 
Gertler, M. (1992). “Financial capacity and output fluctuation in an economy with 
 multi-period financial relationship”. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, pp. 
 455 – 472. 
 
Giddens, A. (1974). (ed.). Positivism and sociology. London: Heinemann Educational.  
 
Gilder, G. (1989). Microcosm. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gladstone, D. (1988). Venture capital investing. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
 
Gompers, P. A. (1995). “Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture 
 capital”. The Journal of Finance, Vol. L, No. 5, December, pp. 1461 – 1489. 
 
Gompers, P. A. and Lerner, J. (1994). “An analysis of compensation in the U.S. venture 
 capital partnership”. Working paper No. 94-009, Harvard Business School. 
 
______________(1999). The venture capital cycle. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
______________(2001). “The venture capital revaluation”. Journal of Economic
 Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, 145 – 168. 
 
Gorman, M. and Sahlman, W. A. (1989). “What do venture capitalists do?”. Journal of 
 Business Venturing, Vol. 4, pp. 231 – 238. 
  
  
187 
Gower, S. M. and Harris, F. C. (1994). “The funding of, and investment in, British 
 science parks: A review”. Journal of Property Finance, Vol. 05, No. 3, pp. 7 
 – 18. 
 
______________(1996). “Evaluating British science parks as property investment 
 opportunities”. Journal of Property Valuation and Investment, Vol. 14, No. 2, 
 pp. 24 – 37. 
 
Greenwald, B., Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1984). “Information imperfections and 
 macroeconomic fluctuations”. American Economic Review, Vol. 74, pp. 194 – 
 199. 
 
Grosman, S. and Hart, O. (1983). “An analysis of the principal agent problem”. 
 Econometrica, Vol. 52, pp. 1 – 45. 
 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L. and Black, W. C. (1998). Multivariate data 
 analysis. Upper Sadle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall (5th. Edition). 
 
Hannan, M. T. and Freeman, J. (1989). Organizational ecology. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
Harding, R. (2000). “Venture capital and regional development: Towards a venture 
 capital ‘System’”. Venture Capital, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 287 – 311. 
 
Harrison, R. T. and Mason, C. M. (2000). “Editorial: The role of the public sector in the 
 development of a regional venture capital industry”. Venture Capital, Vol. 2, 
 No. 4, pp. 243 – 253. 
 
Hart, O. (1995). Firms contracts and financial structure. New York: Oxford University 
Press.   
 
Hellmann, T. F. (1998). “The allocation of control rights in venture capital 
 contracts”. Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 57 – 76. 
 
Higashide, H. and Birley, S. (2000). “The consequences of conflict between the 
 venture capitalist and the entrepreneurial team in the United Kingdom from 
 the perspective of the venture capitalist”.  Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 
 17, pp. 59 – 81. 
 
Higgins, B. and Savoie, D. J.  (1988). (eds.). Regional economic development. Great 
 Britain: Unwin Hyman Ltd.  
 
Hilferding, R. (1981). Finance capital. Routledge and Kegan. 
 
Hillier, B. (1997). The economics of asymmetric information. London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd.   
 
Hofer, C. and Schendel, D. (1978). Strategy formulation: Analytical concepts. St. Paul, 
Minn: West Publishing Company.  
  
  
188 
Houben, A. and Kakes, J. (2001). “Fostering the new economy: The role of financial 
 intermediation”. A Paper for the Monetary & Economic Policy Department, De 
 Nederlandsche Bank. 
 
Hughes, J. A. (1976). Sociological analysis, methods and discovery. Thomas Nelson 
 & Sons Ltd. 
 
Hurry, D., Miller, A. T. and Bowman, E. H. (1992). “Calls on high-technology: 
 Japanese exploration of venture capital investments in the United States”. 
 Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13, pp. 85 – 101. 
 
Jean Lee, S. K. (1992). “Quantitative versus qualitative research methods – Two 
 approaches to organisation studies”.  Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 
 19, No. 1, April. 
 
Jeng, L. and Wells, P. (2000). “The determinants of venture capital funding: Evidence 
 across countries”. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 6, pp. 241 – 289. 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1994). “Self-interest, altruism, and agency theory”. Journal of Applied 
 Corporate Finance, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 40 – 45. 
 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). “The theory of the firm: Managerial 
 behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure”. Journal of Financial 
 Economics, Vol. 3, October, pp. 305 – 360. 
 
Jick, T. D. (1979). “Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in 
 action” in J. Van Maanen, (ed.). Qualitative methodology. Sage Publications. 
 
Jomo K. S. and Felker, G. (1999). (eds.). Technology, competitiveness and the state: 
 Malaysia’s industrial technology policies. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Jorgenson, D. (1963). “Capital market theory and investment behaviour”. American 
 Economic Review, May. 
 
Kaiser, H. F. (1974). “An index of factorial simplicity”. Psychometrika, Volume 35, pp. 
401 – 415. 
 
Kanapathy, V. (2001). “Industrial restructuring in Malaysia: Policy shifts and the 
 promotion of new sources of growth” in S. Masuyama, D. Vandenbrink and 
 C. S. Yue, (eds.). Industrial restructuring in East Asia: Towards the 21st. 
 century. Nomura Research Institute (NRI), Tokyo and Institute of Southeast 
 Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, Tokyo Club Foundation for Global Studies. 
 
Kanter, R. M., Stein, B. A. and Jick, T. D. (1992). The challenge of organisational 
change: How companies experience it and leaders guide it. New York: The 
Free Press.   
 
  
  
189 
Kaplan, S. N. and Per Stromberg (2000a). “Financial contracting theory meets the 
 real world: An empirical analysis of venture capital contracts”. Working Paper, 
 University of Chicago. 
 
______________(2000b). “How do venture capitalists choose and manage their 
 investments?”. Working Paper, University of Chicago. 
 
______________ (2001). “Venture capitalists as principals: Contracting, screening 
 and monitoring”. American Economic Review, May. 
 
Kaplan, S. N. and Zingales, L. (1997). “Do financing constraints explain why 
 investment is correlated with cash flow?”. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
 Vol. 112, pp. 169 – 215. 
 
Kenney, M. (2001). “Regional clusters, venture capital and entrepreneurship: What can 
the social sciences tell us about Silicon Valley?”.  Retrieved on 19 November 
2001 from http://hcd.ucdavis.edu/Faculty/kenney/vita/Reg.html. 
 
Kenney, M., Han, K., and Tanaka, S. (2002). “Scattering geese: The venture capital 
 industries of East Asia”. A Report to the World Bank, BRIE Working Paper 
 146. 
 
Kinefuchi, M. K. (1986). The role of venture capital in supporting innovative risk-
taking in the United States and Japan: A comparative study. Centre for Japan-
US Relations, International University of Japan, No. 6. 
 
Kitamura, T. (2001). “Financial systems and foreign exchange transactions in Central 
 Asia”. GITI Research Bulletin 2000 – 2001, Global Information and 
 Telecommunication Institute, Waseda University, pp. 31 – 41. 
 
______________(2002). “Financial reform in Uzbekistan”. GITI Research Bulletin 
 2001 – 2002, Global Information and Telecommunication Institute, Waseda 
 University, pp. 55 – 61. 
 
Lerner, J. (1995). “Venture capitalists and the oversight of private firms”. The Journal 
 of Finance, Vol. L, No. 1, March, pp. 301 – 318. 
 
______________(1999). “The government as venture capitalist: The long-run impact 
 of the SBIR program”. Journal of Business, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 285 – 318. 
 
______________(2000). “Small business, innovation, and public policy in the 
 information technology industry” in E. Brynjolfsson and B. Kahin, (eds.), 
 Understanding the digital economy. Cambridge: The MIT Press.  
 
Libecup, G. D. (1986). “The dialogue on venture capital markets” in G. Libecup, (ed.), 
 Advances in the study of entrepreneurship, innovation, and economic 
 growth: A research annual, Volume 1, pp. 71 – 78. JAI Press Inc.  
 
Litterer, J. A. (1965). The analysis of organizations. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 
  
  
190 
Machlup, F. (1967). “Theories of the firm: Marginalists, behavioural, managerial”. 
 American Economic Review, Vol. LVII, No. 1, March, pp. 1 – 33. 
 
MacMillan, I. C., Siegel, R. and Subbanarasimha, P. N. (1985). “Criteria used by 
 venture capitalists to evaluate new venture proposals”. Journal of Business 
 Venturing, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 119 – 128. 
 
MacMillan, I. C., Zemann, L. and Subbanarasimha, P. N. (1987). “Criteria 
distinguishing successful from unsuccessful ventures in the venture screening 
process”. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 2, pp. 123 –137. 
 
MacMillan, I. C., Kulow, D. M. and Khoylian, R. (1988). “Venture capitalists’ 
involvement in their investments: Extent and performance”. Journal of 
Business Venturing, Vol. 4, pp. 27 – 47. 
 
Maddala, G. S. (1977). Econometrics. McGraw-Hill International Book Company. 
 
McNally, K. (1995). “Corporate venture capital: The financing of technology 
 businesses”. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, 
 Vol. 01, No. 3, pp. 9 – 43. 
 
Mani, S. and Bartzokas, A. (2002). “Institutional support for investment in new 
 technologies: The role of venture capital institutions in developing  countries”. 
 The United Nations University, INTECH, Discussion Paper Series, No. 2002 – 4, 
 May. 
 
Mansell, R. and Wehn, U. (1998). (eds.). Knowledge societies: Information 
 technology for sustainable development. United Nations Commission on 
 Science and Technology for Development. Oxford University Press. 
 
Marris, R. (1964). The economic theory of managerial capitalism. London: Macmillan.  
 
Massey, D., Quintas, P. and Wield, D. (1992). High-tech fantasies: Science parks in 
 society, science and space. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Masuyama, S. and Vandenbrink, D. (2001). “Industrial restructuring in East Asian 
 economies for the twenty-first century” in S. Masuyama, D. Vandenbrink  and C. 
 S. Yue, (eds.), Industrial restructuring in East Asia: Towards the 21st.century. 
 Nomura Research Institute (NRI), Tokyo and Institute of Southeast Asian 
 Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, Tokyo Club Foundation for Global Studies. 
 
Megginson, W. C. and Weiss, K. A. (1991). “Venture capitalist certification in initial 
 public offerings”. Journal of Finance, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, July, pp. 879 - 903. 
 
Meyer, J. R. and Glauber, R. R. (1964). “Investment decisions, economic forecasting, 
 and public policy”. Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of 
 Research. Boston: Harvard University. 
 
  
  
191 
Miles, M. B. (1983). “Qualitative data as an attractive nuisance: The problem of 
 analysis” in J. Van Maanen, (ed.), Qualitative methodology. Sage Publications. 
 
Miller, R. and Cote, M. (1987). Growing the next Silicon Valley: A guide for 
 successful regional planning. Lexington Books. 
 
Milliband, R. (1973). The state in capitalist society. London: Quartet Books.  
 
Mintzberg, H. (1973). The nature of managerial work. New York: Harper and Row.  
 
______________(1983). Power in and around organizations. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Mitchell, F., Reid, G. C. and Terry, N. G. (1995). “Post investment demand for 
 accounting information by venture capitalists”. Accounting and Business 
 Research, Vol. 25, No. 99, pp. 186 –196. 
 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958). “The cost of capital, corporation finance, and 
 the theory of investment”. American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, June, 
 pp. 261 – 297. 
 
Molnar, J. J. and Rogers, D. L. (1979). “A comparative model of interorganizational 
 conflict”. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, pp. 405 – 424. 
 
Murray, G. (1994). “The second equity gap: Exit problems for seed and early stage 
venture capitalists and their investee companies”. International Small Business 
Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 59 – 76. 
 
Murray, G. C. (1995). “Evolution and change: An analysis of the first decade of the 
 UK venture capital industry”. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
 Vol. 22, No. 8, December, pp. 1077 – 1106. 
 
Myers, S. C. (1984). “The capital structure puzzle”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, pp. 
 575 – 592. 
 
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. (1984). “Corporate financing and investment decisions 
 when firms have information that investors do not have”. Journal of Financial 
 Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 187 – 221. 
 
Nachmias, C. F. and Nachmias, D. (1996). Research methods in the social sciences. St. 
Martin’s Press Inc., Arnold. (5th. Edition). 
 
Norusis, M. J. (1983). SPSSx introductory statistics guide. SPSS Inc. McGraw-Hill 
 Book Company. 
 
______________(1988). SPSSx advanced statistics guide. SPSS Inc. McGraw-Hill 
 Book Company. 
 
  
  
192 
Olson, D. E. (1998). Agency theory extensions: The impacts of board demography in 
 banks and independent colleges. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, the 
 University of Arizona, Arizona. 
 
Oppenheim, A. N. (1966). Questionnaire design and attitude measurement. London: 
Heinemann.  
 
Paqvalen, K. K. (2001). “How does the venture capitalist - entrepreneur relationship 
 translate to the performance of the venture?”. Seminar Paper, Helsinki 
 University of Technology, Institute of Strategy and International Business, 
 Espoo, Finland. 
 
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. New York: John Wiley. 
 
Pfirrmann, O., Wupperfeld, U. and Lerner, J. (1997). “Venture capital and new 
technology based firms: An US-German comparison”. Series of the Fraunhofer 
Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI). Germany: Physica-Verlag 
Heidelberg. 
 
Phillips, E. M. and Pugh, D. S. (2000). How to get a PhD: A handbook for students and 
their supervisors. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press, (Third 
Edition). 
 
Pitelis, C. N. (1987). Corporate capital: Control, ownership, saving and crisis. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Poindexter, E. A. (1976). The efficiency of financial markets: The venture capital case. 
 Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, New York: New York University.  
 
Porter, M. E.  (1980). Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and 
 competitors. New York: The Free Press. 
 
______________(1985). Competitive advantage: Creating and sustaining superior 
 performance. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Plummer, J. L. (1987). “QED Report on Venture Capital Financial Analysis”. Palo Alto, 
California: QED Research Inc.  
 
Reid, G. C. (1998). Venture capital investment: An agency analysis of practice. 
 London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Robbins, S. P. (1982). Organization theory: The structure and design of organizations. 
 Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.  
 
Roscoe, J. T. (1975). Fundamental research statistics for the behavioural sciences. New 
 York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. (2nd. Edition). 
 
  
  
193 
Rosenberg, N. (1986). “Technological innovation and economic growth” in G. 
 Libecup, (ed.), Advances in the study of entrepreneurship, innovation, and 
 economic growth: A research annual. Volume 1, pp. 11 – 24. JAI Press Inc.  
 
Sagari, S. B. and Guidotti, G. (1992). “Venture capital: Lessons from the developed 
 world for the developing markets”. Discussion Paper No. 13, International 
 Finance Corporation (IFC), The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 
Sahlman, W. A. (1990). “The structure and governance of venture-capital 
 organisations”. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 473 – 521. 
 
Sapienza, H. J. and Gupta, A. K. (1994). “The impact of agency risks and task 
 uncertainty on venture capitalist-CEO interaction”. Academy of Management 
 Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 1618 – 1632. 
 
Sappington, D. E. M. (1991). “Incentives in principal-agent relationships”. Journal of 
 Economics Perspectives, Vol. 5, pp. 45 – 66. 
 
Schertler, A. (2000). “Venture capital contracts: A survey of the recent literature”. 
 Kiel Working Paper No. 1017, December. 
 
Securities Commission (2003). Annual report 2003. Kuala Lumpur: SC. 
 
Sekaran, U. (1992). Research methods for business: A skill-building approach. John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2nd. Edition). 
 
Selltiz, C., Marie, J., Morton, D. and Stuart, C. (1962). Research methods in social 
 relations. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson Inc.  
 
Seta, F., Onishi, T. and Kidokoro, T. (2001). “Study about locational tendency of IT 
 companies in city centres and suburbs – Case study of Malaysia”. The 
 University of Tokyo (or Korea Planners Association, Proceedings of 
 International Symposium on Urban Planning 2001, pp. 257 – 266, Taejong, 
 Korea).  
 
Silverman, D. (1985). Qualitative methodology and sociology. Gower Publishing Co. 
 
Simon, H. A. (1960). The new science of management decision. New York: Harper and 
 Brothers.  
 
______________(1979). “Rational decision making in business organizations”. 
 American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 4, September, pp. 493 – 513. 
 
Smith, H. (1975). Strategies of social research: The methodological imagination. 
 Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
 
Snow, C. C. and Hrebiniak, L. G. (1980). “Strategy, distinctive competence, and 
 organisational performance”. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, 
 June. 
  
  
194 
Sohaimi M. S. (2002). “Malaysia’s national information infrastructure: Issues and 
 challenges of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)”. GITI Research Bulletin 
 2001 – 2002, Global Information and Telecommunication Institute, Waseda 
 University, pp. 135 – 148. 
 
______________(2003a). “Financing ICT companies: The experience of Multimedia 
 Super Corridor (MSC), Malaysia”. GITS/GITI Research Bulletin 2002 – 2003, 
 Graduate School of Global Information and Telecommunication Studies & 
 Global Information and Telecommunication Institute, Waseda University, pp. 
 140 – 148. 
 
______________(2003b). “The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) and E-Government 
 initiatives in Malaysia”. A Paper presented at the 3rd. ITU-Waseda University 
 International Workshop for Policy Makers and Regulators 2003 held at Waseda 
 University, October 27, 2003. 
 
______________(2004). “The Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC): Progress 
 and prospects” in Islam & ICT: Diversity & possibility of the Islamic science 
 & technology. Waseda University/United Nations Educational, Scientific & 
 Cultural Organization (UNESCO), pp. 91 – 102. 
 
Sommer, R. and Sommer, B. B. (1980). A practical guide to behavioural research, 
 tools and techniques. Oxford University Press. 
 
Sweeting, R. C. (1991). “UK venture capital funds and the funding of new 
 technology-based businesses: Process and relationships”. Journal of 
 Management Studies, Vol. 28, No. 6, November, pp. 601 – 622. 
 
Sykes, H. B. (1990). “Corporate venture capital: Strategies for success”. Journal of 
 Business Venturing, Vol. 5, pp. 37 – 47. 
 
Tether, B. S. (1997). “Growth diversity amongst innovative and technology based 
 new and small firms: An interpretation”. New Technology Work and 
 Employment, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 91 – 109. 
 
Tether, B. S. and Massini, S. (1998). “Employment creation in small technological and 
 design innovators in the UK during the 1980s”. Small Business Economics, 
 Vol. 11, pp. 353 – 370. 
 
The Bank of England (2001). “Financing of technology-based small firms”. Retrieved 
on 10 December 2001 from http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/hightech2001.pdf. 
 
The Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001 – 2005, (2001). Prime Minister’s Department, Malaysia, 
pp. 413 – 427. Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Berhad. 
 
The First Industrial Master Plan, 1986 – 1995, (1986). Ministry of International Trade 
 and Industry (MITI), Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur. 
 
  
  
195 
The JBIC (2001). “Issues of sustainable development in Asian Countries: Focused on 
 SMIs in Malaysia”. JBIC Research Paper No. 8 -2,  Research Institute for 
 Development and Finance, Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). 
 
The Malaysian Venture Capital Association (MVCA), Retrieved on several dates from 
http://www.mvca.org.my. 
 
The Ministry of Education (MOE) and Multimedia Development Corporation (1999). 
 The Information Technology (IT) & Human Resources (HR) Survey. Kuala 
 Lumpur. 
 
The Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. Retrieved on several dates from  
http://www.treasury.gov.my. 
 
The Multimedia Development Corporation [MDC], Malaysia. Retrieved on several 
dates from http://www.mdc.com.my. 
 
______________(2002). Funding guide & Directory for the ICT/Multimedia industry. 
Kuala Lumpur: MDC (1st. Edition). 
 
______________(2003), MSC Impact Survey 2002. Kuala Lumpur: MDC. 
 
The Second Industrial Master Plan, 1996 – 2005, (1996). Ministry of International 
 Trade and Industry (MITI), Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur. 
 
The Star Online (2002). “Be more flexible, VCs rapped”. Retrieved on 16 July 2002 
from http://star-techcentral.com/tech/story.asp?file=/2002/7/15/ technology/ 
12mem 
 
Thomas, R. E. (1983). Business policy. Oxford: Philip Allan Publishers Ltd. (Second 
Edition).    
 
Timmons, J. A. and Bygrave, W. D. (1986). “Venture capital’s role in financing 
 innovation for economic growth”. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 1, pp. 
 161 – 176. 
 
Tobin, J. (1969). “A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory”. Journal of 
 Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 1, February, pp. 15 – 29. 
 
Trester, J. J. (1993). “Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information”. 
 Working Paper, The Wharton Financial Institutions Center, University of 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
Tyebjee, T. T. and Bruno, A.V. (1984). “A model of venture capitalists investment 
 activity”. Management Science, Vol. 30, No. 9, September, pp. 1051 – 1066. 
 
Van Maanen, J. (1983). (ed.). Qualitative methodology. Sage Publications. 
 
  
  
196 
Van Osnabrugge, M. (2000). “A comparison of business angel and venture capitalist 
 investment procedures: An agency theory-based analysis”. Venture Capital, 
 Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 91 – 109. 
 
Van Osnabrugge, M. and Robinson, R. J. (2000). Angel investing: Matching start-up 
 funds with start-up companies – The guide for entrepreneurs, individual 
 investors, and venture capitalists. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers.  
 
Wells, W. A. (1974). Venture capital decision-making. Unpublished Doctoral 
 Dissertation, Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University.  
 
Williams, B. R. and Scott, W. P. (1965). Investment proposals and decisions. George 
 Allen and Unwin Ltd. 
 
Williamson, J. B., Karp, D. A. and Dalphin, J. R. (1977). The research craft: An 
introduction to social science methods. Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1970). Corporate control and business behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.   
 
______________(1979). “Transaction-cost economics: The governance of 
 contractual relations”. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 233 – 261. 
 
Wright, M., Robbie, K., Romanet, Y., Thompson, S., Joachimsson, R., Bruining, J. and 
 Herst, A. (1993). “Harvesting and the longevity of management buy-outs and 
 buy-ins: A four-country study”. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, Vol. 
 18, Winter, pp. 90 – 109. 
 
Wright, M. and Robbie, K. (1997). Venture capital. London: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company Limited. 
 
______________(1996). “Venture capitalists, unquoted equity investment appraisal 
 and the role of accounting information”. Accounting and Business Research, 
 Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 153 – 168. 
 
Yin, R. K. (1989). “Case study research: Design and methods”. Applied Social 
 Research Methods Series, Vol. 5. Sage Publications Inc. (Revised Edition). 
 
______________(1994). Case study research: Design and methods. Newbury Park, CA
 Sage Publications Inc. (2nd. Edition). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
197 
LIST OF ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
Theses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lectures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O  ‘Venture Capital Financing for ICT Venture Businesses: A Case 
Study of Malaysia’ published in the Journal of International Business 
& Entrepreneurship (JIBE) by the Malaysian Entrepreneurship 
Development Center (MEDEC), MARA University of Technology  – 
(July 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 37 - 70) [Publication number: ISSN 
0128 – 7494]. 
 
O ‘Venture Capital Financing: Managerial Factors and 
Management Conflict in the ICT Industry’ published in the 
Malaysian Management Review by the Malaysian Institute of 
Management, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (June 2004, Vol. 39, pp. 94 - 
106) [Publication number: ISSN 0025 – 1348].  
 
O ‘Recognition of Managerial Factors and Agency Conflict in ICT 
Industry’ for the INTAN Management Journal by the National 
Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia  
– (Forthcoming Vol. 7, 2004) [Publication number: ISSN 0128 – 
3324]- due to be printed. 
 
‘A Situational Analysis of the Malaysia’s Venture Capital Industry’ 
for the Journal of Information Technology & Multimedia by the 
National University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia  – 
(reviewing) [Publication number: ISSN 1675 – 2031]. 
 
‘Venture Capital Financing in a Technology Park: A Case Study of 
the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)’ for the Journal of Information 
Technology & Multimedia by the National University of Malaysia, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia  – (reviewing) [Publication number: ISSN 
1675 – 2031]. 
 
‘Venture Capital Financing: Stakeholders’ Characteristics and 
Agency Conflict in ICT Industry, Malaysia’ for The Developing 
Economies Journal by the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE)-
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) – (reviewing) 
[Publication number: ISSN 0012 – 1533]. 
 
 
 
a. “Venture Capital Financing: Managerial Factors and 
Management Conflict in ICT Industry” on September 3, 2004 in the 
GITS’s public hearing for Doctoral Dissertation Presentation, Room 
#224 (2F), Building 29 - 7, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
b. “Venture Capital Financing: Managerial Factors and 
Management Conflict in ICT Industry” on June 10, 2004 in the 
GITS’s public hearing for Doctoral Dissertation Presentation, Room 
#509 (5F), Building 19, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. “Venture Capital Financing: Managerial Factors and 
Management Conflict in ICT Industry” on May 19, 2004 in the 
GITS’s Meeting for Doctoral Dissertation Presentation, Room N206, 
GITS, Honjou Campus, Japan. 
 
 
d.  “Venture Capital Financing in a Technology Park: A Case Study 
of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)” on March 3, 2004 in the 
jointly organized Waseda University-MMU International workshop 
held in the Malaysia Multimedia University (MMU), Cyberjaya, 
Malaysia. 
 
e.  “Venture Capital Financing in a Technology Park: A Case Study 
of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)” on February 27, 2004 in 
the GITS’s Meeting for Doctoral Dissertation Presentation, Room # 
509 (5F), Building 19, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
f.  “The Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC): Progress 
and Prospects” on November 2, 2003 in the Third International 
Symposium of “Islam & Information-Telecommunication 
Technology: Diversity & Possibility of the Islamic Science & 
Technology” hosted by GITI/Institute of Islamic Sciences (IIS), 
Waseda University held at the Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
g.  “The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) and E-Government 
Initiatives in Malaysia” on October 27, 2003 in the 3rd. ITU-Waseda 
University International Workshop for Policy Makers and Regulators 
2003 held at the Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
h. “Venture Capital Financing: Managerial Factors and 
Management Conflict in ICT Industry” on October 11, 2003 in the 
academic conference of the Japan Association for Social Informatics 
(JASI) held at the Tokyo University of Technology, Hachioji, Japan. 
 
i.  “Issues and Challenges of the Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC)” in the GITS’s Meeting for Doctoral Dissertation Presentation 
on November 8, 2002 held at the Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
j.  “Malaysia’s National Information Infrastructure (NII): Issues 
and Challenges of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)” in the 
Japan Section of the Regional Science Association International 
(JSRSAI) academic meeting on October 6, 2002 held at Sapporo, 
Hokkaido, Japan. 
 
 
 
a.  “The Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC): Progress 
and Prospects” published in the book on “Islam & ICT: Diversity & 
Possibility of the Islamic Science & Technology” by the Waseda 
University/United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) 2004; pp. 91 - 102. 
 
 
  
  
199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Others 
 
 
 
b. “Financing ICT Companies: The Experience of Multimedia 
Super Corridor (MSC), Malaysia” published in the GITS/GITI 
Research Bulletin 2002 – 2003, Graduate School of Global 
Information and Telecommunication Institute, Waseda University; pp. 
140 - 148. 
 
c. “Malaysia’s National Information Infrastructure: Issues and 
Challenges of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC)” published in 
the GITI Research Bulletin 2001 – 2002, Global Information and 
Telecommunication Institute, Waseda University; pp.135 - 148. 
 
d. “Venture Capital Financing: Managerial Factors and 
Management Conflict in ICT Industry” published in the proceedings 
text of the academic conference of the Japan Association for Social 
Informatics (JASI) held on October 10-11, 2003, at the Tokyo 
University of Technology, Hachioji, Japan; pp. 105 - 110. 
 
e. “The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) and E-Government 
Initiatives in Malaysia” for the 3rd. ITU-Waseda University 
International Workshop for Policy Makers and Regulators 2003 
submitted to the GITS Research Bulletin 2004, [Forthcoming 2004] – 
due to be printed. 
 
 
Panelist in the Public Symposium on “Large-scale National Project: 
the Case of Malaysia” during the 3rd. International Symposium of 
Islam and Information-Telecommunication Technology: Diversity and 
Possibility of the Islamic Science and Technology held on November 
2, 2003 at the International Conference Center, Waseda University. 
?
 
